

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Further Develop a Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework for Electric and Gas Utilities.

R.20-07-013  
(Filed July 16, 2020)

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**NOT CONSOLIDATED**

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Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (U 39 M) to Submit Its 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report.

A.20-06-012  
(Filed on June 30, 2020)

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Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company for Authority, Among Other Things, to Increase Rates and Charges for Electric and Gas Service Effective on January 1, 2023.

A.21-06-021  
(Filed on June 30, 2021)

(U 39 M)

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**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S (U39M)  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT**

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Dated: September 30, 2022

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
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Order Instituting Rulemaking to Further Develop a Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework for Electric and Gas Utilities.	R.20-07-013 (Filed July 16, 2020)
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**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY’S (U39M)  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT**

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) hereby submits this semi-annual Safety and Operational Metrics Report in compliance with California Public Utilities Commission Decision (D.) 21-11-009. This is PG&E’s second such report and covers the period from January 1 to June 30, 2022. The report is provided as Attachment 1.

PG&E’s first report was submitted on April 1, 2022. To assist in the review of this second report, PG&E has identified material changes from the first report in blue font and, at the start of each chapter, PG&E has identified where those material changes are to be found. PG&E



**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**ATTACHMENT 1**

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**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT**  
**SEPTEMBER 30, 2022**

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT  
SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

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**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**CHAPTER 1**  
**INTRODUCTION**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
3   **CHAPTER 1**  
4   **INTRODUCTION**

5           For this report, Pacific Gas and Electric Company is identifying material changes  
6 from the April 1, 2022, report in blue font. The material updates to this chapter can  
7           be found in Section D concerning performance against target.

8 **A. Introduction**

9           Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) respectfully  
10 submits this second semi-annual Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) Report.  
11 This report is submitted in compliance with California Public Utilities Commission  
12 (CPUC or Commission) Decision (D.) 21-11-009 concerning the Risk-Based  
13 Decision-Making Framework proceeding (Risk OIR).

14           At PG&E, nothing is more important than the safety of our customers,  
15 employees, contractors and communities. We strive to be the safest,  
16 most-reliable gas and electric Company in the United States. This SOM report  
17 demonstrates PG&E’s commitment to overseeing safe operations and, where  
18 needed, driving progress to reduce risk and improve performance. SOMs are  
19 embedded in our internal processes to give Company leaders visibility into  
20 performance to identify negative trends and take swift corrective actions to  
21 prevent harm. These metrics are central to safety performance across the  
22 Company.

23           PG&E has approached each SOM on a metric-by-metric basis. More  
24 specifically, PG&E evaluated our historical and current year (through June 30,  
25 2022) performance and available benchmarking data, and established objectives  
26 that align with our commitment to safety. For example, a metric where PG&E  
27 already performs in the first quartile may not demand dramatic improvement but  
28 could require consistent monitoring to ensure that performance remains at  
29 acceptable levels. For metrics that include Major Event Days (MED), PG&E will  
30 use the information to help ensure that our infrastructure is adaptable to an  
31 environment rapidly changing due to climate change. For some metrics, the  
32 Company has found opportunity to continue to drive safety performance through  
33 ongoing or future programs that are described in each chapter of this report.

1 **B. Background and Requirements**

2 As part of the decision for PG&E’s Plan of Reorganization (D.20-05-053),  
3 the Commission envisioned a set of metrics that provides a “holistic quantitative  
4 and qualitative 'indicator light' method” to evaluate key metrics directly  
5 associated with PG&E safe and operational performance.”

6 On November 9, 2021, through the Commission’s Risk OIR that began on  
7 November 17, 2020, the Commission approved D.21-11-009 establishing  
8 32 SOMs. Ordering Paragraph 5 of that decision requires that:

9 PG&E shall report its Safety and Operational Metrics as follows. PG&E  
10 shall, on a semi-annual basis, serve and file its SOMs report in Rulemaking  
11 20-07-013, any successor Safety Model Assessment Proceeding, and its  
12 most recent or current General Rate Case and Risk Assessment and  
13 Mitigation Phase proceedings starting March 31, 2022, and continuing  
14 annually at the end of September and March thereafter, with the March  
15 reports covering the 12 months of the previous calendar year (i.e., January  
16 through December) and the September reports providing data for January  
17 through June of the current year. PG&E shall concurrently send a copy of its  
18 semi-annual SOMs reports to the Director of the Commission’s Safety Policy  
19 Division and to RASA\_Email@cpuc.ca.gov. PG&E shall:

- 20 a) Report on each SOM, using data for the preceding 12 months and  
21 providing all available historical data;<sup>1</sup>
- 22 b) For each SOM, provide a proposed target for the year following the  
23 reporting period for each metric and a 5-year target, with the proposed  
24 target represented as specific values, ranges of values, a rolling  
25 average, or another specified target value, except for our final adopted  
26 SOM #s 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 for which PG&E may provide  
27 directional targets;
- 28 c) For each SOM, provide a narrative description of the rationale for  
29 selecting the target proposed and why a specific value, a range of  
30 values, a rolling average or another type of target is selected;
- 31 d) For each SOM, provide a narrative description of progress towards the  
32 proposed annual and 5-year targets;
- 33 e) For each SOM, provide a narrative description of any substantial  
34 deviation from prior trends based on quantitative and qualitative  
35 analysis, as applicable;
- 36 f) For each SOM, provide a brief description of current and future activities  
37 to meet the proposed targets; and

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1 An index of historical data files, provided by chapter, is included as Attachment A. PG&E will provide the data files to the Commission’s Safety Policy Division in Excel format at the time of filing.

- 1 g) Provide the Commission’s Safety and Policy Division with a copy of any  
2 report filed more frequently than semi-annually with the Commission that  
3 contains SOMs, at the same time the report is filed.<sup>2</sup>

4 This report outlines PG&E’s performance from January 1, 2022, through  
5 June 30, 2022, and is organized into 32 individual metric chapters as defined in  
6 Attachment A of D.21-11-009. Each chapter provides discussion on  
7 performance and progress against 1- and 5-year targets.

### 8 **C. PG&E’s Approach to Safety and Operational Metrics Target Setting**

9 PG&E’s approach to SOMs was developed around four pillars for  
10 developing targets that align with Commission’s objective for this report:

- 11 1) Targets should be set at levels indicating “insufficient progress” or “poor  
12 performance” within the context of the Enhanced Oversight and  
13 Enforcement Process;
- 14 2) Targets should be set at a reasonable and attainable level, including but not  
15 limited to the following considerations:
- 16 a) Historical data and trends;
  - 17 b) Benchmarking;
  - 18 c) Applicable federal, state, or regulatory requirements;
  - 19 d) Resources;
- 20 3) Targets should be set at levels where performance can be sustained over  
21 time; and
- 22 4) Targets should be set and evaluated in consideration of a holistic qualitative  
23 and quantitative view including additional contextual information and factors.

24 With these criteria, PG&E sought to develop targets for each metric that  
25 generally maintain performance for well-performing metrics or drive performance  
26 improvement to satisfactory levels of safe and reliable service. As required by  
27 the decision, within each metric chapter PG&E provides the rationale behind the  
28 selection of the 1- and 5-year targets.

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<sup>2</sup> Reports that meet this requirement are provided as Attachment B. PG&E understands this requirement to not include one-time event triggered reports (e.g., Electric Incident Reports). PG&E can provide such reports upon request. Note that PG&E provided quarterly reports as part of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan to the Commission through June 2021 but are now submitted to the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety. These reports can be found online at [PG&E’s Wildfire Mitigation Plan webpage](#).

1           On their own, metrics can fail to tell a complete story and may not provide  
2 crucial detail or context that is necessary for a proper evaluation of performance  
3 or progress. Recognizing that, the Commission’s decision requires PG&E to  
4 provide a narrative-driven report that gives the Commission further insight on  
5 how PG&E’s safety and operational programs are progressing towards targets  
6 or if performance is deviating from target and trend, and to state current and  
7 future activities that will drive performance towards target or trend.

8 **D. Summary of Metric Performance Against Targets**

9           Below is a summary of each metric performance and targets. [Some of the](#)  
10 [metric targets have been revised in response to feedback from Commission](#)  
11 [staff.](#)

12           The details for each metric can be found in each of the metric report  
13 chapters that follow.

**TABLE 1-1  
SUMMARY OF 2022 (JAN – JUN) METRIC PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS**

#	Metric	2022 (Jan – Jun) Performance	2022 Target	2026 Target
<b>Safety</b>				
1.1	Rate of Serious Injury or Fatality (SIF) Actual (Employee)	Rate: 0.046	Rate: 0.080	Rate: 0.060
1.2	Rate of SIF Actual (Contractor)	Rate: 0.040	Rate: 0.100	Rate: 0.100
1.3	SIF Actual (Public)	Confirmed: 2 Pending: 2	Decrease	Decrease
<b>Reliability</b>				
2.1	System Average Interruption Duration (Unplanned)	1.52 hrs.	5.67 – 6.8 hrs.	5.67 – 6.80 hrs.
2.2	System Average Interruption Frequency (Unplanned)	0.642 hrs.	1.681 – 2.017 hrs.	1.681 – 2.017 hrs.
2.3	System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas	0 outages due to 0 MEDs from January-June.	Maintain	Maintain
2.4	System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD Areas (Non-MEDs)	768 CESO	Range: 1,523 – 1,980 CESO	Range: 1,523 – 1,980 CESO
<b>Electric</b>				
3.1	Wires Down MED in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	0 wire down events due to 0 MEDs from January-June.	Maintain	Maintain
3.2	Wires Down Non-MED in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	9.3 WD events/1,000 mi.	41.45	38.24
3.3	Wires Down MED in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	0 wire down events due to 0 MEDs from January-June.	Maintain	Maintain
3.4	Wires Down Non-MED in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	0.72	≤4.456	≤4.456
3.5	Wires Down Red Flag Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	0 wire down events due to 0 MEDs from January-June.	Maintain	Maintain
3.6	Wires Down Red Flag Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	0 wire down events due to 0 MEDs from January-June	Maintain	Maintain

**TABLE 1-1  
SUMMARY OF 2022 (JAN – JUN) METRIC PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS  
(CONTINUED)**

#	Metric	2021 Performance	2022 Target	2026 Target
<b>Patrols and Inspections</b>				
3.7	Missed Overhead Distribution Patrols in HFTD Areas	0.00%	0.0% – 0.05%	0.0% – 0.02%
3.8	Missed Overhead Distribution Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas	0.00%	0.0% – 0.05%	0.0% – 0.02%
3.9	Missed Overhead Transmission Patrols in HFTD Areas	0.00%	0.0% – 0.05%	0.0% – 0.02%
3.10	Missed Overhead Transmission Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas	0.00%	0.0% – 0.05%	0.0% – 0.02%
3.11	GO-95 Corrective Actions in HFTDs	71.1%	70.0%	76.0%
3.12	Electric Emergency Response Time	Average: 30 min Median: 30 min	Average: 44 min Median: 43 min	Average: 44 min Median: 43 min
<b>Ignitions and Wildfire</b>				
3.13	Number of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	45	Range: 82 – 94	Range: 82 – 94
3.14	Percentage of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	1.78	Range: 3.24 – 3.72	Range: 3.24 – 3.72
3.15	Number of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	1	Range: 0 – 10	Range: 0 – 10
3.16	Percentage of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	0.72	0 – 1.75	0 – 1.75
<b>Gas</b>				
4.1	Number of Gas Dig-Ins per 1000 USA tickets on Transmission and Distribution pipelines	1.53	≤2.56	≤2.48
4.2	Number of Overpressure Events	4	≤11	≤9
4.3	Time to Respond On-Site to Emergency Notification	Average: 19.8 Median: 18.23	Average: ≤21.6 Median: ≤19.8	Average: ≤21.2 Median: ≤19.4



**TABLE 1-1  
SUMMARY OF 2022 (JAN – JUN) METRIC PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS  
(CONTINUED)**

#	Metric	2021 Performance	2022 Target	2026 Target
4.4	Gas Shut-In Times, Mains	76.4	≤85.4	≤83.4
4.5	Gas Shut-In Times, Services	37.0	≤40.4	≤39.6
4.6	Uncontrolled Release of Gas on Transmission Pipelines	1,258	≤3,545	≤3,405
4.7	Time to Resolve Hazardous Conditions	159.0	≤183.5	≤181.5
<b>Clean Energy</b>				
5.1	Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric	585.2	≥574	≥3,067
<b>Quality of Service</b>				
6.1	Quality of Service Metric	7 sec	15 sec	15 sec

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 1.1**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**RATE OF SIF ACTUAL**  
**(EMPLOYEE)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 1.1  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL  
(EMPLOYEE)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 1.1**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **RATE OF SIF ACTUAL**  
5   **(EMPLOYEE)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.1 concerning historical data; B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1  
8           and C.2 concerning metric targets; and Section D concerning performance against  
9           target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (1.1) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 1.1 – Rate of Serious Injury and  
13           Fatality (SIF) Actual (Employee) is defined as:

14           *Rate of SIF Actual (Employee) is calculated using the formula: Number*  
15           *of SIF-Actual cases among employees x 200,000/employee hours worked,*  
16           *where SIF Actual is counted using the methodology developed by the*  
17           *Edison Electric Institute’s (EEI) Occupational Safety and Health Committee*  
18           *(OS&HC).*

19       **2. Introduction of Metric**

20           Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E or the Company) safety  
21           stand is, “Everyone and Everything Is Always Safe.” This includes our  
22           employee and contractor workforce, as well as the public. We remain  
23           committed to building an organization where every work activity is designed  
24           to facilitate safe working conditions and every member of our workforce is  
25           encouraged to speak up if they see an unsafe or risky condition with the  
26           confidence that their concerns and ideas will be heard and addressed. As  
27           part of this stand, PG&E is committed to employee safety.

28           As defined by Decision (D.) 21-11-009, the SIF Actual (Employee) SOM  
29           calculation is new in application to PG&E’s existing injury and SIF dataset,  
30           and this report is the first year in which the data were analyzed and reported  
31           under this definition.

1 The EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria are updated annually based on  
2 additional learnings from injury classification to provide further clarification or  
3 criteria for the following year. PG&E is using this year's (2022) criteria,  
4 which can be found on the EEI website.<sup>1</sup> The 2022 EEI OS&HC criteria  
5 define serious injuries as follows:

- 6 1) Fatalities;
- 7 2) Amputations (involving bone);
- 8 3) Concussions and/or cerebral hemorrhages;
- 9 4) Injury or trauma to internal organs;
- 10 5) Bone fractures (certain types);
- 11 6) Complete tendon, ligament and cartilage tears of the major joints  
12 (e.g., shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle);
- 13 7) Herniated disks (neck or back);
- 14 8) Lacerations resulting in severed tendons and/or a deep wound requiring  
15 internal stitches;
- 16 9) Second- (10 percent body surface) or third-degree burns;
- 17 10) Eye injuries resulting in eye damage or loss of vision;
- 18 11) Injections of foreign materials (e.g., hydraulic fluid);
- 19 12) Severe heat exhaustion and all heat stroke cases;
- 20 13) Dislocation of a major joint (shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle);  
21 and  
22 a) Count only cases that required the manipulation or repositioning of  
23 the joint back into place under the direction of a treating doctor.
- 24 14) "Other Injuries" category should only be selected for reporting injuries  
25 not identified in the existing categories.

26 PG&E's SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a  
27 cause evaluation process for coworker serious safety incidents. This  
28 program was established to create consistency and guidance in classifying  
29 and evaluating serious safety incidents for all employees and contractors.  
30 The goal of PG&E's SIF Program is to reduce the number and severity of  
31 safety incidents that result in a SIF. The program objective is to learn from

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<sup>1</sup> The criteria can be found on the EEI website:  
[https://app.esafetyline.net/eeisafetysurvey/Downloads/h\\_sif.pdf](https://app.esafetyline.net/eeisafetysurvey/Downloads/h_sif.pdf).

1 prior safety incidents by performing cause evaluations on each SIF Actual  
2 (SIF-A) and SIF Potential (SIF-P) incident, implementing corrective actions,  
3 and sharing key findings across the enterprise.

4 From 2017 to 2020, PG&E classified SIF-A incidents based on the job  
5 task and whether a life altering, life threatening injury or fatality occurred. In  
6 August of 2020, PG&E adopted Edison Electric International’s Safety  
7 Classification Learning (SCL)<sup>2</sup> model to classify its SIF incidents. The EEI  
8 SCL model classifies incidents into categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),<sup>3</sup>  
9 Low-Energy SIF (LSIF),<sup>4</sup> Potential SIF (PSIF),<sup>5</sup> Capacity,<sup>6</sup> Exposure,<sup>7</sup>  
10 Success,<sup>8</sup> and Low Severity.<sup>9</sup> The HSIF terminology is fairly new to the  
11 industry; however, it is equivalent to a SIF-A with regard to how serious life  
12 threatening, life-altering or fatalities are determined. Adopting the EEI SCL  
13 model has improved the SIF Program by bringing a consistent and objective  
14 approach to reviewing and classifying SIF incidents across the Company  
15 and industry. The SCL model allows the Company to focus its safety and  
16 risk mitigation efforts on the most serious outcomes and highest risk work  
17 where a high energy incident occurred. The EEI SCL model is also used for  
18 the Employee SIF-A Safety Performance Metric (SPM) and is aligned with  
19 other California utilities.

---

2 EEI, SCL Model available here: <https://www.safetyfunction.com/scl-model>.

3 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: “Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained.”

4 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: “Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained.”

5 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: “Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained.”

6 *Id.* at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: “Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained.”

7 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: “Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control.”

8 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: “Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control.”

9 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: “Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained.”

1           The rate of SIF-A (Employee) SOM definition is based on the EEI  
2 OS&HC serious injury criteria,<sup>10</sup> which is different than the EEI SCL Model.  
3 It is suggested by EEI to use the OS&HC criteria in conjunction with the EEI  
4 SCL model. Therefore, using only the OS&HC serious injury criteria creates  
5 a different result in SIF-A classification from the expectation of using the EEI  
6 SCL model that includes high energy incidents.

7 **B. (1.1) Metric Performance**

8 **1. Historical Data (2017 – June 2022)**

9           PG&E is including five and a half years of historical data representing  
10 2017 – June 2022<sup>11</sup>. The dataset includes injury type, incident date,  
11 location, and EEI OS&HC injury classification. See Attachment 1 –  
12 Employee SIF-A SOM for a list of incidents. The last five and a half years of  
13 data are consistent with the start of the PG&E SIF Program.


14           Figure 1.1-1 illustrates the rate of employee injuries by year from 2017  
15 through June 2022. Between 2017 and June of this year there are a total of  
16 50 injuries that met the EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria. 52 percent of the  
17 injuries met the criteria of bone fracture, including of the hands and feet.  
18 [Five of the incidents were fatalities, one involved a violent act of a](#)  
19 [third party, three involved operations of motor vehicles, and one involved a](#)  
20 [pipeline drying \(pigging\) line of fire incident.](#)

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10 [EEI Occupational Safety and Health Committee's Serious Injury Criteria.](#)

11 Historical data through 2021 was provided in PG&E's first Safety and Operational Metrics report provided on April 1, 2022.

**FIGURE 1.1-1  
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (EMPLOYEE)  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE**



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                Injury data are collected by the Nurse Care Line (NCL). The NCL is an  
3        enhanced injury reporting process for improving the employee experience  
4        when reporting major and minor work-related injuries. The NCL allows  
5        employees to speak up, without fear, when faced with a work-related health  
6        challenge, strengthening the message that employee health is essential.  
7        Employees receive medical advice, self-care information and clinic referrals.  
8        For this review, injury data was pulled from PG&E’s Safety and  
9        Environmental Management System (SEMS) database, which houses all  
10        employee injury data.

11                As mentioned above, the SIF-A (Employee) SOM as defined in  
12        D.21-11-009 is new in application to PG&E’s existing injury and SIF dataset,  
13        and this is the first year in which the data were analyzed and reported under  
14        this definition. To evaluate the SIF-A (Employee) metric, PG&E reviewed all  
15        employee injury data from 2017- June 2022 to determine if any met the  
16        14 EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria as summarized above. To establish



1 historical performance for the first SOMs report submittal, PG&E reviewed  
2 approximately 18,000-line items of injury data. A substantial portion of those  
3 were not OSHA-recordable (i.e., self-care), which do not meet the definition  
4 and were removed from the population. The remaining population that met  
5 the OSHA definition (i.e., work-related injury) was reviewed against the EEI  
6 OS&HC serious injury criteria for this report.

### 7 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

8 For the first half of 2022, bone fractures continue to be the leading  
9 cause of injuries at 67 percent (4 of 6). These included bone fractures of the  
10 ankle, leg, and chest. On April 29, 2022, an incident involving a gas pipeline  
11 drying activity (pigging) conducted as part of a strength testing project  
12 resulted in a fatality and a serious injury.

## 13 **C. (1.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

### 14 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

15 PG&E has made changes to the rate of SIF-A (Employee) targets since  
16 the initial SOMs report filing last March. Based on historical performance,  
17 the 2023 target for rate of SIF-A (Employee) is to remain below a rate of  
18 0.070, which represents the second to third quartile threshold (see  
19 Figure 1.1-2 below). The target for 2024 through 2026 is to remain below a  
20 rate of 0.060, which is 0.010 below the second to third quartile threshold  
21 (Figure 1.1-2). As previously discussed, this metric calculation is new to  
22 PG&E and we are continuing to monitor the metric's trend and the  
23 appropriateness of the targets.

### 24 **2. Target Methodology**

25 To establish the 1-year and 5-year target thresholds, PG&E considered  
26 the following factors:

- 27 • Historical Data and Trends: PG&E pulled OSHA recorded injuries from  
28 2017 to 2021 to review each injury against the EEI OS&HC serious  
29 injury criteria. This injury dataset was used because it aligns with the  
30 beginning of the PG&E SIF Program (est. in 2017). Over that historical  
31 data period, performance showed a consistent trend at or around  
32 0.04 injury rate, with dip in 2019 and trend back up in 2020 and 2021;

- 1 • Benchmarking: In July 2022, PG&E met with EEI leadership and  
2 confirmed that OS&HC serious injury criteria benchmarking is available  
3 for the metric going back to 2017. PG&E used the prior years'  
4 benchmarking data from EEI and compared it to PG&E's performance  
5 going back to 2017. Between 2017 and 2020, PG&E hovered between  
6 the top of 1st quartile and low 2nd quartile. In 2021, PG&E ended the  
7 year in 2nd quartile, 1/100th of a point above the 1st quartile  
8 performance. PG&E's performance for 2022 is currently in the low end  
9 of 2<sup>nd</sup> quartile;
- 10 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 11 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes. The main focus  
12 for driving down injuries is noted below in planned/future work related to  
13 Days Away, Restricted and Transferred (DART) reduction;
- 14 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators: While the performance at or below  
15 the target threshold is sustainable, the more appropriate metric is to  
16 focus on injuries resulting from a high energy incident, which is  
17 consistent with both industry SIF-A monitoring and the SPM; and
- 18 • Other Qualitative Considerations: This target threshold approach was  
19 established to account for all job-related tasks with the potential to  
20 cause injury as defined by the EEI OS&HC criteria.

### 21 3. 2022 and 2026 Target

22 The initial 2022 and 2026 target thresholds were to maintain at a rate of  
23 less than 0.080. This target threshold rate for SIF-A (Employee)—using the  
24 EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria—allowed for no more than an increase  
25 of 0.038, as compared to highest rate from 2017 to 2021. The targets for  
26 2022 (1-year) and 2026 (5-year) used this same methodology. Rates are  
27 subject to change depending on number of employee hours worked in a  
28 given year. The target thresholds were set at the highest serious injury  
29 occurrence in one year that would be concerning if the rate was surpassed.  
30 Since this metric calculation is new to PG&E and this is the first year it is  
31 being reported, the threshold considered the past five years of historical  
32 data with an allowance for understanding this calculation and its  
33 consequences. The initial threshold allowed for almost double the rate over  
34 2021 and allowed PG&E to refine the new metric further. As mentioned

1 above, the initial rate would keep us in the top quartile of our proxy  
2 benchmark data calculations. This was also the same methodology used for  
3 SOM 1.2: SIF-A (Contractor), which keeps target setting consistent for both  
4 metric calculations.

5 As discussed in C.1. above, PG&E has modified it's 2023-2026 target  
6 thresholds to be in line with now known available benchmark data from EEI.  
7 Thus, the target thresholds for 2023-2026 have been modified to stay below  
8 the second and third quartile thresholds.

#### 9 **D. (1.1) Performance Against Target**


##### 10 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

11 As demonstrated in Figure 1.1-2 below, PG&E saw a slight increase in  
12 the Employee SIF Actual rate in the first half of 2022.

##### 13 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

14 As discussed in Section E below, and in consideration of the metric's  
15 trend, PG&E is continuing to deploy a number of programs to maintain or  
16 improve the long-term performance of this metric and to meet the  
17 Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 1.1-2  
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (EMPLOYEE)  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS**



**E. (1.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

- PG&E One Plan: PG&E’s safety strategy is continuing to evolve from the completion of the One PG&E Occupational Health and Safety Plan to the 2025 Workforce Safety Strategy which includes implementation of the PG&E Safety Excellence Management System (PSEMS) (formerly the Enterprise Safety Management System).
- PG&E Safety Excellence Management System (PSEMS): PSEMS is the systematic management of our processes, assets, and occupational health and safety programs to prevent injury and illness, effectively and safely control and govern our assets, and manage the integrity of operating systems and processes. PSEMS drives continuous improvement in four areas:
  - Asset Management;
  - Occupational Health & Safety;
  - Process Safety; and
  - Safety Culture.

- 1 • PG&E's Enterprise Health and Safety organization supports this metric  
2 through focusing on:
- 3 – Safety Leadership Development and Safety Culture;
  - 4 – Preventing workforce illness and injuries;
  - 5 – Governance, oversight, analytics, and reporting functions, including field  
6 safety support to drive strategy, programs, and continuous  
7 improvement;
  - 8 – SIF prevention and life safety
  - 9 – Safe operation of motor vehicles including regulatory compliance and  
10 governance;
  - 11 – Workforce health programs;
  - 12 – Field observations and inspection;
  - 13 – Assessing safety program impact; and
  - 14 – Incident investigations and human factor analyses.
- 15 • Regionalized Safety Directors: In 2021, PG&E regionalized its service  
16 territory to effectively and efficiently manage the workforce by balancing  
17 size, operational challenges such as wildfire risk, and complexity of issues.  
18 The regional field safety organization is led by five regional Safety Directors  
19 who work with the lines of business to advise on and support health and  
20 safety program implementation and sustainability including:
- 21 – Safety Culture Improvements;
  - 22 – Hazards Identification with the goal of reducing risk exposures;
  - 23 – Workforce observations and inspections;
  - 24 – Incident investigations;
  - 25 – Safety tailboards and training; and
  - 26 – Emergency preparation and response.
- 27 • Injury Management: The SIF-A (Employee) SOM definition includes injuries  
28 that can occur during any work activity (including low or no energy tasks  
29 such as lifting, walking, managing tools like knives), which is broader than  
30 the high energy incidents that a mature SIF Program focuses on. Therefore,  
31 a significant driver for improvement is within our occupational health  
32 organization where our OSHA and DART cases are managed. DART cases  
33 are employee OSHA-recordable injuries that involve Days Away from work  
34 and/or days on Restricted duty or a job Transfer because the employee is

1 no longer able to perform his or her regular job. Since 2019, there has been  
2 a 50 percent decrease in the employee DART rate (number of DART cases  
3 per 100 fulltime employees divided by number of hours worked). The efforts  
4 supporting this reduction include the expansion of PG&E's ergonomic  
5 programs and increased Industrial Athlete Specialists for job site  
6 evaluations. A primary goal of the efforts is reduced injury severity through  
7 injury prevention and early intervention care for employees. In alignment  
8 with this, we are strengthening the identification of the highest risk work  
9 groups and tasks for field and vehicle ergonomic injuries. We identify  
10 high-risk computer users through predictive modeling and provide targeted  
11 interventions. Additional efforts also include enhanced injury management  
12 containment for injuries at risk for escalation to DART and providing our  
13 people leaders with additional injury management training.

- 14 • Safety Leadership Development: PG&E is continuing to improve Safety  
15 Leadership Development and supervisor coaching by continuing to update  
16 an impactful, practical training course for front line leaders. The Safety  
17 Leadership development program provides training for crew leaders  
18 (i.e., those individuals who lead teams of front-line employees doing field  
19 operations and maintenance work) so they have the necessary safety skills  
20 to create trust, set expectations, remove barriers to safety and identify and  
21 mitigate at risk behaviors.
- 22 • Safety Observations: Safety Observations Program plays a critical role in  
23 helping to reduce employee and contractor injuries and fatalities by  
24 increasing awareness of hazards and exposures in the field, reinforcing  
25 positive work practices, and driving PG&E's Speak-Up culture. The  
26 Program includes the use of the SafetyNet observation tool,  
27 communications of top risks and barriers to senior leaders through the  
28 Safety Observations dashboards, promotion of continuous improvement,  
29 and communication of safety successes and improvement opportunities.
- 30 • Transportation Safety: PG&E Transportation Safety programs protect our  
31 employees and the public by establishing requirements and processes to  
32 control risks that can lead to motor vehicle accidents, improve safety  
33 performance, and increase awareness of all PG&E employees related to the  
34 operation of motor vehicles. This comprehensive program was established

1 to reduce the number of motor vehicle incidents that have the potential for  
2 serious injury, including fatal injury, to PG&E's employees, staff  
3 augmentation employees operating vehicles on Company business, and the  
4 public. Driver performance data are used to identify specific risk drivers for  
5 targeted intervention, including driver training and implementing vehicle  
6 safety technology. Additional Motor Vehicle Safety Incident risk reduction  
7 programs including cell phone blocking and in-cab camera technologies  
8 currently being piloted are discussed in the PG&E 2020 Risk Assessment  
9 and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) Report.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> PG&E 2020 RAMP Report, Chapter 18, Risk Mitigation Plan: Motor Vehicle Safety Incident.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 1.2**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**RATE OF SIF ACTUAL**  
**(CONTRACTOR)**



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 1.2  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL  
(CONTRACTOR)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 1.2**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **RATE OF SIF ACTUAL**  
5   **(CONTRACTOR)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.1 concerning historical data; Section C.1 and C.2 concerning metric  
8           targets; and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes  
9                                   from the prior report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (1.2) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 1.2 – Rate of Serious Injury and/or  
13           Fatality (SIF) Actual (Contractor) is defined as:

14                   *Rate of SIF Actual (Contractor) is calculated using the formula: Number*  
15                   *of SIF-Actual cases among contractors x 200,000/contractor hours worked,*  
16                   *where SIF-Actual is counted using the methodology developed by the*  
17                   *Edison Electrical Institute’s (EEI) Occupational Safety and Health*  
18                   *Committee (OS&HC).*

19       **2. Introduction of Metric**

20           Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E or the Company) safety  
21           stand is “Everyone and Everything is Always Safe.” Nothing is more  
22           important than our goal of continued risk reduction to keep our customers,  
23           and the communities we serve as well as our workforce (employees and  
24           contractors) safe. PG&E employees and contractors must understand that  
25           their actions reflect this priority. Our safety culture begins with each of us  
26           individually and extends to our coworkers and our communities. As part of  
27           this stand, PG&E is committed to contractor safety.

28           As defined in Decision (D.) 21-11-009, the SIF Actual (Contractor) SOM  
29           calculation is new in application to PG&E’s existing injury and SIF dataset,  
30           and this report is the first year in which the data were analyzed and reported  
31           under this definition.

1           The EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria are updated annually based on  
2 additional learnings from injury classification to provide further clarification or  
3 criteria for the following year. PG&E is using this year's (2022) criteria,  
4 which can be found on the EEI website.<sup>1</sup> The 2022 OS&HC criteria define  
5 serious injuries as follows:

- 6           1) Fatalities;
- 7           2) Amputations (involving bone);
- 8           3) Concussions and/or cerebral hemorrhages;
- 9           4) Injury or trauma to internal organs;
- 10          5) Bone fractures (certain types);
- 11          6) Complete tendon, ligament and cartilage tears of the major joints  
12           (e.g., shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle);
- 13          7) Herniated disks (neck or back);
- 14          8) Lacerations resulting in severed tendons and/or a deep wound requiring  
15           internal stitches;
- 16          9) 2nd (10 percent body surface) or 3rd degree burns;
- 17          10) Eye injuries resulting in eye damage or loss of vision;
- 18          11) Injections of foreign materials (e.g., hydraulic fluid);
- 19          12) Severe heat exhaustion and all heat stroke cases;
- 20          13) Dislocation of a major joint (shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle):  
21           a) Count only cases that required the manipulation or repositioning of  
22           the joint back into place under the direction of a treating doctor;
- 23          14) "Other Injuries" category should only be selected for reporting injuries  
24           not identified in the existing categories.

25           PG&E's SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a  
26 cause evaluation process for coworker serious safety incidents. When it  
27 was deployed only contractor incidents that resulted in a SIF Actual (fatality  
28 or serious injury that was defined as life threatening or life altering) were  
29 investigated by PG&E and entered into the Corrective Action Program  
30 (CAP). The contractor was responsible for investigating all other incidents  
31 and reporting back to PG&E, but those incidents were not entered into CAP.

---

<sup>1</sup> The criteria can be found on the EEI website: [EEI Occupational Safety and Health Committee's Serious Injury Criteria](#).

1 From 2017 to 2020, PG&E classified SIF Actual (SIF-A) incidents based  
2 on the job task and whether a life altering, life threatening injury or fatality  
3 occurred. In August of 2020, PG&E adopted EEI Safety Classification  
4 Learning (SCL)<sup>2</sup> model to classify its SIF incidents. The EEI SCL model  
5 classifies incidents into categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),<sup>3</sup> Low-Energy  
6 SIF (LSIF),<sup>4</sup> Potential SIF (PSIF),<sup>5</sup> Capacity,<sup>6</sup> Exposure,<sup>7</sup> Success<sup>8</sup> and  
7 Low Severity.<sup>9</sup> The HSIF terminology is fairly new to the industry; however,  
8 it is equivalent to a SIF-A with regard to how serious life threatening,  
9 life-altering or fatalities are determined. Adopting the EEI SCL model has  
10 improved the SIF Program by bringing a consistent and objective approach  
11 to reviewing and classifying SIF incidents across the Company and industry.  
12 The SCL model allows the Company to focus its safety and risk mitigation  
13 efforts on the most serious outcomes and highest risk work where a high  
14 energy incident occurred. The EEI SCL model is also used for the  
15 Employee SIF-A Safety Performance Metric (SPM) and is aligned with other  
16 California utilities. In addition, in June of 2020 PG&E modified the SIF  
17 Program to include internal classification and investigation of contractor SIF  
18 Potential (SIF-P) incidents.<sup>10</sup> This expanded requirement led to an increase  
19 in contractor injury data.

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2 EEI, SCL Model available here: <https://www.safetyfunction.com/scl-model>.

3 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: “Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained.”

4 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: “Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained.”

5 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: “Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained.”

6 *Id.* at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: “Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained.”

7 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: “Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control.”

8 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: “Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control.”

9 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: “Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained.”

10 SAFE-1100S-B001: Contractor SIF-P Incidents: Requiring SIF-P Incidents and Cause Evaluations Published 6/2020.

1 The rate of SIF-A (Contractor) SOM definition is based on the EEI  
2 OS&HC serious injury criteria<sup>11</sup> which is different than the EEI SCL Model.  
3 It is suggested by EEI to use the OS&HC criteria in conjunction with the EEI  
4 SCL model. Therefore, using only the OS&HC serious injury criteria creates  
5 a different result in SIF-A classification from the expectation of using the EEI  
6 SCL model that includes high energy incidents.

## 7 **B. (1.2) Metric Performance**

### 8 **1. Historical Data (2017 – June 2022)**

9 PG&E is including five and a half years of historical data representing  
10 2017 through June 2022. The dataset includes injury type, incident date,  
11 location, and EEI OS&HC injury classification. See Attachment 2 –  
12 Contractor SIF-A SOM for a list of incidents. Following the Kern Order  
13 Instituting Investigation (OII) Settlement Agreement,<sup>12</sup> PG&E deployed the  
14 SIF Program to investigate employee and contractor incidents resulting in  
15 life altering, life threatening or fatal injuries. Beginning in 2017, PG&E only  
16 tracked contractor incidents that were classified through the SIF Program<sup>13</sup>  
17 meeting those criteria. Prior to the implementation of the Kern OII  
18 requirements, contractors were not required to report SIF incidents. In June  
19 2020, PG&E expanded the SIF Program to include investigating contractor  
20 incidents rising to SIF-P classification (focusing on incidents that meet the  
21 EEI SCL methodology as described above). This increased the number and  
22 types of injuries and incidents that contractors are required to report<sup>14</sup> in  
23 2020 and 2021, and this year.<sup>15</sup>

24 Figure 1.2-1 illustrates the rate of contractor injuries by year from  
25 2017-June 2022 based on historical data availability as discussed above.

---

<sup>11</sup> EEI OS&HC's Serious Injury Criteria, which can be found at  
<https://images.magnetmail.net/images/clients/EEI //attach/Environment/hsif2022.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Investigation (I.) 14-08-022, Kern OII (Aug. 28, 2014) Settlement Agreement with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) see D.15-07-014.


<sup>13</sup> SAFE-1100S Rev. 00 (2017): SIF Program.

<sup>14</sup> SAFE-1100S-B001.

<sup>15</sup> Note, the expanded incident reporting requirement implemented in 2020 does not include the broader SOM SIF-A (Contractor) metric definition, which is discussed further in §III.b below.

1 For 2020 through June of this year, the dataset reflects the expanded SIF-P  
2 incident reporting requirements for contractors implemented in June of  
3 2020.<sup>16</sup> There are a total of 48 injuries that met the EEI OS&HC serious  
4 injury criteria. Fifty-four percent of the injuries met the criteria of bone  
5 fracture, including of the hands and feet. Eleven were fatalities, where one  
6 helicopter crash in 2020 claimed the lives of three individuals; the other  
7 fatalities involved an act of a third party, falls from trees, and electrical pole  
8 gas pipe placement, and operations of motor and powered vehicles.

**FIGURE 1.2-1**  
**RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (CONTRACTOR)**  
**HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE**



9 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

10 Contractor related Serious Safety Incidents<sup>17</sup> or any SIF-A or SIF-P  
11 incidents are reported to the Safety Helpline at Company number 223-8700,

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<sup>16</sup> SAFE-1100S-B001: Contractor SIF-P Incidents: Requiring SIF-P Incidents and Cause Evaluations Published 6/2020.

<sup>17</sup> As defined by SAFE-1004S: Safety Incident Notification and Response Management.

1 Option 1 and then entered into the Enterprise CAP program for SIF review  
2 and classification.<sup>18</sup> PG&E's SIF Program<sup>19</sup> is managed through the CAP.

3 As mentioned above, the SIF-A (Contractor) SOM as defined in  
4 D.21-11-009 SOM calculation is new in application to PG&E's existing injury  
5 and SIF dataset, and this is the first year in which the data were analyzed  
6 and reported under this definition. To evaluate and establish historical  
7 performance for the SOM SIF-A (Contractor) metric, PG&E pulled data from  
8 the CAP and reviewed 472 issues with the Issue Type of Contractor Safety.  
9 The list included both incidents or injuries reported to PG&E or entered in  
10 CAP between 2017-2021. 27 percent, or 128 incidents were related to gas  
11 dig-in by a third-party where no injuries occurred. The remaining issues  
12 were reviewed to determine if any met the 14 EEI OS&HC serious injury  
13 criteria as summarized above.

### 14 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

15 For the first half of 2022, bone fractures were the leading type of injuries  
16 at 86 percent (6 of 7). These included bone fractures of the fingers, wrist,  
17 arms, ribs and legs. There were no contractor fatalities between January  
18 and June 2022.

19 All the incidents involved a high-energy event and were classified as  
20 either SIF-A (HSIF) or SIF-P per the EEI SCL model and PG&E's SIF  
21 Standard.

22 As mentioned above beginning in June of 2020, PG&E began requiring  
23 contractors to report all SIF-P incidents and injuries, which resulted in an  
24 increase in reported incidents in 2020 by 466-percent over 2019. In 2020  
25 and 2021, bone fractures were the leading cause of injuries at 65-percent  
26 (20 of 31). In addition, there were four contractor fatalities in 2020 and three  
27 in 2021.

---

<sup>18</sup> Per SAFE-1100S-B001, PG&E contractors are required to submit any Serious Safety Incidents or PSIF incidents to PG&E within 5-business days of becoming aware of the incident.

<sup>19</sup> SAFE-1100S: SIF Standard determined SIF classification and management.

1 **C. (1.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There have been no changes to the 1- and five- year targets since the  
4 last SOMs report filing. As mentioned above, the rate of Contractor SIF-A  
5 dataset includes the expanded SIF-P incident reporting requirements for  
6 contractors implemented in June of 2020. We will continue to monitor  
7 Contractor SIF-A trends and adjust the targets once the dataset has  
8 matured.

9 **2. Target Methodology**

10 To establish the 1-year and 5-year target thresholds, PG&E considered  
11 the following factors:

- 12 • Historical Data and Trends: The target threshold takes into  
13 consideration the historical increase (from 0.013 to 0.063) between  
14 2019, 2020 and 2021, after expanding the contractor reporting  
15 requirements in 2020. This increased the amount and rate of contractor  
16 serious injuries (as defined by the EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria) by  
17 over 466-percent. It also takes into consideration that in 2022 PG&E will  
18 have to expand contractor injury reporting requirements to meet the  
19 SOM SIF-A OS&HC criteria;
- 20 • Benchmarking: Not available. This metric uses new methodology not  
21 used in the industry; therefore, benchmarking is not available. PG&E  
22 confirmed with EEI that they are starting to collect these data among its  
23 utility members and hopes to increase benchmarking capability as more  
24 utilities begin to track contractor incident data. For establishing the  
25 SOM 1.2: SIF-A (Contractor) target threshold PG&E used the industry  
26 data that were available as a proxy to establish approximate  
27 calculations. Doubling the historical rate with the benchmark data  
28 available for EEI SCL Model would keep PG&E within top quartile.  
29 PG&E will continue to refine its targets as benchmark data comes  
30 available;
- 31 • Regulatory Requirements: None;



- 1 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes. The main focus  
2 for driving down injuries is noted below in planned/future work related to  
3 Contractor Safety initiatives;
- 4 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators: While the performance at or below  
5 the target may be sustainable, the more appropriate metric is to focus  
6 on injuries resulting from a high energy incident, which is consistent with  
7 both industry SIF-A monitoring and the SPM; and
- 8 • Other Qualitative Considerations: This target approach was established  
9 to account for all job-related tasks with the potential to cause injury as  
10 defined by the EEI OS&HC criteria.

### 11 **3. 2022 and 2026 Target**

12 The 2022 (1-year) and 2026 (5-year) target thresholds are to maintain a  
13 rate of less than 0.100. This target rate takes into consideration the  
14 historical increase (from 0.013 to 0.063) between 2019, 2020 and 2021 after  
15 expanding the contractor reporting requirements in 2020. It also takes into  
16 consideration that in 2022 PG&E will have to expand contractor injury  
17 reporting requirements to meet the SOM SIF-A (Contractor) defined EEI  
18 OS&HC criteria. Rates are subject to change depending on number of  
19 contractors hours worked.

20 The target thresholds are set at the highest serious injury occurrence in  
21 one year that would be concerning if the rate was surpassed. Since this  
22 metric calculation is new to PG&E and this is the first year its being reported,  
23 the threshold takes into consideration the past two years of historical data  
24 and allowance for understanding this calculation and its consequences. The  
25 threshold allows for a 50-percent rate increase over 2021, which allows  
26 PG&E to refine expectations as this new metric is refined further. As  
27 mentioned above, this rate would keep us in the top quartile of our proxy  
28 benchmark data calculations. This is also the same methodology used for  
29 SOM 1.2: SIF-A (Employee), which keeps target setting consistent for both  
30 metric calculations.

1 **D. (1.2) Performance Against Target**


2 **1. Progress on Sustaining the 1-Year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 1.1-2 below, PG&E saw a decrease in the  
4 Contractor SIF Actual rate in the first half of 2022.

5 **2. Progress on Sustaining the 5-Year Target**

6 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy a  
7 number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this  
8 metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target and will continue  
9 to monitor Contractor SIF-A trends and adjust the targets as appropriate.

**FIGURE 1.2-2  
RATE OF SIF-A (CONTRACTOR)  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS**



10 **E. (1.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

- 11 • PG&E's Contractor Safety Program: Programs that support this metric  
12 include PG&E's Enterprise Health and Safety organization and the  
13 Contractor Safety Program. Beginning in 2016, PG&E implemented a  
14 formal Contractor Safety Program to help our contractor partners reduce  
15 illness and injuries when working with PG&E. The program was  
16 implemented as required by the CPUC, Kern Oil Settlement Agreement.

1 PG&E's Contractor Safety Program includes all contractors and  
2 subcontractors performing high and medium-risk work on behalf of PG&E,  
3 on either PG&E owned, or customer owned, sites and assets. The  
4 Contractor Safety Program consists of the following primary elements:

- 5 – Contractor Company Pre-Qualification: PG&E leverages the capabilities  
6 of ISNetworld (ISN) to collect performance and safety compliance  
7 program information from all prime and subcontractors that conduct  
8 work classified as high or medium risk. PG&E is responsible for the  
9 performance of its contractors. As part of this effort, ISNetworld a  
10 third-party administrator, independently assesses contractors' historical  
11 safety data, and safety, drug/alcohol, and disciplinary programs to  
12 evaluate whether contractors meet PG&E's minimum performance  
13 standards and have the necessary programs in place to manage  
14 compliance. A variance to work for PG&E is required for contractors  
15 who do not meet the prequalification requirements. The variance  
16 process includes a review of the contractor's performance and  
17 improvement plans and the business need. The decision to award a  
18 variance requires Chief Executive Officer (CEO) approval, or CEO  
19 designee approval. PG&E continues to strengthen the requirements in  
20 the areas of fatalities and performance evaluation, including requiring a  
21 mitigation plan, and adding the requirement of a safety observation  
22 program.
- 23 – Enhanced Safety Contract Terms: PG&E Contract terms require that,  
24 following a serious public or worker safety incident, the contractor will  
25 conduct a cause evaluation, share the analysis with PG&E, and  
26 cooperate and assist with PG&E's cause evaluation analysis and  
27 corrective actions for the incident, and regulatory investigations and  
28 inquiries, including but not limited to Safety Enforcement Division's  
29 investigations and inquiries. Under the enhanced Safety Contract  
30 Terms, PG&E has the right to:
  - 31 1) Designate safety precautions in addition to those in use or proposed  
32 by the contractor;
  - 33 2) Stop work to ensure compliance with safe work practices and  
34 applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations;

- 1           3) Require the contractor to provide additional safeguards beyond what
- 2           the contractor plans to utilize;
- 3           4) Terminate the contractor for cause in the event of a serious incident
- 4           or failure to comply with PG&E's safety precautions; and
- 5           5) Review and approve criteria for work plans, which include safety
- 6           plans.

- 7       • Contractor Job Safety Planning: Safety must be factored into every job plan
- 8       from start to finish. Safety considerations include formal training, job site
- 9       work controls, specialized equipment to reduce hazards, and personal
- 10       protective equipment. Each of PG&E's Lines of Business have safety plan
- 11       requirements unique to its operations. Prior to commencement of work,
- 12       PG&E is required to review the adequacy of the safety plans, including
- 13       contractor safety personnel qualifications where applicable, and perform a
- 14       safety assessment to evaluate whether additional safety mitigations are
- 15       required, including whether to assign PG&E onsite safety personnel. These
- 16       reviews must be conducted by PG&E employees that are qualified to
- 17       perform such work or PG&E engages third-party experts as appropriate to
- 18       perform this safety analysis.
- 19       • Contractor Oversight: Work activities are governed by qualified PG&E
- 20       oversight personnel to ensure work follows the PG&E reviewed and
- 21       approved safety plan designed for the job. PG&E conducts field safety
- 22       observations of the contractor. In 2021, approximately 97,000 contractor
- 23       observations were conducted. High-risk findings are reviewed daily, and
- 24       corrective actions are discussed. Observation data collected by all
- 25       observers (e.g., PG&E and contractors) are analyzed to support continuous
- 26       improvement.
- 27       • Contractor Transportation Safety: In late 2021, the Motor Vehicle Safety
- 28       team updated guidance for reviewing and classifying Contractor MVI SIF
- 29       incidents for those who operate a vehicle when completing work for PG&E.
- 30       In late 2021 and continuing into 2022, the Motor Vehicle Regulatory Team
- 31       also hired a third-party expert to complete a systemwide review of the high
- 32       and medium vendors in ISN who may operate trucks over 10,000 pounds
- 33       Gross Vehicle Weight Rating, checking for a valid California motor carrier
- 34       permit and USDOT number if required.
- 35       • Regionalization: See Chapter 1.1 of this report for the details of this activity.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 1.3**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**SIF ACTUAL**  
**(PUBLIC)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 1.3  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SIF ACTUAL  
(PUBLIC)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 1.3**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **SIF ACTUAL**  
5   **(PUBLIC)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.1 concerning historical data; B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1  
8           and C.2 concerning updated metric targets; Section D concerning performance; and  
9           Section E Current and Planned Work Activities. Material changes from the prior  
10           report are identified in blue font.

11   **A. (1.3) Overview**

12       **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 1.3 – Serious Injury and Fatality  
14           (SIF) Actual (Public) is defined as:

15           *A fatality or personal injury requiring inpatient hospitalization for other*  
16           *than medical observations that an authority having jurisdiction has*  
17           *determined resulted directly from incorrect operation of equipment, failure or*  
18           *malfunction of utility-owned equipment, or failure to comply with any*  
19           *California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) rule or*  
20           *standard. Equipment includes utility or contractor vehicles and aircraft used*  
21           *during the course of business.*

22       **2. Introduction of Metric**

23           Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E) safety stand is “Everyone  
24           and Everything is Always Safe.” Our goal is zero public safety incidents that  
25           result from the failure or malfunction of a PG&E asset or the failure of PG&E  
26           to follow rules and/or standards. In support of this, PG&E is continuing to  
27           invest in programs to protect the public including electric transmission and  
28           distribution system reliability and the reduction of wildfire risk. PG&E  
29           remains committed to building an organization where every work activity is  
30           designed to facilitate safe performance, every member of our workforce  
31           knows and practices safe behaviors, and every individual is encouraged to  
32           speak up if they see an unsafe or risky behavior with the confidence that

1 their concerns and ideas will be heard and followed up on. As part of this  
2 stand, the Public SIF Actual metric is integral in ensuring the safety of our  
3 communities.

4 The Public SIF Actual metric definition established in Decision  
5 (D.) 21-11-009 is a new way for PG&E to categorize and report public safety  
6 incidents resulting in a SIF. There are two primary differences between the  
7 SOMs Public SIF Actual metric and the Safety Performance Metric (SPM)  
8 Public SIF metric (SPM Metric 20).

- 9 • First, the SOM requires a finding by an authority with jurisdiction  
10 (e.g., CAL FIRE, CPUC); and
- 11 • Second, that finding must determine that the Public SIF Actual was  
12 caused by incorrect operation, a malfunction, or failure to meet a  
13 Commission rule or standard.<sup>1</sup>

14 As a result, the data in this report are a subset of the data included with  
15 the SPM Report for the Public SIFs metric, which is defined as a fatality or  
16 personal injury requiring in-patient hospitalization involving utility facilities or  
17 equipment. Equipment, in the case of the SPM, includes utility vehicles  
18 used during the course of business.

19 In 2012, PG&E improved its data collection processes and reporting for  
20 public serious incidents. These data were used to inform PG&E's Risk  
21 Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) Report, which informs and helps  
22 prioritize our investments to address top safety risks. The report outlines  
23 our top safety risks and includes descriptions of the controls currently in  
24 place, as well as mitigations—both underway and proposed—to reduce  
25 each risk.

26 For the purposes of reporting, PG&E is including incidents where PG&E  
27 may have disputed the finding of an authority with jurisdiction that the Public  
28 SIF Actual was caused by incorrect operation, a malfunction, or failure to  
29 meet a commission rule or standard. For example, PG&E disputes that that  
30 the SIF incident caused by the Zogg Fire was caused by incorrect operation,  
31 a malfunction, or failure to meet a commission rule or standard, but is

---

<sup>1</sup> D.21-11-009 – (Rulemaking 20-07-013) Appendix A, p. 1.



1 including the SIFs from those incidents in its reporting here as pending  
2 because of CAL FIRE’s determinations.

3 **B. (1.3) Metric Performance**

4 **1. Historical Data (2010 – June 2022)**

5 In this report, PG&E is providing twelve and a half years of historical  
6 data from 2010-June 2022. The data include a description of the incident,  
7 type of injury, and the authority with jurisdiction that has determined that  
8 incorrect operations, malfunction, or failure to meet a standard was the  
9 cause of the injury. As mentioned above, the data collection and internal  
10 reporting processes for public safety serious incidents were improved in  
11 2012. Historical data for the Public SIF Actual metric are based on this  
12 timeframe and also include available data for the years of 2010 and 2011.

13 Because the metric definition requires a finding from an authority having  
14 jurisdiction, Public SIF Actual incidents in prior years may not appear in the  
15 historical data. PG&E will continue to update the historical data in future  
16 SOMs reports as appropriate and identify changes based on new  
17 information. [For this reporting period, two historical incidents have been  
18 included in the report. On January 12, 2017, a structure fire in Yuba City,  
19 which was the result of a natural gas explosion, was caused by a fabrication  
20 error on a gas distribution pipe and therefore did not meet a Department of  
21 Transportation \(DOT\) standard. On March 10, 2018, a structure fire  
22 following a natural gas explosion was determined to be the result of  
23 equipment failure.](#)

24 See Attachment 3 – Public SIF Actual SOM 2010- June 2022 for a  
25 detailed list of incidents.

26 **2. Data Collection Methodology**


27 PG&E’s Public SIF Actual incident data largely come from the Enterprise  
28 Health and Safety Serious Incidents Reports, which includes a compilation  
29 of Law Department claims from PG&E’s Riskmaster database, Electric  
30 Incident Reports, and other reportable incidents such as PG&E Federal  
31 Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license compliance reports. For the  
32 SOMs report, the incidents included in the Public SIF Actual metric must be  
33 determined by an authority having jurisdiction to have resulted directly from:

1 (1) incorrect operation of equipment, failure or malfunction of utility-owned  
2 equipment, or from (2) the failure to comply with any Commission rule or  
3 standard. PG&E interprets jurisdictional authorities to be those with  
4 enforcement authority, such as CAL FIRE, the CPUC, PG&E, or National  
5 Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).


6 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

7 The graphs included in Figure 1.3-1 and Figure 1.3-2 below show the  
8 total number of incidents and the total number of serious injuries or fatalities  
9 for each identified incident. From 2010 through June 2022, there were a  
10 total of 23 confirmed incidents where Public SIF Actuals occurred  
11 (Figure 1.3-1), which resulted in a total of 169 public SIFs (Figure 1.3-2).  
12 Seven incidents where Public SIF Actuals occurred are pending further  
13 investigation into the incident cause and a SOM determination.

**FIGURE 1.3-1  
NUMBER OF PUBLIC SIF ACTUAL INCIDENTS 2010 – JUNE 2022  
CONFIRMED AND PENDING INVESTIGATION**



**FIGURE 1.3-2  
NUMBER OF PUBLIC SIF ACTUALS 2010 – JUNE 2022  
CONFIRMED AND PENDING INVESTIGATION**



1            In 2021, there were three Public SIF Actual incidents that resulted in two  
 2 fatalities and one serious injury. Two were the result of the failure of utility  
 3 owned equipment (wires down), and the third was the result of a contractor  
 4 motor vehicle noncompliance. The Dixie fire was removed from the SOMs  
 5 report based on the results of the investigation.

6            For the first six months of 2022, there have been two confirmed Public  
 7 SIF Actual incidents. On January 3, 2022, a third-party semi-trailer became  
 8 entangled in communications cable attached to a PG&E distribution pole,  
 9 which resulted in a serious injury. On January 24, 2022, an electric contact  
 10 occurred in Monterey County, which resulted in a fatality. One additional  
 11 incident involving a PG&E contractor motor vehicle is pending a final  
 12 determination on the SOMs Public SIF Actual definition.

13            PG&E is continuing to evaluate its Public Safety programs as discussed  
 14 in the 2020 RAMP Report Third-Party Safety Incident Risk chapter and also  
 15 in other chapters, and through further maturing its public incident

1 investigation process, including the advancement of Public SIF Actual metric  
2 definition requirements and learnings.

### 3 C. (1.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

#### 4 1. Updates to 1- and 5- Year Targets Since Last Report

5 There are no changes to the 1- and 5- year targets for the Public SIF  
6 Actual metric, which is to demonstrate progress towards the elimination of  
7 serious injuries and fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents).

#### 8 2. Target Methodology

9 With our stand of Everyone and Everything is Always Safe, our goal is  
10 the elimination of Public SIF Actual incidents resulting directly from incorrect  
11 operation of PG&E equipment, failure or malfunction of PG&E-owned  
12 equipment, or from PG&E's failure to comply with any Commission rule or  
13 standard.

14 In consideration of the above, PG&E also reviewed the following factors:

- 15 • Historical data and trends: From 2010 through the second quarter of  
16 this year, there were a total of 23 confirmed incidents where Public SIF  
17 Actuals occurred (Figure 1.3-1), which resulted in a total of 169 public  
18 SIFs (Figure 1.3-2). Seven incidents where Public SIF Actuals occurred  
19 are pending further investigation into the incident cause and a SOM  
20 determination. Historical data will continue to inform PG&E's plans and  
21 actions to achieve its goal of zero public safety incidents;
- 22 • Benchmarking: Not available. This is a new metric definition;
- 23 • Regulatory requirements: CPUC, FERC, and DOT, public safety  
24 reporting requirements;
- 25 • Attainable within known resources/work plan: Yes. PG&E's work and  
26 resource plan prioritizes public safety risk reduction. This includes  
27 minimizing the risk of catastrophic wildfires in alignment with the  
28 continued execution of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) and  
29 maturation of key wildfire mitigation strategies. It also includes  
30 mitigation of other public safety risks related to the elimination of serious  
31 injuries and fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents);
- 32 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight  
33 Enforcement: A goal of zero Public SIF Actuals, in 2022 (1 year) and on

1 an ongoing basis into 2026 (5 year) reflects PG&E’s intent to  
2 immediately and continuously operate without creating risk to the public;  
3 and

- 4 • Other Qualitative Considerations: PG&E’s approach is aligned to and  
5 anchored on PG&E’s goal and commitment to “always” safe operations.

### 6 **3. 2022 Target**

7 As discussed above, PG&E’s 1-year target for the Public SIF Actual  
8 metric is to demonstrate progress towards the elimination of serious injuries  
9 and fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents) resulting directly from  
10 incorrect operation of PG&E equipment, failure or malfunction of  
11 PG&E-owned equipment, or PG&E’s failure to comply with any Commission  
12 rule or standard.

### 13 **4. 2026 Target**

14 PG&E’s 5-year target for the Public SIF Actual metric is to demonstrate  
15 progress towards the elimination of serious injuries and fatalities  
16 (zero Public SIF Actual incidents) resulting directly from incorrect operation  
17 of PG&E equipment, failure or malfunction of PG&E-owned equipment, or  
18 PG&E’s failure to comply with any Commission rule or standard.

## 19 **D. (1.3) Performance Against Target**

### 20 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Directional Target**

21 As discussed above, PG&E has confirmed two Public SIF Actual  
22 incidents between January and June 2022.

### 23 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Directional Target**

24 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy a  
25 number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this  
26 metric to meet the Company’s 5-year performance target.

## 27 **E. (1.3) Current and Planned Work Activities**

28 Many of the current and planned activities to eliminate public safety  
29 incidents are addressed by meeting key operations risks, which are discussed in  
30 other SOMs. The list here touches upon some of the key risk drivers and  
31 mitigation activities in place and references the specific SOMS chapters:

- 1 • Gas Distribution Public Safety Enhancements: We have made significant  
2 progress on the safety and reliability programs for our extensive gas  
3 storage, transmission, and distribution systems. The programs are  
4 designed to enhance public and coworker safety and the reliability of our  
5 natural gas system. Continued distribution system enhancements to public  
6 safety programs are forecasted through 2026 and include ongoing vintage  
7 gas pipeline replacement, corrosion detection and mitigation, leak surveys  
8 and repair, and locate and mark services so customers and workers will  
9 know where they can safely dig.
- 10 • Gas Transmission and Storage (GT&S) Safety Improvements: PG&E plans  
11 to increase the safety of our GT&S assets with increased in-line inspections,  
12 direct assessments, strength tests, over pressure protection, and gas  
13 storage well reworks and retrofits. Many of these programs are required by  
14 recent state and federal regulations designed to ensure that natural gas  
15 companies provide safe and reliable service to their customers. In addition  
16 to our own programs, federal and state regulations impacting natural gas  
17 infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities, continue to evolve  
18 and add new requirements for our operations.
- 19 • Gas Operations (GO) Public Awareness and Education Programs: GO  
20 public awareness programs reduce the threat of third-party damage to  
21 pipelines through educational outreach regarding safe excavation near  
22 pipelines. PG&E's gas safety communication efforts use a variety of media  
23 to effectively reach the greatest population possible within PG&E's service  
24 territory. These efforts include sending bill inserts, e-mails, brochures or  
25 letters to communicate gas safety information, providing targeted agricultural  
26 excavation safety messaging, and hosting 811 "Call Before You Dig"  
27 workshops.
- 28 • GO Patrols: GO patrols help to identify third-party threats from construction  
29 and excavation activities.
- 30 • GO System Remediation: GO system remediation includes the retirement  
31 of gas gathering facilities, including idle pressurized pipe, and the  
32 replacement and remediation of exposed and shallow pipe to further reduce  
33 the likelihood of third-party contact.

1 For additional information regarding current and planned work activities for  
2 reducing the risk of gas transmission and distribution system equipment failure  
3 or malfunction, please see Chapters 4.1 through 4.7 of this report.

- 4 • **Electric Operations (EO) manhole cover replacement:** Programs that  
5 address asset-related safety risk also include continuing to replace manhole  
6 covers in areas of high pedestrian foot traffic with hinged venting manhole  
7 covers designed to stay in place in the event of a vault explosion.
- 8 • **Electric Asset Inspections Improvements:** The continuous improvement of  
9 detailed asset inspections to enable proactive identification of any potential  
10 equipment issues that may lead to failures.
- 11 • **EO Public Awareness Programs:** EO Public awareness programs to  
12 educate non-PG&E contractors and the public about power line safety and  
13 the hazards associated with wire down events and are intended to reduce  
14 the number of third-party electrical contacts. Outreach efforts include social  
15 media campaigns focused on increasing customer awareness of overhead  
16 lines, representation at local fire safe councils and community events and  
17 the automated customer notification system. Security improvements can  
18 include proactive equipment replacement, security measures and intrusion  
19 detection devices.

20 For additional information regarding current and planned work activities for  
21 reducing the risk of electric transmission and distribution system equipment  
22 failure or malfunction please see Chapters 2.1 through 2.4, Chapters 3.1  
23 through 3.9, and Chapters 3.11 through 3.16 of this report. In addition, PG&E's  
24 2022 Wildfire Mitigation Plan<sup>2</sup> also includes information regarding grid system  
25 hardening and enhancements to reduce the risk of wildfire.

- 26 • **Power Generations Hydroelectric Programs:** Hydroelectric programs  
27 include procedures for planning for unusual water releases, along with their  
28 associated safety warnings.
- 29 • **Power Generation Compliance Programs:** Public Safety Plans are  
30 published and routinely updated as required by PG&E hydroelectric facility  
31 FERC licenses. FERC required Emergency Action Plans exist for all

---

2 [PG&E's 2022 Wildfire Mitigation Plan.](#)

1 significant and high hazards dams. The Plans are exercised annually with a  
2 seminar and phone drill.

- 3 • Hydro Facility Unusual Water Releases and Water Safety Warning Standard  
4 and accompanying procedure: Hydroelectric facility Unusual Water  
5 Releases and Water Safety Warning documentation establishes Hydro  
6 facility requirements for planning and making unusual water releases or high  
7 flow events and their associated safety warnings.
- 8 • PG&E Dam Safety Surveillance and Monitoring Program: This program  
9 establishes and defines PG&E's Dam Safety Surveillance and Monitoring  
10 Program for the continued long-term safe and reliable operation of PG&E's  
11 dams. Dam surveillance involves the collection of data by various means,  
12 including inspections and instrumentation, whereas monitoring involves the  
13 review of the collected data as obtained and over time for any adverse  
14 trends.
- 15 • Canals and Waterways Safety: This year PG&E Power Generation leaders  
16 and external public safety representatives successfully tested a new rope  
17 system designed to enable members of the public who might accidentally  
18 fall into a hydro canal to pull themselves out of danger. Since 2019, an  
19 additional 7.5 miles of barrier fencing has been installed along with 139  
20 newly designed escape ladders. In addition, 327 warning signs have been  
21 posted, identifying the canal and specific GPS location.
- 22 • Power Generation has installed approximately 161,000 linear feet of barrier  
23 fencing along PG&E's canal systems to date. Power Generation has also  
24 created and distributed safety information to property owners with canals  
25 that bisect their property. A canal entry emergency response plan has been  
26 published to guide efficient and timely communications between PG&E  
27 personnel and local first responders when responding to emergencies  
28 resulting from public entry into PG&E-owned water conveyance systems.
- 29 • Transportation Safety: PG&E Transportation Safety programs protect our  
30 employees and the public by establishing requirements and processes to  
31 control risks that can lead to motor vehicle accidents, improve safety  
32 performance, and increase awareness of all PG&E employees related to the  
33 operation of motor vehicles. This comprehensive program was established  
34 to reduce the number of motor vehicle incidents that have the potential for



1 serious injury, including fatal injury, to PG&E's employees, staff  
2 augmentation employees operating vehicles on Company business, and the  
3 public. Driver performance data is used to identify specific risk drivers for  
4 targeted intervention, including driver training and implementing vehicle  
5 safety technology.

6 PG&E's Transportation Safety Department also ensures compliance with  
7 federal Department of Transportation and California state regulations and  
8 requirements which emphasize public and employee safety.

- 9 • Contractor Safety Programs: Pre-qualification requirements for the PG&E  
10 Contractor Safety Program include a review of the 3-year history of Serious  
11 Safety Incidents (Life Altering/Life Threatening) affecting the public. This  
12 information must be updated annually. Additional information on the  
13 Contractor Safety program can be found in Chapter 1.2 of this report.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 2.1**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION**  
**DURATION INDEX (SAIDI)**  
**(UNPLANNED)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 2.1  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION  
DURATION INDEX (SAIDI)  
(UNPLANNED)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 2.1**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION**  
5   **DURATION INDEX (SAIDI)**  
6   **(UNPLANNED)**

7           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
8 in Section B.3 metric performance; C.1 and C.4 concerning updated metric targets;  
9 and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the  
10                                   prior report are identified in blue font.

11 **A. (2.1) Overview**

12 **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.1 – System Average Interruption  
14 Duration Index (SAIDI)(Unplanned) is defined as:

15           *SAIDI (Unplanned) = average duration of sustained interruptions per*  
16 *metered customer due to all unplanned outages, excluding on Major Event*  
17 *Days (MED), in a calendar year. “Average duration” is defined as: Sum of*  
18 *(duration of interruption \* # of customer interruptions)/Total number of*  
19 *customers served. “Duration” is defined as: Customer hours of outages.*  
20 *Includes all transmission and distribution outages.*

21 **2. Introduction of Metric**

22           The measurement of SAIDI unplanned represents the amount of time  
23 the average Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) customer  
24 experiences a sustained outage or outages, defined as being without power  
25 for more than five minutes, each year. The SAIDI measurement does not  
26 include planned outages, which occur when PG&E deactivates power to  
27 safely perform system work. This metric is associated with risk of Asset  
28 Failure, which is associated with both utility reliability and safety. The metric  
29 measures outages due to all causes including impacts of various external  
30 factors, but excludes MED. It is an important industry-standard measure of  
31 reliability performance as it is a direct measure of a customer’s electric  
32 reliability experience.

1 **B. (2.1) Metric Performance**

2 **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

3 PG&E has measured unplanned SAIDI for over 20 years, however this  
4 report uses 2013-June 2022 unplanned SAIDI values for target analysis to  
5 align with the same timeframe used for the wire down SOMs metrics. 2013  
6 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events.

7 The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity  
8 and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability  
9 performance in 2015. In 2015, SAIDI (unplanned and planned) was in  
10 second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.


11 Much of the 2017-2020 reliability investment was on Fault Location  
12 Isolation and Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line  
13 sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than  
14 five minutes typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not  
15 prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers  
16 that experience a sustained outage.

17 The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuse replacement, and  
18 installing reclosers in the worst performing areas are the initiatives that have  
19 had the biggest impact in improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

20 Other factors that contribute to reliability improvement include (but not  
21 limited to) reliability project investments and project execution, favorable  
22 weather conditions, outage response and repair times, asset lifecycle and  
23 health, vegetation management (VM) and switching device locations and  
24 function (including disablement of reclosers to mitigate fire risk).

25 Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as  
26 PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a  
27 45 percent unplanned SAIDI increase occurring in 2021 from 2020.

**FIGURE 2.1-1  
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION HISTORICAL UNPLANNED SAIDI PERFORMANCE  
(2013-JUNE 2022 NON-MED ONLY)**



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated  
3        Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer  
4        Care and Billing database to obtain the customer count information to  
5        calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E’s outage  
6        database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that  
7        impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered  
8        customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators  
9        based on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory  
10       Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeters™. PG&E last  
11       upgraded its outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter  
12       information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a  
13       subsequent review and correction.

14                PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
15       (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution  
16       Reliability Indices to define and apply excludable MED to measure the  
17       performance of its electric system under normally expected operating  
18       conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from


1 daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large  
2 statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is  
3 calculated from the natural log of the daily SAIDI values over the past five  
4 years. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent  
5 results and is a good indicator of operational and design stress.

### 6 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

7 As of June 2022, the unplanned SAIDI metric performance was 1.52  
8 hours and projected to finish the year better than the 1-Year target range of  
9 5.67 hours-6.80 hours. However, end of year performance is projected to  
10 be higher than previous years. This is largely due to the following factors:

- 11 • To reduce ignition risk, PG&E implemented the Enhanced Powerline  
12 Safety Shutoff (EPSS) program in July 2021. This program enabled  
13 higher sensitivity settings on targeted circuits in High Fire Threat  
14 Districts (HFTD) to deenergize when tripped. As illustrated below,  
15 during the July 28 – October 22, 2021, activation of EPSS, which  
16 remains the only full fire season data set, unplanned SAIDI performance  
17 was significantly impacted during the period these settings were  
18 activated. As discussed in Section C, PG&E will continue to assess  
19 data as it becomes available and will continually update our targets with  
20 each subsequent report according to metric performance and in  
21 consideration of the benefit to reducing the risk of Wildfires.


**FIGURE 2.1-2  
2021 DAILY TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SAIDI EPSS CIRCUIT PERFORMANCE**



- 1           • In 2021, PG&E observed a 46 percent reduction in ignitions across
- 2           HFTD compared to 3-year averages during the time that EPSS was
- 3           enabled in limited locations from July 28-October 20.



**FIGURE 2.1-3  
2018-2021 COUNT OF CPUC-REPORTABLE TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION IGNITIONS  
AUG-OCT**



- 1           • In addition to EPSS, the unplanned SAIDI metric has been impacted as  
2           PG&E shifted away from traditional system reliability improvement work  
3           and toward other wildfire risk reduction efforts, with reclose disablement  
4           beginning in 2018. As such, 2021 performance is not directly  
5           comparable to prior years as the operating conditions have changed  
6           significantly and resulted in large year-over-year changes.

**7   C. (2.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

**8   1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

9           There are no updates to the 1 and 5-Year Targets since the last report.  
10          As this report only captures information from January through June, and  
11          lacks an additional full Summer and Fall season, PG&E believes it would be  
12          premature to draw any immediate conclusions to develop new performance  
13          targets for this half-year report.

14          Following the conclusion of 2022, the 5-Year target will be adjusted to  
15          reflect a year's worth of results the EPSS program (and a complete fire  
16          season), as well as to account for any efficiencies gained. This will be  
17          reflected in the report to be filed March 2023. As year-over-year weather  
18          variables shift, targets will continue to be adjusted in each subsequent report

1 filing as PG&E continues to be able to quantify the impacts of EPSS on  
2 Reliability performance.

## 3 **2. Target Methodology**

4 For 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E is proposing a range for the SAIDI  
5 unplanned metric of 5.67 hours-6.80 hours, primarily due to the vast  
6 expansion of the EPSS program in 2022 to reduce wildfire risk and the  
7 increase to PG&E's MED threshold.

- 8 • EPSS settings will be added to an additional 848 circuits in 2022  
9 (compared to 170 in 2021) for a total of 1,018<sup>1</sup> circuits.
- 10 • Settings to be deployed for the entire anticipated fire season (June  
11 through November), whereas in 2021 EPSS settings were active July 28  
12 through October 22.
- 13 • The MED threshold has increased from a daily SAIDI value of  
14 3.50 minutes in 2021 to 5.04 minutes in 2022. This new threshold would  
15 have equated to 7 more MED exclusions in 2022 (these days having  
16 occurred in the range of 3.50 minutes and 5.04 minutes, which  
17 exceeded last year's threshold but would not exceed this year's).

18 The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

- 19 • Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS  
20 deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022, there is no  
21 historical data to help guide in target setting. PG&E has undertaken an  
22 effort to re-baseline 2021 results to the 2022 anticipated EPSS/MED  
23 threshold environment and illustrates an informational datapoint for  
24 future performance and target setting (the unplanned portion of the  
25 measure marked in red, note these SAIDI times are in minutes);

---

<sup>1</sup> As of March 10, 2022, the 2022 scope for EPSS has increased to 1,018 enabled circuits. Further changes may occur as the program is implemented throughout 2022.

**TABLE 2.1-1  
SAIDI AND SAIFI ADJUSTED 2021 PERFORMANCE**

	T&D - Unplanned & Planned Outages		T&D - Unplanned Outages		T&D - Planned Outages	
	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI
2021 EOY Results	218.7	1.320	183.3	1.180	35.4	0.140
Adjustment For Increased T <sub>100</sub> Threshold (2)	31.0	0.049	29.3	0.049	1.7	0.0003
Non EPSS Trendline adjustments (5)	14.4	0.049	6.3	0.029	8.1	0.021
Adjustment for current EPSS Ckts (3) (previously HLT operated in 2021)	-14.3	-0.053	-14.3	-0.053	0.0	0.000
2021 EPSS Circuit Adjustment #1 (4)	28.1	0.101	28.1	0.101	0.0	0.000
EPSS Adjustment #2 for new EPSS circuits planned for 2022 (5)	118.7	0.428	118.7	0.428	0.0	0.000
Adjusted 2021 EOY Forecast (7)	396.5	1.895	351.3	1.734	45.2	0.161

**Notes:**

Red text indicates the recent updates from the previous December estimates.

- (1) EOY 2021 actual values as of January 22, 2022.
- (2) Assumes 7 additional non-MEDs (daily SAIDI values between 3.5 and 5.0 based on the actual 2021 MEDs of Jan 25, July 18, July 22, August 1, August 12, December 25, and December 28).
- (3) HLT to EPSS Adjustment - This adjustment replaces the temporary HLT operation values with an equivalent EPSS performance value. Based on the actual daily outage rates of 161 circuits (days operated as HLT vs days operated as EPSS)
- (4) EPSS Adjustment #1  
Adjustment for full 172 days of EPSS (161 circuits implemented in 2021 and 6 to be implemented in 2022)
- (5) EPSS Adjustment #2  
Assumes 827 new circuits planned for 2022 EPSS (5 carry-over from 2021, 615 HFRA & HFTD, 27 HFRA, 23 HFTD) assumed to be operated from June to November and 156 Tier 1 Buffer circuits assumed to be operated for 30 days. Each group is forecasted based on its respective average number of EPSS devices per circuit and relative to the EPSS impacts measured in 2021.
- (6) Non-EPSS Related Trendline Adjustments - These adjustments are based on the trendlines of the past five years for: (a) all unplanned non-EPSS outages and (b) all planned outages. The prior 3.0 planned outage adjustment was updated 12/16/21 to reflect the increase in work volume (+3.3) and to account for the estimated decrease in Hot work due in the HFTD areas (+1.8).
- (7) Adjusted 2021 EOY Forecast - This forecast reflects the estimated 2021 SAIDI value if the electric T&D system is operated as that planned for 2022 (without improvement initiatives).

- 1 • Benchmarking: PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile. At this time,
- 2 targets are set based on operational and risk factors as opposed to only
- 3 an aspiration quartile goal, although current quartile performance is
- 4 acknowledged as an indicator of PG&E’s opportunity to improve for our
- 5 customers over the long-run as risk reduction allows;
- 6 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 7 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and
- 8 Enforcement: The target range for this metric is suitable for EOE as it
- 9 accounts for our current work plan and the unknowns of EPSS;
- 10 • Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2021 results
- 11 and 2022 work plan, PG&E expects performance to fall within proposed
- 12 target range. The bottom portion of PG&E’s proposed SOMs target
- 13 (5.67 hours) reflects a 3 percent improvement from our adjusted 2021
- 14 result (5.86 hours), ~11 minutes:
- 15 – PG&E’s top work plan and resource priority of minimizing the risk of
- 16 catastrophic wildfires is the driving factor of reliability performance.

1 This risk prioritized work plan does not support an improvement of  
2 the unplanned SAIDI metric;

**FIGURE 2.1-4  
HISTORICAL RELIABILITY SPEND (2010-2022)**



- 3 – The GRC in 2017-2020 allocated budget for reliability, but the work  
4 was re-prioritized to focus on wildfire mitigation, compliance, pole  
5 replacement and tags;
- 6 – The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment  
7 Failure, specifically Overhead (OH) Conductor;
- 8 – Current replacement rates from 2017-2021 have been on average  
9 32 miles/year. This is significantly below the OH Conductor Asset  
10 Management Plan, which cites third-party recommendations for  
11 replacement rates at approximately 1200 miles per year to sustain  
12 2016 levels of reliability performance;
- 13 – Current investment profile in the GRC for OH Conductor is  
14 ~70 miles/year. Alternative funding scenarios or internal  
15 prioritization would be needed to increase replacement miles  
16 per year;
- 17 – Conductor replacement under the System Hardening program for  
18 wildfire risk reduction is forecasted through the GRC period, but

1 provides limited additional benefit, at approximately 1 percent  
2 (due to rural HFTD geography in which this work takes place);

- 3 – Current allocated 2022 GRC spending amount for targeted  
4 Reliability improvements (MAT code 49x) is \$9 million, which  
5 equates to an approximate unplanned SAIDI reduction of  
6 0.72 minutes;
- 7 – Prior to the implementation of EPSS in July 2021, current levels of  
8 investment and assuming the GRC forecast through 2026,  
9 SAIDI/System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI)  
10 performance was expected to remain in the third quartile and  
11 sustained improvement trending not expected until 2023. However,  
12 with the EPSS implementation, performance fell and is expected to  
13 remain in the fourth quartile; and
- 14 • Other Considerations: PG&E expanded their 2022 EPSS program (as  
15 described earlier in this chapter) and began enablement on high-risk  
16 circuits in January—representing and expanded fire season duration—all  
17 of which significantly impact expected SAIDI and SAIFI performance  
18 and targets.

### 19 **3. 2022 Target**

20 Range: 5.67 hours-6.80 hours.

21 The 2022 target reflects a range of a 3 percent improvement to a  
22 20 percent increased unplanned SAIDI performance from 2021 adjusted  
23 result (5.86 hours) to account for the factors listed above.

### 24 **4. 2026 Target**

25 Range: 5.67 hours-6.80 hours.

26 Given the uncertainty of the EPSS environments, 2026 target range  
27 mirrors 2022 and will be adjusted once the 2022 fire season impacts are  
28 actualized and further data is available to leverage for updating the target  
29 strategy to capture actual results and efficiencies. *We expect that the 2026  
30 target will continue to be amended in subsequent report filings as EPSS  
31 impacts and other Reliability metric factors continue to be realized.*

1 **D. (2.1) Performance Against Target**


2 **1. Progress Towards 1-Year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 2.1-5 below, PG&E saw an unplanned SAIDI  
4 result of 1.52 hours in the first half of 2022 which is consistent with  
5 Company’s 1-year target.

6 **2. Progress Towards 5-Year Target**

7 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
8 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
9 meet the Company’s 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 2.1-5  
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION UNPLANNED SAIDI HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND  
TARGETS THROUGH JUNE 2022**



10 **E. (2.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11 Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Metric Performance and  
12 historical trend data for SAIDI are listed below.

- 1 • Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM): Program is targeted at OH  
2 distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements PG&E's  
3 annual routine VM work with CPUC mandated clearances. PG&E's VM  
4 program, components of which exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to  
5 mitigating wildfire risk. Our VM team inspects and identifies needed  
6 vegetation maintenance on all distribution and transmission circuit miles in  
7 PG&E's service area on a recurring cycle through Routine and Tree  
8 Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole Clearing. Our EVM program goes above  
9 and beyond regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding  
10 minimum clearances and removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022  
11 PG&E will complete 1800 miles of EVM work.

12 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
13 PG&E's WMP for additional details on 2022.

- 14 • Asset Replacement (Overhead/Underground): Overhead asset replacement  
15 addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches, while  
16 underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing underground  
17 cable and switches.

18 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
19 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 20 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program  
21 covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2022  
22 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program  
23 which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused  
24 by distribution overhead assets. In 2022, we are rapidly expanding our  
25 system hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of system  
26 hardening work which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding  
27 and removal of overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing at  
28 least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County  
29 Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work; replacing  
30 equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt  
31 fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all known, remaining in HFTD  
32 areas). As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3600 miles of  
33 Undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the  
34 10,000 Mile Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at

1 scale is expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD  
2 geography, and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk  
3 at this time,

4 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening  
5 Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details on 2022.

- 6 • Downed Conductor Detection: To further mitigate high impedance faults  
7 that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific distribution line  
8 reclosers utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate previously  
9 undetectable faults. This innovative solution is called Down Conductor  
10 Detection (DCD) and has been implemented on over 200 reclosing  
11 devices as of September 1, 2022. This technology uses sophisticated  
12 algorithms to determine when a line-to-ground arc is present (i.e.,  
13 electrical current flowing from one conductive point to another) and the  
14 recloser will immediately de-energize the line once detected. Although  
15 this technology is new, it has already proven successful in detecting faults  
16 that would have otherwise been undetectable. PG&E will continue to  
17 learn from these pilot installations through the 2022 wildfire season and  
18 expects to develop future plans leveraging this technology to address  
19 system risks.

- 20 • Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of  
21 existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal  
22 contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission  
23 poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms

24 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
25 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 26 • Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement  
27 Work: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance  
28 of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,  
29 Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches  
30 (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors—that plays an  
31 important role in preventing customer interruptions and is critical for  
32 restoring power after an outage.

33 The Underground COE Program is comprised of corrective 26  
34 maintenance of certain defined equipment—including Protective 27 Devices



1 (Reclosers, Interrupters, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices 28 (Regulators,  
 2 Stepdowns/Autobanks), Switches (Switches, Auto-Transfer 29 Switches),  
 3 Capacitors, and Cable (Mainline (only), Loop (UG 30 only))  
 4 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
 5 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

**TABLE 2.1-2  
 TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SAIDI UNPLANNED PERFORMANCE DRIVER  
 SUMMARY<sup>2</sup>**

SAIDI SUMMARY	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	5-Yr Ave	%
SYSTEM	93.9	97.5	99.6	117.6	125.8	183.3	106.9	-72%
3rd Party	18.9	16.5	20.6	22.9	26.4	29.0	21.1	-38%
Animal	3.8	4.2	6.5	6.2	7.0	10.5	5.5	-90%
Company Initiated	1.1	1.5	1.2	2.1	2.7	4.0	1.7	-133%
Environmental	1.7	3.0	3.7	2.7	4.0	8.8	3.0	-191%
Equipment Failure	43.2	45.9	43.2	48.0	54.8	73.6	47.0	-57%
Unknown Cause	7.6	7.7	9.8	12.9	14.4	33.1	10.5	-216%
Vegetation	17.3	18.8	14.5	22.4	15.4	23.8	17.7	-35%
Wildfire Mitigation	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.4	0.3	-43%

<sup>2</sup> Table with 2022 data will be provided in the March 2023 report filing.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 2.2**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION FREQUENCY (SAIFI)  
(UNPLANNED)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
 CHAPTER 2.2  
 SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
 SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION FREQUENCY (SAIFI)  
 (UNPLANNED)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 2.2**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION FREQUENCY (SAIFI)**  
5   **(UNPLANNED)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 and C.4 concerning metric  
8           targets; and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes  
9                                   from the prior report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (2.2) Overview**

11 **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.2 – System Average Interruption  
13           Frequency (SAIFI)(Unplanned) is defined as:

14           *SAIFI (Unplanned) = average frequency of sustained interruptions due*  
15           *to all unplanned outages per metered customer, except on Major Event*  
16           *Days (MED), in a calendar year. “Average frequency” is defined as: Total #*  
17           *of customer interruptions/Total # of customers served. Includes all*  
18           *transmission and distribution outages.*

19 **2. Introduction of Metric**

20           The measurement of SAIFI unplanned represents the number of  
21           instances the average Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) customer  
22           experiences a sustained outage or outages, defined as being without power  
23           for more than five minutes,) each year. The SAIFI measurement does not  
24           include planned outages, which occur when r PG&E deactivates power to  
25           safely perform system work. This metric is associated with the risk of Asset  
26           Failure, which is associated with both utility reliability and safety. The metric  
27           measures outages of all causes but excludes MEDs. It is an important  
28           industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it is a direct  
29           measure of the frequency of outages a customer experiences.

1 **B. (2.2) Metric Performance**

2 **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

3 PG&E has measured unplanned SAIFI for over 20 years; however this  
4 report uses 2013 to June 2022 unplanned SAIFI values for target analysis to  
5 align with the same timeframe used for the wire down SOMs metrics. 2013  
6 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events.

7 The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity  
8 and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability  
9 performance in 2015. In 2015, SAIFI (unplanned and planned) was in  
10 second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.


11 Most of the 2017-20 reliability investment was on Fault Location  
12 Isolation and Service Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates  
13 faulted line sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less  
14 than 5 minutes) typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not  
15 prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers  
16 that experience a sustained (greater than five minutes) outage.

17 The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuse replacements and  
18 installing reclosers in the worst performing areas are initiatives that have  
19 had the biggest impact in improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

20 Other factors that contribute to reliability improvement include (but not  
21 limited to) reliability project investments and project execution, favorable  
22 weather conditions, outage response and repair time, vegetation  
23 management (VM), asset lifecycle and health, and switching device  
24 locations and function (including disablement of reclosers to mitigate fire  
25 risk).

26 Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as  
27 PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a  
28 10 percent unplanned SAIFI increase occurring in 2021 from 2020.

**FIGURE 2.2-1  
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION SAIFI UNPLANNED HISTORICAL DATA (2013-JUNE 2022  
NON-MEDS ONLY)**



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated  
3        Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer  
4        Care & Billing database to obtain the customer count information to  
5        calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E’s outage  
6        database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that  
7        impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered  
8        customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators  
9        based on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory  
10       Control and Data Acquisition alarms and Smart meters. PG&E last  
11       upgraded its outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated Smart meter  
12       information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a  
13       subsequent review and correction.

14                PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)  
15        1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability  
16        Indices to define and apply excludable MEDs to measure the performance  
17        of its electric system under normally expected operating conditions. Its  
18        purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily operation


1 and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of  
2 major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is calculated from  
3 the natural log of the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index  
4 (SAIDI) values over the past five years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI  
5 index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent results and is a good  
6 indicator of operational and design stress.

### 7 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

8 As of June 2022, the unplanned SAIDI metric performance was 0.642  
9 and projected to finish the year better than the 1-Year target range of  
10 1.681-2.017. However, the end of year performance is projected to be  
11 higher than previous years. This is largely due to the following factors:

- 12 • To reduce ignition risk, PG&E implemented the Enhanced Powerline  
13 Safety Shutoff (EPSS) program in July 2021. This program enabled  
14 higher sensitivity settings on targeted circuits in High Fire Threat  
15 Districts (HFTD) to deenergize when tripped. As illustrated below,  
16 during the July 28 – October 22, 2021 activation of EPSS, which  
17 remains the only full fire season data set, unplanned SAIDI performance  
18 was significantly impacted during the period these settings were  
19 activated. As discussed in Section C, PG&E will continue to assess  
20 data as it becomes available and will update our targets with  
21 subsequent reports according to metric performance and in  
22 consideration of the benefit to reducing the risk of Wildfires.
- 23 • In 2021, PG&E observed a 46 percent reduction in ignitions across  
24 HFTD compared to 3-year averages during the time that EPSS was  
25 enabled in limited locations from July 28-October 20. In addition to  
26 EPSS, the unplanned SAIFI metric has been impacted as PG&E shifted  
27 away from traditional system reliability improvement work and more  
28 toward other wildfire risk reduction efforts, starting with recloser  
29 disablement in 2018. As such 2021 performance is not directly  
30 comparable to prior years as the operating conditions have changed  
31 significantly and resulted in large year-over-year changes.

**FIGURE 2.2-2  
2021 DAILY TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SAIDI UNPLANNED PERFORMANCE: EPSS  
CIRCUITS**



1 **C. (2.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There are no updates to the 1 and 5-Year Targets since the last report.  
 4 As this report only captures information from January through June, and  
 5 lacks an additional full Summer and Fall season, PG&E believes it would be  
 6 premature to draw any immediate conclusions to develop new performance  
 7 targets for this half-year report.

8 Following the conclusion of 2022, the 5-Year target will be adjusted to  
 9 reflect a year's worth of results the EPSS program (and a complete fire  
 10 season), as well as to account for any efficiencies gained. This will be  
 11 reflected in the report to be filed March 2023. As year-over-year weather  
 12 variables shift, we expect that targets will be adjusted in subsequent reports  
 13 as PG&E continues to be able to quantify the impacts of EPSS on Reliability  
 14 performance.

15 **2. Target Methodology**

- 16 • For 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E is proposing a range for the SAIFI  
 17 unplanned metric of 1.681 to 2.017; primarily due to the vast expansion



1 of the EPSS program in 2022 and increase to MED threshold (and the  
2 unknowns that brings to the environment):

- 3 – EPSS settings will be added to an additional 848 circuits in 2022  
4 (compared to 170 in 2021) for a total of 1,018<sup>1</sup> circuits
- 5 – Settings to be deployed for the entire anticipated fire season  
6 (June through November), whereas in 2021 EPSS settings were  
7 active July 28 through October 22
- 8 – The MED threshold has increased from a daily SAIDI value of 3.50  
9 in 2021 to 5.04 in 2022. This new threshold would equate to  
10 seven fewer MEDs in 2022, compared to that experienced in 2021

- 11 • Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS  
12 deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022, there is no  
13 historical data to help guide in target setting. PG&E has undertaken the  
14 below effort to re-baseline 2021 results to the 2022 anticipated EPSS  
15 environment and illustrates an informational datapoint for future  
16 performance and target setting

---

<sup>1</sup> As of March 10, 2022, the 2022 scope for EPSS has increased to 1,018 enabled circuits. Further changes may occur as the program is implemented throughout 2022.

**FIGURE 2.2-3  
SAIDI AND SAIFI ADJUSTED 2021 PERFORMANCE**


	T&D - Unplanned & Planned Outages		T&D - Unplanned Outages		T&D - Planned Outages	
	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI
2021 EOY Results	218.7	1.320	183.3	1.100	35.4	0.140
Adjustment For Increased T <sub>avg</sub> Threshold (2)	31.0	0.049	29.3	0.049	1.7	0.0003
Non EPSS Trendline adjustments (6)	14.4	0.049	6.3	0.029	8.1	0.021
Adjustment for current EPSS CxTs (3) (previously HLT operated in 2021)	-14.3	-0.053	-14.3	-0.053	0.0	0.000
2021 EPSS Circuit Adjustment #1 (4)	28.1	0.101	28.1	0.101	0.0	0.000
EPSS Adjustment #2 for new EPSS circuits planned for 2022 (5)	118.7	0.428	118.7	0.428	0.0	0.000
Adjusted 2021 EOY Forecast (7)	396.5	1.895	351.3	1.734	45.2	0.161

- Notes:**  
*Red text indicates the recent updates from the previous December estimates.*
- (1) **EOY 2021 actual values as of January 22, 2022.**
  - (2) Assumes 7 additional non-MEDs (daily SAIDI values between 3.5 and 5.0 based on the actual 2021 MEDs of Jan 25, July 18, July 22, August 1, August 12, December 25, and December 28).
  - (3) **HLT to EPSS Adjustment** - This adjustment replaces the temporary HLT operation values with an equivalent EPSS performance value. Based on the actual daily outage rates of 161 circuits (days operated as HLT vs days operated as EPSS)
  - (4) **EPSS Adjustment #1**  
Adjustment for full 172 days of EPSS (161 circuits implemented in 2021 and 6 to be implemented in 2022)
  - (5) **EPSS Adjustment #2**  
Assumes 827 new circuits planned for 2022 EPSS (6 carry-over from 2021, 615 HFRA & HFTD, 27 HRFA, 23 HFTD) assumed to be operated from June to November and 156 Tier 1 Buffer circuits assumed to be operated for 30 days. Each group is forecasted based on its respective average number of EPSS devices per circuit and relative to the EPSS impacts measured in 2021.
  - (6) **Non-EPSS Related Trendline Adjustments** - These adjustments are based on the trendlines of the past five years for: (a) all unplanned non-EPSS outages and (b) all planned outages. The prior 3.0 planned outage adjustment was updated 12/16/21 to reflect the increase in work volume (+3.3) and to account for the estimated decrease in Hot work due in the HFTD areas (+1.8).
  - (7) **Adjusted 2021 EOY Forecast** - This forecast reflects the estimated 2021 SAIDI value if the electric T&D system is operated as that planned for 2022 (without improvement initiatives).

- 1       • Benchmarking: PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile. At this time,
- 2       targets are set based on operational and risk factors as opposed to only
- 3       an aspiration quartile goal, although current quartile performance is
- 4       acknowledged as an indicator of PG&E’s opportunity to improve for our
- 5       customers over the long-run as risk reduction allows
- 6       • Regulatory Requirements: None
- 7       • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and
- 8       Enforcement: The target range for this metric is suitable for EOE as it
- 9       accounts for our current work plan and the unknowns of EPSS
- 10      • Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2021 results
- 11      and 2022 work plan, PG&E expects performance to fall within proposed
- 12      target range. The bottom portion of PG&E’s proposed SOMs target
- 13      (1.681) reflects a 3 percent improvement from our adjusted 2021
- 14      result (1.734)

- 1 – PG&E’s top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of  
2 catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and  
3 does not support an improvement of the unplanned SAIFI metric

**FIGURE 2.2-4**  
**RELIABILITY SPEND 2010 – JUNE 2022**



- 4 – The GRC in 2017-20 allocated budget for reliability, but the work  
5 was re-prioritized to focus on wildfire mitigation, compliance, pole  
6 replacement and tags;
- 7 – The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment  
8 Failure, specifically Overhead Conductor;
- 9 – Current replacement rates from 2017-2021 have been on average  
10 32 miles/year. This is significantly below the Overhead Conductor  
11 Asset Management Plan, which cites 3rd party recommendations for  
12 replacement rates at approximately 1,200 miles per year to sustain  
13 2016 levels of reliability performance;
- 14 – Current investment profile in the GRC for OH Conductor is  
15 ~70 miles/year. Alternative funding scenarios or internal  
16 prioritization would be needed to increase replacement miles per  
17 year;
- 18 – Conductor replacement under the System Hardening program for  
19 wildfire risk reduction is forecasted through the GRC period but

1 provides limited additional benefit, at approximately 1 percent (due  
2 to the rural HFTD geography in which this work takes place);

- 3 – Current assigned 2022 GRC spending amount for targeted  
4 Reliability improvements (MAT Code 49x) is \$9 million, which  
5 equates to an approximate unplanned SAIFI reduction of  
6 0.004 minutes;
- 7 – Prior to the implementation of EPSS in July 2021, current levels of  
8 investment and assuming the GRC forecast through 2026,  
9 SAIDI/SAIFI performance was expected to remain in the third  
10 quartile and sustained improvement trending not expected until  
11 2023. However, with the EPSS implementation, performance fell  
12 and is expected to remain in the fourth quartile; and
- 13 • Other Considerations: PG&E expanded their EPSS program in 2022  
14 (as described earlier in this chapter) and began enablement on high-risk  
15 circuits in January—representing and expanded fire season—all of which  
16 significantly impact SAIDI and SAIFI performance.

### 17 **3. 2022 Target**

18 Range: 1.681-2.017

19 The 2022 target reflects a range of a 3 percent improvement to a  
20 20 percent increased unplanned SAIFI performance from 2021 adjusted  
21 result to account for the factors listed above.

### 22 **4. 2026 Target**

23 Range: 1.681-2.017

24 Given the uncertainty of the EPSS environments, 2026 target range  
25 mirrors 2022 and will be adjusted once the 2022 fire season impacts are  
26 actualized and further data is available to leverage for updating the target  
27 strategy to capture actual results and efficiencies. We expect the 2026  
28 target will be amended in subsequent filings as EPSS impacts and other  
29 Reliability metric factors continue to be realized.

1 **D. (2.2) Performance Against Target**


2 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 2.2-5 below, PG&E saw an unplanned SAIFI  
4 result of 0.642 in the first half of 2022 which is consistent with Company's  
5 1-year target.

6 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

7 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
8 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
9 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 2.2-5  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SAIFI  
UNPLANNED HISTORICAL RESULTS AND TARGETS**



10 **E. (2.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11 Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Metric Performance and  
12 historical trend data for SAIFI are listed below.

- 13 • Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM): Program is targeted at  
14 overhead distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements  
15 PG&E's annual routine VM work with CPUC mandated clearances. PG&E's  
16 VM program, components of which exceed regulatory requirements, is

1 critical to mitigating wildfire risk. Our VM team inspects and identifies  
2 needed vegetation maintenance on all distribution and transmission circuit  
3 miles in PG&E's service area on a recurring cycle through Routine and Tree  
4 Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole Clearing. Our EVM program goes above  
5 and beyond regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding  
6 minimum clearances and removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022  
7 PG&E will complete 1,800 miles of EVM work.

8 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
9 PG&E's Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) for additional details on 2022.

- 10 • Asset Replacement (Overhead, Underground): Overhead asset  
11 replacement addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches,  
12 while underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing  
13 underground cable and switches.

14 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
15 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 16 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program  
17 covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2022  
18 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program  
19 which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused  
20 by distribution overhead assets. In 2022, we are rapidly expanding our  
21 system hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of system  
22 hardening work which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding  
23 and removal of overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing at  
24 least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County  
25 Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work; replacing  
26 equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt  
27 fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all known, remaining in HFTD  
28 areas). As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3,600 miles of  
29 Undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the  
30 10,000 Mile Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at  
31 scale is expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD  
32 geography, and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk  
33 at this time,

1 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening Mitigations in  
2 PG&E’s WMP for additional details on 2022.

- 3 • Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of  
4 existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal  
5 contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission  
6 poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms

7 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
8 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details,

- 9 • Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement  
10 Work: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance  
11 of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,  
12 Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches  
13 (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors – that plays an  
14 important role in preventing customer interruptions and is critical for  
15 restoring power after an outage.

16 The Underground COE Program is comprised of corrective 26 maintenance  
17 of certain defined equipment – including Protective 27 Devices (Reclosers,  
18 Interrupters, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices 28 (Regulators,  
19 Stepdowns/Autobanks), Switches (Switches, Auto-Transfer 29 Switches),  
20 Capacitors, and Cable (Mainline (only), Loop (underground 30 only)).

21 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
22 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

**FIGURE 2.2-6  
SAIFI UNPLANNED PERFORMANCE DRIVERS HISTORICAL DATA<sup>2</sup>**

SAIFI SUMMARY	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	5-Yr Ave	%
SYSTEM	0.940	0.877	0.877	0.960	1.068	1.181	0.968	-22%
3rd Party	0.199	0.169	0.216	0.201	0.220	0.234	0.201	-16%
Animal	0.051	0.057	0.071	0.069	0.075	0.078	0.065	-21%
Company Initiated	0.029	0.035	0.033	0.048	0.055	0.061	0.040	-53%
Environmental	0.022	0.017	0.028	0.022	0.020	0.026	0.022	-19%
Equipment Failure	0.413	0.413	0.398	0.405	0.436	0.485	0.413	-17%
Unknown Cause	0.098	0.088	0.117	0.136	0.172	0.200	0.122	-64%
Vegetation	0.127	0.104	0.101	0.129	0.087	0.098	0.110	11%
Wildfire Mitigation	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	-25%

<sup>2</sup> Table will be updated with 2022 full-year data in March 2023 report filing



**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 2.3**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND  
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS  
(MAJOR EVENT DAYS)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 2.3  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT  
DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS  
(MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 2.3**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND**  
5                                   **EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS**  
6                                   **(MAJOR EVENT DAYS)**

7           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
8           in Section B.1 concerning historical data; B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1  
9           concerning metric targets; and Section D concerning performance against targets.

10           Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

11   **A. (2.3) Overview**

12       **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.3 – System Average Outages  
14           Due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD (Major Event Days) is  
15           defined as:

16           *Average number of sustained outages on Major Event Days (MED) per*  
17           *100 circuit miles in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) per metered customer,*  
18           *in a calendar year, where each sustained outage is defined as: total number*  
19           *of customers interrupted/total number of customers served.*

20       **2. Introduction of Metric**

21           The measurement of System Average Outages due to Vegetation and  
22           Equipment Damage in HFTD areas on MEDs is tied to the public safety risk  
23           of Asset Failure. While PG&E traditionally does not measure Customers  
24           Experiencing Sustained Outages (CESO) on MEDs only, CESO is an  
25           important industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it a direct  
26           measure of outage frequency.

27   **B. (2.3) Metric Performance**

28       **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

29           PG&E has measured CESO for over 20 years, however this report uses  
30           2013 to June 2022 CESO values for target analysis to align with the same  
31           timeframe used for the wire down SOMs metrics (2013 was the first full year  
32           PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events).

1           The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity  
2 and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability  
3 performance in 2015. While this metric is not benchmarkable, in 2015  
4 System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) (unplanned and  
5 planned) was in second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.


6           The majority of the 2017-2020 investment was on Fault Location  
7 Isolation and Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line  
8 sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than  
9 five minutes) typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not  
10 prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers  
11 that experience a sustained outage.

12           The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuse replacement, and  
13 installing reclosers in the worst performing areas are initiatives that have  
14 had the biggest impact in improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

15           Other factors that contribute to reliability improvement include (but not  
16 limited to) project investments and project execution, favorable weather  
17 conditions, response to outages, asset lifecycle and health, vegetation  
18 management, switching device locations and function (including disablement  
19 of reclosers to mitigate fire risk).


20           The current investment/work plan is heavily weighted towards wildfire  
21 mitigation and is not weighted towards improving reliability performance.  
22 While the 2017 and 2020 General Rate Case (GRC) allocated budget for  
23 reliability, the work was re-prioritized to focus on wildfire mitigation,  
24 compliance, pole replacement and tags.

**FIGURE 2.3-1  
RELIABILITY SPEND HISTORICAL DATA 2010 – JUNE 2022**




- 1 Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as
- 2 PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation.


**FIGURE 2.3-2  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION  
VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL DATA  
(MED ONLY, 2013 – YTD JUNE 2022)**



**TABLE 2.3-3  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION VEGETATION CESO HISTORICAL DATA  
(MED ONLY 2013-JUNE 2022)**



**TABLE 2.3-4  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION  
OVERHEAD/UNDERGROUND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL DATA  
(MED ONLY, 2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**



**TABLE 2.3-1  
ANNUAL MEDS (2013-JUNE 2022)**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	YTD June 2022
4	5	10	3	30	7	31	14	25	0

1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated  
3        Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer  
4        Care & Billing database to obtain the customer count information to  
5        calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E’s outage  
6        database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that  
7        impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered  
8        customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators  
9        based on information from field personnel and devices such as SCADA  
10       alarms and Smart meters. PG&E last upgraded its outage reporting tools in  
11       2015 and integrated Smart meter information to identify potential outage  
12       reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

13                PG&E traditionally excludes MEDs from Reliability measures per the  
14        Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled  
15        IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and  
16        apply excludable MED to measure the performance of its electric system  
17        under normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major  
18        events to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily  
19        trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the  
20        Standard, the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the  
21        daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the  
22        past five years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the  
23        basis since it leads to consistent results and is a good indicator of  
24        operational and design stress.

25                There are a total of 33,599.5<sup>1</sup> transmission and distribution (overhead  
26        and underground) circuit miles located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD areas.

---

1        EOY 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference EOY 2022 mileage.

1 PG&E's data bases reflect the circuit miles that currently exist and do not  
2 maintain the historical values specifically in the Tier 2/3 HFTD areas. As  
3 such, PG&E has assumed these values have remained the same for all  
4 years from 2013 to June 2022 and assuming annual variances due to the  
5 circuit miles are very small. On average (based on customer count data),  
6 PG&E's system is growing at ~0.6 percent per year. Therefore, assuming  
7 this is true for the OH miles in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 areas, the line miles  
8 would have grown roughly 5.4 percent over the past nine years.  
9 Consequently, the line mile adjustment would only represent a potential  
10 variance of around 5.4 percent, which is significantly smaller than the actual  
11 key metric driver of the number of equipment and vegetation caused  
12 outages and will also be significantly impacted by Enhanced Powerline  
13 Safety Shutoff (EPSS) in 2022.

14 Due to data limitations, PG&E uses the Lat/Long of the operating device  
15 as a proxy for determining the distribution outage events that occurred in the  
16 Tier 2/3 HFTD areas.

### 17 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

18 The number of vegetation and equipment failure related customer  
19 outages per 100 transmission and distribution line miles during MEDs has  
20 varied each year and has been heavily driven by not just the number, but by  
21 the severity of the MED experienced in that specific year (refer to table  
22 above). 2021 performance increased by 235 percent from 2020, and  
23 experienced nine more MEDs largely due to historic snowstorms that  
24 occurred in December. Other performance spikes were experienced in  
25 2017 and 2019, with both years also experiencing a high number of MEDs.  
26 Given the randomness of weather patterns, no discernable trends can be  
27 learned from historical performance results. [Through June 2022, we have](#)  
28 [experienced zero MEDs.](#)

### 29 **C. (2.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

#### 30 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

31 [There have been no changes to the directional 1 and 5-Year Targets](#)  
32 [since the SOMs report filing in April.](#)



## 2. Target Methodology

- Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes response stays the same in events).

When normalized based on the number of MEDs per year, this metric shows improved performance. However, this metric measures the average number of customers impacted per 100 miles and will increase due the additional EPSS settings to be deployed in 2022 if EPSS contributes to more MEDs. Performance is expected to remain within historical range but would need to be reassessed after 2022 with more data available as to the impact of EPSS (refer to SAIDI and SAIFI reports).

In addition, the MED threshold has increased from a daily SAIDI value of 3.50 in 2021 to 5.04 in 2022. This new threshold would equate to seven fewer MEDs in 2022 compared to that experienced in 2021.

The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

- Historical Data and Trends: No discernable trends can be learned from historical performance results given the randomness of weather patterns;
- Benchmarking: While this metric is not benchmarkable, PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile in SAIFI performance;
- Regulatory Requirements: None;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it states we are to remain within historical performance range while accounting for the randomness of weather patterns and impacts of climate change;
- Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2021 results and variability in weather patterns, performance expected to be within historical range; and
- Other Considerations: Given the difficulty in predicting when PG&E areas will experience fire risk conditions, EPSS settings may be activated for a significantly longer period than the currently estimated fire season of June through November—leading to a greater than anticipated impact on reliability performance.

1 **D. (2.3) Performance Against Target**

2 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 2.3-2 above, PG&E experienced zero Major  
4 Event Days in the first half of 2022 (and in turn no outages on MEDs) which  
5 is consistent with Company's 1-year directional target.

6 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

7 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
8 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
9 align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

10 **E. (2.3) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11 Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Metric Performance are  
12 listed below.

- 13 • Enhanced Vegetation Management: Program is targeted at overhead  
14 distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements PG&E's  
15 annual routine vegetation management work with CPUC mandated  
16 clearances. PG&E's Vegetation Management program, components of  
17 which exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to mitigating wildfire risk.  
18 Our vegetation management team inspects and identifies needed vegetation  
19 maintenance on all distribution and transmission circuit miles in PG&E's  
20 service area on a recurring cycle through Routine and Tree Mortality Patrols,  
21 as well as Pole Clearing. Our EVM program goes above and beyond  
22 regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum  
23 clearances and removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022 PG&E will  
24 complete 1800 miles of EVM work.

25 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
26 PG&E's WMP for additional details on 2022.

- 27 • Asset Replacement (Overhead, Underground): Overhead asset  
28 replacement addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches,  
29 while underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing  
30 underground cable and switches.

31 Please see Chapter 11, Overhead and Underground Distribution  
32 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

1 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E’s broader grid design program  
2 covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E’s 2022  
3 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program  
4 which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused  
5 by distribution overhead assets. In 2022, we are rapidly expanding our  
6 system hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of system  
7 hardening work which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding  
8 and removal of overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing at  
9 least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County  
10 Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work; replacing  
11 equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt  
12 fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all known, remaining in HFTD  
13 areas). As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3600 miles of  
14 Undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the  
15 10,000 Mile Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at  
16 scale is expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD  
17 geography, and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk  
18 at this time,

19 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening Mitigations in  
20 PG&E’s WMP for additional details on 2022.

21 • Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of  
22 existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal  
23 contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission  
24 poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms.

25 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution  
26 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details,

27 • Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement  
28 Work: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance  
29 of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,  
30 Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches  
31 (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors – that plays an  
32 important role in preventing customer interruptions and is critical for  
33 restoring power after an outage.

1           The Underground COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance of  
2 certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,  
3 Interrupters, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators,  
4 Stepdowns/Autobanks), Switches (Switches, Auto-Transfer Switches),  
5 Capacitors, and Cable (Mainline (only), Loop (underground only))

6           Please see Chapter 11, Overhead and Underground Distribution  
7 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 2.4**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND  
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS  
(NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 2.4  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND  
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS  
(NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 2.4**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND**  
5                                   **EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS**  
6   **(NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS)**

7           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
8           in Section B.1 concerning historical data; B.3 concerning metric performance;  
9           Section C concerning metric targets; and Section D concerning performance against  
10          target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

11   **A. (2.4) Overview**

12       **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 2.4 – System Average Outages  
14           due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD Areas (Non-Major  
15           Event Days) is defined as:

16           *Average number of sustained outages on Non-Major Event Days (MED)*  
17           *per 100 circuit miles in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) per metered*  
18           *customer, in a calendar year, where each sustained outage is defined as:*  
19           *total number of customers interrupted/total number of customers served.*

20       **2. Introduction of Metric**

21           The measurement of System Average Outages due to Vegetation and  
22           Equipment Damage in HFTD areas is tied to the public safety risk of Asset  
23           Failure. Customers Experiencing Sustained Outages (CESO) is an  
24           important industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it a direct  
25           measure of outage frequency.

26   **B. (2.4) Metric Performance**

27       **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

28           Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) has measured CESO for  
29           over 20 years, however this report used 2013 to June 2022 CESO values for  
30           target analysis to align with the same timeframe used for the wire down  
31           SOMs (2013 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire  
32           down events).

1           The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity  
2 and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability  
3 performance in 2015. While this metric is not benchmarkable, in  
4 2015 System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) (unplanned and  
5 planned) was in second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.

6           The majority of the 2017-2020 investment was on Fault Location  
7 Isolation and Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line  
8 sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than  
9 five minutes) typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not  
10 prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers  
11 that experience a sustained (> 5 minutes) outage.


12           The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuses, and recloser  
13 installation in the worst performing areas have the biggest impact in  
14 improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

15           Many factors influence reliability performance, including (but not limited  
16 to) reliability project investments and project execution, favorable weather  
17 conditions, outage response time, asset lifecycle and health, switching  
18 device locations and function (including disablement of reclosers to mitigate  
19 fire risk).

20           The current investment/work plan is heavily weighted towards wildfire  
21 mitigation and is not targeted towards improving reliability performance.




**FIGURE 2.4-1  
HISTORICAL RELIABILITY SPEND: 2010 – JUNE 2022**




1 Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as  
2 PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a  
3 27 percent CESO increase occurring in 2021 from 2020.


**FIGURE 2.4-2  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION  
VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL DATA  
(HFTD ONLY, NON-MED 2013-JUNE 2022)**



**FIGURE 2.4-3  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION  
OVERHEAD/UNDERGROUND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL DATA  
(NON MED, 2013 – JUNE 2022)**



**FIGURE 2.4-4  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION  
VEGETATION CESO HISTORICAL DATA  
(NON MED 2013-JUNE 2022)**



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated  
3 Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer  
4 Care & Billing database to obtain the customer count information to  
5 calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E’s outage  
6 database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that  
7 impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered  
8 customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators  
9 based on information from field personnel and devices, such as SCADA  
10 alarms and SmartMeter™ devices. PG&E last upgraded its outage  
11 reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter™ devices information to  
12 identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent review  
13 and correction.

14                PG&E excludes MEDs from Reliability measures per the Institute of  
15 Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE  
16 Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and apply  
17 excludable MED to measure the performance of its electric system under  
18 normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events  
19 to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to

1 be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard,  
2 the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the daily System  
3 Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the past five years  
4 by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads  
5 to consistent results and is a good indicator of operational and design  
6 stress.

7 There are a total of 33,599.5<sup>1</sup> transmission and distribution (overhead  
8 and underground) circuit miles located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD areas.  
9 PG&E's data bases reflect the circuit miles that currently exist and do not  
10 maintain the historical values specifically in the Tier 2/3 HFTD areas. As  
11 such, PG&E has assumed these values have remained the same for all  
12 years from 2013 to 2021 and assuming annual variances due to the circuit  
13 miles are very small. On average (based on customer count data), PG&E's  
14 system is growing at ~0.6 percent per year. Therefore, assuming this is true  
15 for the OH miles in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 areas, the line miles would have  
16 grown roughly 5.4 percent over the past nine years. Consequently, the line  
17 mile adjustment would only represent a potential variance of around  
18 5.4 percent, which is significantly smaller than the actual key metric driver of  
19 the number of equipment and vegetation caused outages and will also be  
20 significantly impacted by Enhanced Powerline Safety Shutoff (EPSS) in  
21 2022.

22 Due to data limitations, PG&E uses the Lat/Long of the operating device  
23 as a proxy for determining the distribution outage events that occurred in the  
24 Tier 2/3 HFTD areas.

### 25 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

26 The number of vegetation and equipment failure related customer  
27 outages occurring per 100 T&D line miles on Non-MEDs has varied each  
28 year but has generally been declining since 2016. [Through June 2022,](#)  
29 [PG&E's performance is trending 17% higher than the 2022 target.](#) 2021  
30 performance was 27 percent worse than 2020, driven primarily by a

---

<sup>1</sup> EOY 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference EOY 2022 mileage.

1 37 percent increase in Equipment Failure CESO. Performance drivers  
2 include the following:

- 3 • To reduce ignition risk, PG&E implemented the EPSS program in  
4 July 2021. This program enabled higher sensitivity settings on targeted  
5 circuits in HFTD to deenergize when tripped. It should be noted that the  
6 number of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) reportable  
7 ignitions in HFTD decreased by 51 percent from the previous 3-year  
8 average upon deployment of EPSS; and
- 9 • In addition to the impact of EPSS, the metrics tied to CESO have been  
10 impacted as PG&E shifted away from traditional system reliability  
11 improvement work and more toward wildfire risk reduction, from reclose  
12 disablement in 2018 forward. As such, 2021 performance is not directly  
13 comparable to prior years as the operating conditions have changed  
14 significantly and resulted in large year-over-year changes.

### 15 C. (2.4) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

#### 16 1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

- 17 • PG&E proposes a 1- and 5-Year target range for this metric, similar to  
18 the SAIDI (2.1) and SAIFI (2.2) metrics as it is experiencing the same  
19 unknowns within the EPSS environment. Customer outages of all  
20 causes are increasing in the HFTD areas due to EPSS, and the full  
21 annual impact is currently unknown. Due to the increase in threshold,  
22 there are also less excludable MEDs thus resulting in more vegetation  
23 and equipment failure related outages that occur during large  
24 (non-MED) storm events, such as in January 2022. 25 MEDs occurred  
25 in 2021, compared to 0 YTD June 2022.

26 In addition, PG&E's outage reporting systems were not designed to  
27 accurately measure this metric:

- 28 • Transmission outages may impact multiple downstream substations that  
29 may not use accurate Lat/Long values for identifying those within a Tier  
30 2/3 HFTD location
- 31 • Distribution outages are recorded by the operating device and the  
32 Lat/Long of the operating device is used to identify the Tier 2/3 HFTD  
33 location (not the actual Lat/Long of where the fault occurred since this is

1 unavailable within the data base). As such, this metric may include a  
2 device outage located in a Tier 2/3 HFTD area that may operate due to  
3 a fault in a non-Tier 2/3 HFTD area and this may also distort over time  
4 the benefits associated with the Tier 2/3 HFTD mitigation efforts.

- 5 • Tier 2/3 HFTD T&D line miles for 2013 to 2020 were not recorded and  
6 thus not available when determining the 2022 targets.

7 Longer term technology enhancements and processes are needed to  
8 automate the determination of accurate fault locations on the T&D systems  
9 relative to the Tier 2/3 HFTD areas and to better integrate with the outage  
10 data base to improve the reporting accuracy of this metric.

11 Until the metric data can be more accurately measured, a target range  
12 for this metric will be established to account for the variances mentioned  
13 above.

## 14 **2. Target Methodology**

- 15 • For 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E is proposing range of CESO due  
16 to Vegetation and Equipment Failure in HFTD of 1,523-1,980. The  
17 bottom of the range correlates to the anticipated ~36 percent increase to  
18 SAIFI performance in 2022 (2021 result of 1.320 compared to a  
19 projected SAIFI result of 1.801 in 2022, reflected in the illustration  
20 below). Increase is primarily due to the vast expansion of the EPSS  
21 program in 2022 and increase to MED threshold (and the unknowns that  
22 brings to the environment):
  - 23 – EPSS settings will be added to an additional 848 circuits in 2022  
24 (compared to 170 in 2021) for a total of 1,018<sup>2</sup> circuits;
  - 25 – Settings to be deployed for the entire anticipated fire season (June  
26 through November), whereas in 2021 EPSS settings were active  
27 July 28 through October 22; and
  - 28 – The MED threshold has increased from a daily SAIDI value of 3.50  
29 in 2021 to 5.04 in 2022. This new threshold would equate to seven  
30 fewer MEDs in 2022 compared to that experienced in 2021.

---

2 As of March 10, 2022, the 2022 scope for EPSS has increased to 1,018 enabled circuits. Further changes may occur as the program is implemented throughout 2022.

- The upper range of the target range represents a 30% buffer, as June 2022 YTD performance is currently tracking 17% higher than 1,523 and accounts for even higher than anticipated customer interruptions in HFTD.

The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

- Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022, there is no historical data to help guide in target setting. PG&E has undertaken an effort to re-baseline 2021 results to the 2022 anticipated EPSS/MED threshold environment and illustrates an informational datapoint for future performance and target setting. In Figure 2.4-5 below, the unplanned portion of the measure is marked in red; SAIDI times are provided in minutes;

**FIGURE 2.4-5  
2021 AND 2022 SAIDI AND SAIFI ADJUSTED FORECASTS**

	T&D - Unplanned & Planned Outages		T&D - Unplanned Outages		T&D - Planned Outages	
	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI	SAIDI	SAIFI
2021 EOY Results	218.7	1.320	183.3	1.180	35.4	0.140
Adjustment For Increased T <sub>100</sub> Threshold (2)	31.0	0.049	29.3	0.049	1.7	0.0003
Non EPSS Trendline adjustments (6)	14.4	0.049	6.3	0.029	8.1	0.021
Adjustment for current EPSS Cmts (3) (previously HLT operated in 2021)	-14.3	-0.053	-14.3	-0.053	0.0	0.000
2021 EPSS Circuit Adjustment #1 (4)	28.1	0.101	28.1	0.101	0.0	0.000
EPSS Adjustment #2 for new EPSS circuits planned for 2022 (5)	118.7	0.428	118.7	0.428	0.0	0.000
Adjusted 2021 EOY Forecast (7)	396.5	1.895	351.3	1.734	45.2	0.161

**Notes:**

Red text indicates the recent updates from the previous December estimates.

- (1) EOY 2021 actual values as of January 22, 2022.
- (2) Assumes 7 additional non-MEDs (daily SAIDI values between 3.5 and 5.0 based on the actual 2021 MEDs of Jan 25, July 18, July 22, August 1, August 12, December 25, and December 29).
- (3) HLT to EPSS Adjustment - This adjustment replaces the temporary HLT operation values with an equivalent EPSS performance value. Based on the actual daily outage rates of 161 circuits (days operated as HLT vs days operated as EPSS).
- (4) EPSS Adjustment #1  
Adjustment for full 172 days of EPSS (161 circuits implemented in 2021 and 6 to be implemented in 2022).
- (5) EPSS Adjustment #2  
Assumes 827 new circuits planned for 2022 EPSS (6 carry-over from 2021, 615 HFRA & HFTD, 27 HFRA, 23 HFTD) assumed to be operated from June to November and 156 Tier 1 Buffer circuits assumed to be operated for 30 days. Each group is forecasted based on its respective average number of EPSS devices per circuit and relative to the EPSS impacts measured in 2021.
- (6) Non-EPSS Related Trendline Adjustments - These adjustments are based on the trendlines of the past five years for: (a) all unplanned non-EPSS outages and (b) all planned outages. The prior 3.0 planned outage adjustment was updated 12/16/21 to reflect the increase in work volume (+3.3) and to account for the estimated decrease in Hot work due in the HFTD areas (+1.8).
- (7) Adjusted 2021 EOY Forecast - This forecast reflects the estimated 2021 SAIDI value if the electric T&D system is operated as that planned for 2022 (without improvement initiatives).

- Benchmarking: While this metric is not benchmarkable, PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile in SAIFI performance;
- Regulatory Requirements: None;

- 1 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
2 Enforcement: The target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it aligns  
3 with unplanned SAIFI target range and accounts for our current work  
4 plan and the unknowns of EPSS;
- 5 • Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2021 results  
6 and 2022 work plan, PG&E does not expect degradation that would  
7 prevent us from meeting proposed target;
- 8 • PG&E's top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of  
9 catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and  
10 does not support an improvement of outage performance:
  - 11 – The General Rate Case (GRC) in 2017-20 allocated budget for  
12 reliability, but the work was re-prioritized to focus on wildfire  
13 mitigation, compliance, pole replacement and tags;
  - 14 – The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment  
15 Failure, specifically Overhead Conductor;
  - 16 – Current replacement rates from 2017-2021 have been on average  
17 32 miles/year. This is significantly below the Overhead Conductor  
18 Asset Management Plan, which cites third-party recommendations  
19 for replacement rates at approximately 1200 miles per year to  
20 sustain 2016 levels of reliability performance;
  - 21 – Current investment profile in the GRC for OH Conductor is  
22 ~70 miles/year. Alternative funding scenarios or internal  
23 prioritization would be needed to increase replacement miles  
24 per year;
  - 25 – Conductor replacement under the System Hardening program for  
26 wildfire risk reduction is forecasted through the GRC period but  
27 provides limited additional benefit, at approximately 1 percent  
28 (due to the rural HFTD geography in which this work takes place);
  - 29 – Current allocated 2022 GRC spending amount for targeted reliability  
30 improvements (MAT Code 49x) is \$9 million;
  - 31 – Prior to the implementation of EPSS in July 2021, current levels of  
32 investment and assuming the GRC forecast through 2026,  
33 SAIDI/SAIFI performance was expected to remain in the  
34 third quartile and sustained improvement trending not expected until



1 2023. However, with the EPSS implementation performance fell  
2 and is expected to remain in the fourth quartile; and

- 3 • Other Considerations: PG&E expanded their EPSS program (as  
4 described earlier in this chapter) and began enablement on high-risk  
5 circuits in January—representing and expanded fire season—all of which  
6 significantly impact SAIDI, SAIFI and CESCO performance.

### 7 **3. 2022 Target (Amended)**

8 Range: 1,523-1,980

9 The amended 2022 Target reflects a range of 1,523, which aligns to the  
10 projected 2022 SAIFI (planned/unplanned) performance increase (1.320 to  
11 1.801) to a 30 percent increase of 1,980, primarily driven by anticipated  
12 EPSS impacts and limitations within our reporting systems. See Section C  
13 above.

### 14 **4. 2026 Target (Amended)**

15 Range: 1,523-1,980

16 Given the uncertainty of the EPSS environments and limitations within  
17 our reporting capabilities, 2026 target range mirrors 2022 and will be  
18 adjusted in the March 2023 filing once the 2022 impacts are actualized and  
19 further data is available to leverage for updating the target strategy.

## 20 **D. (2.4) Performance Against Target**


### 21 **1. Deviation From the 1-Year Target**

22 As demonstrated in Figure 2.4-6 below, PG&E saw a performance  
23 of 768 in the first half of 2022 which is tracking 17% over YTD target. As  
24 this is the first year measuring this metric in addition to the issues described  
25 in Section C above, additional historical data is needed to improve the EOY  
26 forecasting accuracy of this new metric.

### 27 **2. Deviation From the 5-Year Target**

28 As discussed in Section C above, PG&E is proposing a 1-year and  
29 5-year target range due to wide-scale implementation of the EPSS program  
30 and system reporting limitations. However, as mentioned in Section E  
31 below, PG&E is deploying a number of programs to maintain or improve the  
32 long-term performance of this metric.

**FIGURE 2.4-6  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION  
VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL RESULTS AND 2022 AND 2026  
TARGET RANGES**



1 **E. (2.4) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Outage Metric Performance  
3 are listed below.

- 4 • Enhanced Vegetation Management: Program is targeted at overhead  
5 distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements PG&Es  
6 annual routine vegetation management work with CPUC mandated  
7 clearances. PG&E’s Vegetation Management program, components of  
8 which exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to mitigating wildfire risk.  
9 Our vegetation management team inspects and identifies needed vegetation  
10 maintenance on all distribution and transmission circuit miles in PG&E’s  
11 service area on a recurring cycle through Routine and Tree Mortality Patrols,  
12 as well as Pole Clearing. Our EVM Program goes above and beyond  
13 regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum

1 clearances and removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022 PG&E will  
2 complete 1800 miles of EVM work.

3 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
4 PG&E's Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) for additional details on 2022.

- 5 • Asset Replacement (Overhead, Underground): Overhead asset  
6 replacement addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches,  
7 while underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing  
8 underground cable and switches.
- 9 • Please see Chapter 11, Overhead and Underground Distribution  
10 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.
- 11 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program  
12 covers several significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2022  
13 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program  
14 which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused  
15 by distribution overhead assets. In 2022, we are rapidly expanding our  
16 system hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of system  
17 hardening work which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding  
18 and removal of overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing at  
19 least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County  
20 Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work; replacing  
21 equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt  
22 fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all known, remaining in HFTD  
23 areas). As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3,600 miles of  
24 Undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the  
25 10,000 Mile Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at  
26 scale is expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD  
27 geography, and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk  
28 at this time,

29 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening Mitigations in  
30 PG&E's WMP for additional details on 2022.

- 31 • Downed Conductor Detection: To further mitigate high impedance faults  
32 that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific distribution line reclosers  
33 utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate previously undetectable  
34 faults. This innovative solution is called Down Conductor Detection (DCD)

1 and has been implemented on over 200 reclosing devices as of  
2 September 1, 2022. This technology uses sophisticated algorithms to  
3 determine when a line-to-ground arc is present (i.e., electrical current  
4 flowing from one conductive point to another) and the recloser will  
5 immediately de-energize the line once detected. Although this technology is  
6 new, it has already proven successful in detecting faults that would have  
7 otherwise been undetectable. PG&E will continue to learn from these pilot  
8 installations through the 2022 wildfire season and expects to develop future  
9 plans leveraging this technology to address system risks.

- 10 • Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of  
11 existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal  
12 contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission  
13 poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms  
14 Please see Chapter 11 Overhead and Underground Distribution

15 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 16 • Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement  
17 Work: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance  
18 of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,  
19 Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches  
20 (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors—that plays an  
21 important role in preventing customer interruptions and is critical for  
22 restoring power after an outage.

23 The Underground COE Program is comprised of: corrective maintenance of  
24 certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,  
25 Interrupters, Sectionalizers); Voltage Devices (Regulators,  
26 Stepdowns/Autobanks); Switches (Switches, Auto-Transfer Switches);  
27 Capacitors, and Cable (Mainline (only); Loop (underground only))

28 Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 11, Overhead and Underground  
29 Distribution Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.1**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.1  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.1**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(DISTRIBUTION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.1) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.1 – Wires Down Major Event  
13           Days (MED) in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is  
14           defined as:

15           *Number of Wires Down events on MED involving overhead (OH)*  
16           *primary or secondary distribution circuits divided by total circuit miles of OH*  
17           *primary distribution lines x 1,000, in HFTD Areas in a calendar year.*

18       **2. Introduction of Metric**

19           In 2012, PG&E initiated the Electric Wires Down Program, including  
20           introduction of the electric wires down metric, to address our increased  
21           focus on public safety by reducing the number of electric wire conductors  
22           that fail and result in contact with the ground, a vehicle, or other object.

23           This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution OH  
24           Asset Risk and our Wildfire Risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk  
25           Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report (RAMP) filing.

26 **B. (3.1) Metric Performance**

27       **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

28           We have nine and a half years of historical data that includes the years  
29           2013- June 2022. Although we started measuring distribution wire down  
30           incidents in 2012, 2013 was the first full year we uniformly measured the  
31           number of distribution wire down incidents. Over this historical reporting  
32           period, performance is largely influenced by external factors such as

1 weather and third-party contact with our OH electric facilities. These  
2 historical results are plotted in Figure 3.1-1 below.

3 Our OH electric primary distribution system consists of approximately  
4 81,000 circuit miles of OH conductor and associated assets that could  
5 contribute to a wires down incident. Approximately 25,280<sup>1</sup> miles of our OH  
6 electric primary distribution lines traverse in the HFTD areas.

7 Over the last several years, we have completed significant work and  
8 launched various initiatives targeted at reducing wires down incidents,  
9 including:

- 10 • Investigating wire down incidents and implementing learnings and  
11 corrective actions;
- 12 • Performing infrared inspections of OH electric power lines to identify and  
13 repair hot spots;
- 14 • Clearing of vegetation hazards posing risks to our OH electric facilities
- 15 • Replacing deteriorated OH electric line conductors with newer line  
16 conductors; and
- 17 • Hardening of OH electric power systems with more resilient equipment.

18 In addition, our vegetation management (VM) teams conduct site visits  
19 of vegetation caused wires down incidents as part of its standard tree  
20 caused service interruption investigation process. The data obtained from  
21 site visits supports efforts to reduce future vegetation caused wires down  
22 incidents. The data collected from these investigations also helps identify  
23 failure patterns by tree species that are associated with wires down  
24 incidents.


25 Distribution Wire Down Events on MEDS have varied each year and has  
26 been heavily driven by not just the number of events, but by the severity of  
27 the MED experienced in that specific year (refer to table below). Given the  
28 randomness of weather patterns, no discernable trends can be learned from  
29 historical performance results.

---

<sup>1</sup> EOY 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference EOY 2022 mileage



**FIGURE 3.1-1  
DISTRIBUTION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES TIER 2/3,  
OCCURRING ON MEDS (2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**



**TABLE 3.1-1  
NUMBER OF MEDS/YEAR (2013 – JUNE 2022)**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	YTD June 2022
4	5	10	3	30	7	31	14	25	0

1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                PG&E uses the Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) –  
3        Operations Database, to track and count the number of wires down  
4        incidents as well as our electric distribution geographical information  
5        systems (EDGIS) to determine if the wire down incident was in an HFTD  
6        locations. Although our outage database does not specifically identify  
7        precise location of the downed wire, we use the Latitude and Longitude  
8        (e.g., Lat/Long) of the device used to isolate the involved electric power line  
9        Section as a proxy. We also use our electric distribution geographic  
10       information system (EDGIS) application to determine if that device (via:  
11       Lat/Long information) is in the HFTD (e.g., Tier 2 or Tier 3 location). Outage  
12       information is entered into ILIS by our electric distribution operators based

1 on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory Control  
2 and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™<sup>2</sup> devices. We last upgraded  
3 our outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter information to  
4 identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent review  
5 and correction.

6 PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
7 (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution  
8 Reliability Indices to define MED to measure the performance of its electric  
9 system under normally expected operating conditions. PG&E normally  
10 excludes MEDs to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily  
11 operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical  
12 effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is  
13 calculated from the natural log of the daily SAIDI values over the past five  
14 years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it  
15 leads to consistent results and is a good indicator of operational and design  
16 stress.

### 17 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

18 The number of Distribution Wire Down events during MEDs has varied  
19 each year and has been heavily driven by both the number and severity of  
20 the MED experienced in that specific year.

21 As can be seen from the 2013 to June 2022 distribution down event and  
22 number of MEDs per year data, the number of Tier 2 and Tier 3 wire down  
23 events were significantly impacted by the number of MEDs experienced in  
24 2017 and 2019. The average number of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD distribution  
25 wire down events per 1,000 mile per MED was 0.438 in 2021, compared to  
26 2.294 in 2017 and 1.794 in 2019.

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2 SmartMeter is a PG&E registered trademark. All further references to SmartMeters in PG&E's testimony in this proceeding should be assumed to refer to the trademarked name, without continually using the ™ symbol, consistent with legally-acceptable practice.

1 **C. (3.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There have been no changes to the directional 1- and five- year targets  
4 since the last report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

- 6 • Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes  
7 response stays the same in events);
- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: This metric is expected to remain within the  
9 historical performance levels, but will vary based on the number of  
10 MEDs experienced in a year;
- 11 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 12 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 13 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
14 Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as  
15 it states performance will remain within historical range;
- 16 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes, this metric is  
17 attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by  
18 variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the severity  
19 of weather on MED; and
- 20 • Other Considerations: None.

21 **3. 2022 Target**

22 The 2022 target is to maintain within historical performance levels.

23 **4. 2026 Target**

24 The 2026 target is to maintain within historical performance levels.

25 **D. (3.1) Performance Against Target**

26 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

27 As demonstrated in Figure 3.1-1 above, PG&E experienced zero Major  
28 Event Days in the first half of 2022 (and in turn no distribution wire down  
29 events on MEDs) which is consistent with Company's 1-year directional  
30 target.

1       **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

2               As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
3               programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
4               align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

5       **E. (3.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

6               PG&E will continue to execute many ongoing activities to reduce wires  
7               down, including the following programs:

- 8       •   OH Conductor Replacement: PG&E's electric distribution system includes  
9               approximately 81,000 circuit miles of OH conductor on its distribution system  
10              that operates between 4 and 21 kilovolt, including bare and covered  
11              conductors. Approximately 55,000 circuit miles of this distribution  
12              conductor, including approximately 40,000 circuit miles of small conductor is  
13              in non-HFTD areas. PG&E's OH Conductor Replacement Program,  
14              recorded in MAT 08J, proactively replaces OH conductor in non-HFTD  
15              areas to address elevated rates of wires down and deteriorated/damaged  
16              conductors and to improve system safety, reliability, and integrity.

17              PG&E updated its prioritization process for OH conductor replacements  
18              to include consideration the RAMP risk tranches with Safety Consequence  
19              Zones and/or shared protection zones with critical customer(s). The three  
20              focused tranches are: (1) corrosive regions with specific materials  
21              (Aluminum Conductor Steel-Reinforced (ACSR)), (2) elevated wires down  
22              (small copper conductors), and (3) poor reliability performance. The final  
23              definition of 2 the Safety Consequence Zones is being developed, but  
24              currently takes 3 into consideration: Within buffer zones near Major  
25              Transportation 4 Infrastructure, Public Assembly Areas, and Public Safety  
26              Entities.

27              Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground  
28              Asset Management in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 29       •   Patrols and Inspections: PG&E monitors the condition of primary OH  
30              conductor through patrols and inspections consistent with GO 165, and  
31              targeted infrared inspections. Replacement plans are developed using  
32              failure rates obtained through wires down analysis and conductor-splice  
33              data. PG&E conducts post-event investigations of targeted equipment  
34              failure caused outages (i.e., wires down events involving conductor or splice

1 failure). These investigations collect physical and environmental attributes  
2 to determine conductor replacement justification and priority as well as to  
3 determine failure trends. The information collected is entered into the  
4 “Engineer Investigation Wires Down Database.” Analysis of this data has  
5 informed PG&E’s strategy to focus replacement work on conductor types  
6 with elevated wires down rates, including small (#4 and #6 gauge) copper  
7 conductors and #4 ACSR conductors located in corrosion areas.

8 Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground  
9 Asset Management in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 10 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E’s broader grid design program  
11 covers several significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E’s 2022  
12 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program  
13 which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused  
14 by distribution OH assets. In 2022, we are rapidly expanding our system  
15 hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of system hardening  
16 work, which includes: OH system hardening, undergrounding, and removal  
17 of OH lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing at least 175 circuit  
18 miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts and  
19 other distribution system hardening work; replacing equipment in HFTD  
20 areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt fuses (3,000) and  
21 surge arresters (~4,500, all known, remaining in HFTD areas). As we look  
22 beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3,600 miles of Undergrounding to be  
23 completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the 10,000 Mile  
24 Undergrounding Program. This system hardening work done at scale is  
25 expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD geography and is  
26 currently prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk.

27 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening  
28 Mitigations in PG&E’s WMP for additional details.

- 29 • Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM): The EVM Program is targeted  
30 at OH distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements  
31 PG&E’s annual routine VM work with California Public Utilities Commission  
32 mandated clearances. PG&E’s EVM Program, components of which  
33 exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to mitigating wildfire risk. Our  
34 EVM team inspects and identifies needed vegetation maintenance on all

1 distribution and transmission circuit miles in PG&E's service area on a  
2 recurring cycle through Routine and Tree Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole  
3 Clearing. Our EVM Program goes above and beyond regulatory  
4 requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and  
5 removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022 PG&E will complete  
6 1,800 miles of EVM work.

7 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
8 PG&E's WMP.

- 9 • Other Advancements: There are several technologies that PG&E is piloting  
10 to better identify and/or prevent conductor to ground faults. This includes:
  - 11 – SmartMeter-based methods;
  - 12 – Distribution Falling Wire Detection Method;
  - 13 – Distribution Fault Anticipation;
  - 14 – Early Fault Detection; and
  - 15 – Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.2**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.2  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.2**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(DISTRIBUTION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.2) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.2 – Wires Down Non-Major  
13           Event Days in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is  
14           defined as:

15           *Number of Wires Down incidents on Non-Major Event Days (Non-MED)*  
16           *involving Overhead (OH) electric primary distribution circuits divided by the*  
17           *total circuit miles of OH electric primary distribution lines multiplied by 1,000,*  
18           *in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) areas, in a calendar year.*

19       **2. Introduction to the Metric**

20           In 2012, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company)  
21           initiated the Electric Wires Down Program, including introduction of the  
22           electric wires down metric, to advance the Company’s focus on public safety  
23           by reducing the number of electric wire conductors that fail and result in  
24           contact with the ground, a vehicle, or other object.

25           This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution  
26           Overhead (OH) Asset Risk and Wildfire risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk  
27           Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report (RAMP) filing.

28 **B. (3.2) Metric Performance**

29       **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

30           There are nine and a half years of historical data available from the  
31           years 2013 – June 2022. Although PG&E started measuring distribution

1 wire down incidents in 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring  
2 the number of distribution wire down incidents.

3 Over this historical reporting period, performance is largely influenced by  
4 external factors such as weather and third-party contact with OH electric  
5 facilities.

6 PG&E's OH electric primary distribution system consists of  
7 approximately 81,000 circuit miles of OH conductor and associated assets  
8 that could contribute to a wires down incident. Approximately 25,280 miles  
9 of our OH electric primary distribution lines traverse in the HFTD areas.

10 Over the last several years, we have completed significant work and  
11 launched various initiatives targeted at reducing wires down incidents,  
12 including:

- 13 • Investigating wire down incidents and implementing learnings and  
14 corrective actions;
- 15 • Performing infrared inspections of OH electric power lines to identify and  
16 repair hot spots;
- 17 • Clearing of vegetation hazards posing risks to our OH electric facilities;
- 18 • Replacing deteriorated OH electric line conductors with newer line  
19 conductors; and
- 20 • Hardening of OH electric power systems with more resilient equipment.

21 In addition, our vegetation management (VM) teams conduct site visits  
22 of vegetation caused wires down incidents as part of its standard tree  
23 caused service interruption investigation process. The data obtained from  
24 site visits supports efforts to reduce future vegetation caused wires down  
25 incidents. The data collected from these investigations also helps identify  
26 failure patterns by tree species that are associated with wires down  
27 incidents.


28 PG&E's asset data base reflects the circuit miles that currently exist,  
29 and it does not specifically maintain line miles by HFTD in prior years. As  
30 such, all wire down rates are based on a total of 25,278.5<sup>1</sup> overhead

---

<sup>1</sup> EOY 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference EOY 2022 mileage.

1 distribution circuit line miles and assumes annual variances due to the circuit  
2 miles are considered to be negligible.

**FIGURE 3.2-1**  
**DISTRIBUTION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES**  
**(TIER 2/3, NON-MED ONLY 2013-JUNE YTD 2022)**



3 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

4 PG&E uses its Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) –  
5 Operations Database to track and count the number of wires down incidents  
6 as well as its electric distribution geographical information systems (EDGIS)  
7 to determine if the wire down incident was in an HFTD locations. Although  
8 the outage database does not specifically identify precise location of the  
9 downed wire, the Latitude and Longitude (e.g., Lat/Long) of the device is  
10 used to isolate the involved electric power line Section as a proxy. PG&E  
11 also uses its EDGIS application to determine if that device (Lat/Long  
12 information) is in the HFTD (e.g., Tier 2 or Tier 3 location). Outage  
13 information is entered into ILIS by our electric distribution operators based  
14 on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory Control

1 and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeters™<sup>2</sup>. We last upgraded our  
2 outage reporting tools in year 2015 and integrated SmartMeter information  
3 to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent  
4 review and correction.

5 PG&E uses the IEEE 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric  
6 Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and apply excludable Major  
7 Event Days (MED) to measure the performance of its electric system under  
8 normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events  
9 to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to  
10 be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard,  
11 the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the daily System  
12 Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the past five years  
13 by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads  
14 to consistent results and is a good indicator of operational and design  
15 stress.

### 16 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

17 Through June 2022 there have been 235 distribution wires down events,  
18 compared to 238 during the same time frame in 2021. 2021 had 15 more  
19 distribution wires down events in HFTD than had occurred in 2020. The  
20 number of distribution wire down events occurring on non-MED has varied  
21 each year. The significant variance in this metric is driven by several factors  
22 including weather conditions, third party influence and the number of MED  
23 days per year. Furthermore, PG&E's approach to wildfire mitigations in the  
24 HFTD locations is based on a risk informed prioritization of work in the areas  
25 where wildfire risk is evaluated as highest, as opposed to where wires down  
26 incidents have a high likelihood of occurrence if they are in areas where  
27 wildfire risk is relatively lower within the HFTD.

---

<sup>2</sup> SmartMeter is a PG&E registered trademark. All further references to SmartMeters in PG&E's testimony in this proceeding should be assumed to refer to the trademarked name, without continually using the ™ symbol, consistent with legally-acceptable practice.

1 **C. (3.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 [There are no updates to the 1 and 5-Year Targets since last report.](#)

4 **2. Target Methodology**

5 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, the following factors were  
6 considered:

7 • Historical Data and Trends:

- 8 – The past five years were used in PG&E’s target setting  
9 methodology. These five years (2017-2021), as opposed to the  
10 9 years of historical data available, were used because of their  
11 comparability to the current state of wildfire mitigation activity, which  
12 began at significant scale in 2017. Not only do these years more  
13 comparably reflect the current environment but also the current state  
14 of performance. Between 2017 and 2021, there was a 55 percent  
15 decrease in distribution wire down events. The 5-year period will be  
16 updated following the conclusion of 2022 and reflected in the April  
17 report filing.
- 18 – Target methodology leverages a 5-year average + 1 Standard  
19 deviation approach, so that targeted performance maintains the  
20 improvement achieved over the past five years while accounting for  
21 the normal variability observed in the results of this metric, typically  
22 caused by weather;
- 23 – Target methodology also accounts for PG&E’s wildfire mitigation  
24 strategies, with work in HFTD areas being targeted for wildfire risk  
25 reduction, which is not fully consistent with a work prioritization  
26 approach targeting wires down count reduction only;

27 • Benchmarking: Not available;

28 • Regulatory Requirements: None;

29 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
30 Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they  
31 account for the variability experienced by this metric;

32 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targets are attainable  
33 within known resources, however this metric is impacted by the

1 variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as weather  
2 conditions that may not be excluded as an MED; and

3 • Other Considerations:

- 4 – Longer term (5-year) target setting includes a 2 percent  
5 year-over-year improvement methodology which accounts for  
6 weather variability and the increase in MED threshold (less days will  
7 be excluded) in 2022, as well as the improvements expected in  
8 HFTD from System Hardening and Enhanced Vegetation  
9 Management (EVM).

10 **3. 2022 Target**

11 The 2022 target leverages a 5-year average + 1 Standard deviation  
12 approach.

13 **4. 2026 Target**

14 The 2026 target is set to a 10 percent improvement from the 2017 result  
15 (assumes a continued year-over-year 2 percent improvement from the 2022  
16 Target) based on the considerations described above.

17 The following figure plots our historical and projected performance for  
18 Distribution Wires Down during Non-MED in the HFTD.

19 **D. (3.2) Performance Against Target**


20 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

21 As demonstrated in Figure 3.2-2 below, PG&E saw a performance of 9.3  
22 Distribution Wires Down Events per 1,000 circuit miles in the first half of  
23 2022 which is consistent with Company's 1-year target.

24 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

25 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
26 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
27 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 3.2-2  
HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN  
INCIDENTS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES**



1 **E. (3.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 PG&E will continue to execute many ongoing activities to reduce wires  
3 down, including the following programs:

- 4 • Overhead Conductor Replacement: PG&E’s electric distribution system  
5 includes approximately 81,000 circuit miles of OH conductor on its  
6 distribution system that operates between 4 and 21 kilovolt, including bare  
7 and covered conductors. Approximately 55,000 circuit miles of this  
8 distribution conductor, including approximately 40,000 circuit miles of small  
9 conductor is in non-HFTD areas. PG&E’s OH Conductor Replacement  
10 Program, recorded in MAT 08J, proactively replaces OH conductor in  
11 non-HFTD areas to address elevated rates of wires down and  
12 deteriorated/damaged conductors and to improve system safety, reliability,  
13 and integrity.

14 PG&E updated its prioritization process for OH conductor replacements  
15 to include consideration the RAMP risk tranches with Safety Consequence  
16 Zones and/or shared protection zones with critical customer(s). The  
17 three focused tranches are: (1) corrosive regions with specific materials  
18 (Aluminum Conductor Steel-Reinforced (ACSR)), (2) elevated wires down  
19 (small copper conductors), and (3) poor reliability performance. The final

1 definition of two the Safety Consequence Zones is being developed, but  
2 currently takes three into consideration: Within buffer zones near Major  
3 Transportation 4 Infrastructure, Public Assembly Areas, and Public Safety  
4 Entities.

5 Please see Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground Asset Management  
6 in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 7 • Patrols and Inspections: PG&E monitors the condition of primary OH  
8 conductor through patrols and inspections consistent with GO 165 and  
9 targeted infrared inspections. Replacement plans are developed using  
10 failure rates obtained through wires down analysis and conductor-splice  
11 data. Seven PG&E conducts post-event investigations of targeted  
12 equipment failure eight caused outages (i.e., wires down events involving  
13 conductor or splice failure). These investigations collect physical and  
14 environmental attributes to determine conductor replacement justification  
15 and priority as well as to determine failure trends. The information collected  
16 is entered into the “Engineer Investigation Wires Down Database.” Analysis  
17 of this data has informed PG&E’s strategy to focus replacement work on  
18 conductor types with elevated wires down rates, including small (#4 and  
19 #6 gauge) copper conductors and #4 ACSR conductors located in corrosion  
20 areas.

21 Please see Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground Asset Management  
22 in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- 23 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E’s broader grid design program  
24 covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E’s 2022  
25 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program  
26 which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused  
27 by distribution OH assets. In 2022, we are rapidly expanding our system  
28 hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of system hardening work  
29 which includes OH system hardening, undergrounding and removal of OH  
30 lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing at least 175 circuit miles of  
31 undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other  
32 distribution system hardening work; replacing equipment in HFTD areas that  
33 creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt fuses (3,000) and surge arresters  
34 (~4,500, all known, remaining in HFTD areas). As we look beyond 2022,



1 PG&E is targeting 3,600 miles of Undergrounding to be completed between  
2 2023 and 2026 as part of the 10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. This  
3 system hardening work done at scale is expected to have limited reliability  
4 benefit due to rural HFTD geography and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire  
5 risk rather than reliability risk at this time.

6 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening  
7 Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details on 2022.

- 8 • Enhanced Vegetation Management: The EVM program is targeted at OH  
9 distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements PG&E's  
10 annual routine VM work with CPUC mandated clearances. PG&E's VM  
11 program, components of which exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to  
12 mitigating wildfire risk. PG&E's VM team inspects and identifies needed  
13 vegetation maintenance on all distribution and transmission circuit miles in  
14 PG&E's service area on a recurring cycle through Routine and Tree  
15 Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole Clearing. Our EVM program goes above  
16 and beyond regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding  
17 minimum clearances and removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022  
18 PG&E will complete 1,800 miles of EVM work.

19 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
20 PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- 21 • Other Advancements: In addition, there are several technologies that PG&E  
22 is piloting to better identify and/or prevent conductor to ground faults. This  
23 includes:
  - 24 – SmartMeter-based methods;
  - 25 – Distribution Falling Wire Detection Method;
  - 26 – Distribution Fault Anticipation;
  - 27 – Early Fault Detection; and
  - 28 – Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.3**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.3  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.3**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(TRANSMISSION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in; C.1 concerning updated metric targets; and Section D concerning performance  
8           against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

9           **A. (3.3) Overview**

10           **1. Metric Definition**

11                   Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.3 – Wires Down Major Event  
12                   Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

13                           *Number of Wires Down events on Major Event Days (MED) involving*  
14                           *overhead transmission circuits divided by total circuit miles of overhead*  
15                           *transmission lines x 1,000, in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas in a*  
16                           *calendar year.*

17           **2. Introduction of Metric**

18                   This metric is a measure of how Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
19                   (PG&E or the Company) provides safe and reliable electric services to its  
20                   customers. It's also a measure of how available PG&E's electric  
21                   transmission (ET) grid is to the market for the buying and selling of electricity  
22                   as managed by the California Independent System Operator.

23                   This metric is associated with PG&E's Failure of ET Overhead Asset  
24                   Risk and Wildfire Risk, which are part of the Company's 2020 Risk  
25                   Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report filing.

26           **B. (3.3) Metric Performance**

27           **1. Data Collection**

28                   Unplanned ET outages are documented by PG&E's Transmission  
29                   Operations Department using its Transmission Operations Tracking &  
30                   Logging (TOTL) application. If distribution-served customers are affected by  
31                   a particular transmission wire down event, the data captured in TOTL are  
32                   merged in a separate data set with respective data from PG&E's distribution

1 outage reporting application Integrated Logging Information System. Follow  
2 up is usually required to validate cause of the wire down event, including  
3 daily outage review calls with various stakeholder departments to clarify the  
4 details of the wire down event. Results are consolidated and regularly  
5 communicated internally to keep stakeholders informed of progress.

## 6 **2. Historical Data**

7 PG&E initiated the electric wires down events metric in 2012 to support  
8 public safety. To help develop targets for 2012, outages in 2011 were  
9 reviewed for a count of wire down events. Included as part of Attachment B  
10 is an Excel workbook that provides details of all the ET wire down events  
11 since 2011. The workbook allows users to filter for events that occurred on  
12 MEDs, were within a particular HFTD (either Tier 2 or Tier 3), or were due to  
13 specific cause (e.g., equipment failure, external contacts such as Mylar  
14 balloons or vehicles, lightning, and tree failures).

15 Electric Transmission reports its wire down events by precise points of  
16 failure including circuit name and pole location. When multiple spans are  
17 involved, the spreadsheet shows only one of those spans, but the column  
18 under the “Comments” header provides more details about the event  
19 including if multiple spans were involved. There are also columns that were  
20 populated for latitude and longitude from PG&E’s ET Geographical Interface  
21 System coinciding with the pole location. This view is available by request.

22 This metric is normalized by the transmission circuit miles within Tier 2  
23 and Tier 3 HFTDs. The HFTD boundaries are recent development and were  
24 not defined for several years as shown in Figure 3.3-1 below. Hence, for all  
25 years prior to and including ytd. June 2022 performance PG&E uses  
26 5,525.9<sup>1</sup> overhead transmission circuit miles in Tier 2/3 HFTD areas and  
27 assumes any variances in prior years are negligible.

## 28 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

29 All systems and processes and their outputs exhibit variability. Control  
30 charts help monitor variability and can be used to differentiate common  
31 causes of variability from special causes. Common, or chance, causes are

---

1 [End-of-year 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference end-of-year 2022 mileage.](#)


1 numerous small causes of variability that are inherent to a system and  
2 operate randomly. Special, or assignable, causes can have relatively large  
3 effects on the process and may lead to a state that is out of statistical  
4 control—i.e., outside control chart limits.

5 The probability that a point falls above the upper control limit (for most  
6 control chart designs, usually an indicator of significant process degradation)  
7 or below the lower control limit (an indicator, usually, of significant process  
8 improvement) if only common causes are operating is approximately  
9 0.00135. It is therefore unlikely to have measures fall beyond the control  
10 limits when no special cause is operating. False alarms are possible, but  
11 the placement of the control limits at 3 standard deviations (+/-) from the  
12 process average is thought to control the number of false alarms adequately  
13 in most situations. The simplest rule for detecting presence of a special  
14 cause is one or more points that fall beyond upper or lower limits of the  
15 chart.


16 Control charts can further illustrate an expected range of performance  
17 based on historical data. They can assist with discrete observations of  
18 recent performance improvement or decline or stability.

19 Figure 3.3-1 below is a control chart showing historical annual  
20 performances since 2011 for ET wire down events excluding those that  
21 occurred on a declared MED. Similarly, Figure 3.3-2 is a control chart  
22 showing all wire down events including MEDs.

**FIGURE 3.3-1  
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN EVENTS, EXCLUDING MEDS  
(2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**



**FIGURE 3.3-2  
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN EVENTS, INCLUDING MEDS  
(2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**




1            Comparing the two figures above, one can conclude that on average we  
 2            can expect 20 more transmission wire down events when MEDs are  
 3            included. More importantly, there are no instances in either chart where the  
 4            upper chart limit set at three standard deviations was exceeded, and there's  
 5            only one instance (performance year 2012) where the upper warning limit  
 6            (UWL) set at two standard deviations was exceeded. It appears we have a  
 7            stable performing process in the count of transmission wire down events,  
 8            whether MEDs are included in the count or not.

9            Figure 3.3-3 below is analogous to Figure 3.3-2 above but restricts the  
 10           count of transmission wire down events to those occurring within Tier 2 or  
 11           Tier 3 HFTDs. All categories related to cause are included. The bars in the  
 12           chart show congruence between the number of MEDs in a performance year  
 13           vs. the count of transmission wire down. It's also apparent that we have a  
 14           stable system as all annual performance results fall within the two standard  
 15           deviation lines for UWL and lower warning limit.



**FIGURE 3.3-3  
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN EVENTS,  
INCLUDING MEDS, TIER 2/3 (2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**



1                    Figure 3.3-4 below is analogous to Figure 3.3-3 above but further  
 2                    restricts the count of transmission wire down events to those that occurred  
 3                    only during a declared MED. These counts are normalized by dividing by  
 4                    the circuit mileage associated circuits located in Tier 2 and Tier 3  
 5                    boundaries x 1,000. Again, there is congruence between the normalized  
 6                    counts of transmission wire down events and the number of MEDs. There is  
 7                    one instance (2021) where the actual count slightly exceeds the UWL set at  
 8                    two standard deviations. Nevertheless, it appears we have a stable  
 9                    performance.

**TABLE 3.3-1  
NUMBER OF MEDS/YEAR (2013 – JUNE 2022)**

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	YTD June 2022
4	5	10	3	30	7	31	14	25	0

1 **C. (3.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There are no updates to the directional 1 and 5-Year Targets since last  
4 report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

- 6 • Unplanned Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and  
7 assumes response stays the same in events)

8 As discussed above in the interpretations of control charts related to this  
9 metric—and absent any “special” cause(s) that would result in deviation  
10 above the current three standard deviations—it is reasonable to expect that  
11 future transmission wire down results would remain within the historical  
12 performance levels. Such results will vary based on the number of MEDs  
13 experienced in a year; however, end of year actuals should remain centered  
14 around the mean and below the UWL shown in Figure 3.3-4.

- 15 • Benchmarking: Not available to best of our knowledge;  
16 • Regulatory Requirements: None;  
17 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
18 Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as  
19 it states metric performance will remain in historical range;  
20 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes, this metric is  
21 attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by  
22 the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the  
23 severity of inclement weather on MED; and  
24 • Other Considerations: None.

25 **D. (3.3) Performance Against Target**

26 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

27 PG&E experienced zero Major Event Days in the first half of 2022 (and  
28 in turn no transmission wire down events on MEDs) which is consistent with  
29 Company's 1-year directional target.

30 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

31 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
32 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
33 meet the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

1 **E. (3.3) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Wire down events can be caused by a variety of factors, including but not  
3 limited to asset failure, third party contact, or vegetation contact. The following  
4 work activities may provide future resiliency for certain wire down event causes,  
5 though the effectiveness of the work is dependent upon the circumstances of the  
6 wire down event (e.g., new assets may still be prone to a wire down event that  
7 occur due to extreme weather events outside of standard design guidance).

- 8 • Asset Inspection: Enhanced detailed inspections (i.e., enhanced  
9 inspections) of overhead transmission assets seek to proactively identify  
10 and treat pending failures of asset components which could create future  
11 wire down, outage, and/or safety events if left unresolved or allowed to “run  
12 to failure.” Enhanced inspections for transmission assets involve at least  
13 two detailed inspection methods per structure: ground and aerial. In  
14 addition to the ground and aerial inspections, climbing inspections are also  
15 required for 500 kilovolt structures or as triggered. All these inspection  
16 methods involve detailed, visual examinations of the assets with use of  
17 inspection checklists that are in accordance with the ET Preventive  
18 Maintenance (TD-1001M) as well as the Failure Modes and Effects  
19 Analysis. Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone, helicopter,  
20 or aerial lift.
- 21 • Asset Repair and Replacement: Completing repair, replacement, and life  
22 extension to transmission assets provides the benefit of reduced probability  
23 of failure for components that could potentially result in a wire down event.  
24 Most corrective maintenance notifications are identified as a result of  
25 transmission asset inspections and patrols.

26 Prioritization of maintenance tags are based on severity of the issues  
27 found, fire ignition potential (i.e., asset-conditions impacting issues  
28 associated with HFTD areas and High Fire Risk Area), probability of failure  
29 and the Wildfire Consequence Model. As conditions are identified, they are  
30 given a time-based priority based on guidance in PG&E’s ET Preventative  
31 Maintenance Manual. For certain tags (E and F priority tags), additional  
32 prioritization occurs based on the damage found. Time dependent  
33 conditions (meaning that the damage can worsen with time) with ignition  
34 potential are typically prioritized before other non-time dependent,

1 non-ignition potential tags. Execution of the prioritized work plan would also  
2 have to address other factors such as clearance availability, access, work  
3 efficiency, etc.

4 Additionally, replacement of assets in HFTD areas also may reduce wire  
5 down event risk. This reduction can be a combination of replacing aged,  
6 degraded assets, as well as providing more robust, up-to-standard designs.  
7 Asset removal eliminates wire-down event risk by removing the energized  
8 electrical components.

- 9 • Vegetation Management (VM): Trees or other vegetation that make contact  
10 or cross within flash-over distance of high voltage transmission lines can  
11 cause phase to phase or phase to ground electrical arcing, fire ignition or  
12 local, regional or cascading, grid-level service interruption. Dense  
13 vegetation growing within the right-of-way (ROW) can act as a fuel bed for  
14 wildfire ignition. Vegetation growing close to any pole or structure can  
15 impede inspection of the structure base and in some cases can damage the  
16 structure or conductors and result in wire down events.

17 PG&E operates our lines in ET corridors that are home to vast amounts  
18 of vegetation. This vegetation ranges from sparse to extremely dense. Our  
19 transmission lines also pass through urban, agricultural, and forested  
20 settings. The corridor environment is dynamic and requires focused  
21 attention to ensure vegetation stays clear of energized conductors and other  
22 equipment. Vegetation inspection is a required operational step in an  
23 overall VM Program. Accordingly, PG&E has developed an annual  
24 inspection cycle program as part of our overall Transmission VM Program to  
25 respond to the diverse and dynamic environment of our service territory.  
26 The Routine North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and  
27 Routine Non-NERC Programs are annually recurring. The Integrated  
28 Vegetation Management (IVM) Program maintains cleared ROWs on a  
29 recurs every three-to-5-year cycles. The frequency and prioritization for  
30 each of these programs is described in more detail below.

- 31 • Routine NERC: The Routine NERC Program includes Light Detection and  
32 Ranging (LiDAR) inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of  
33 vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on  
34 approximately 6,800 miles of NERC Critical lines. 100 percent inspection and

- 1 work plan completion are required by NERC Standard FAC-003-4. Work is  
2 prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs annually.
- 3 • Routine Non-NERC: The Non-Routine NERC Program includes LiDAR  
4 inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation  
5 encroachments as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately  
6 11,400 miles of transmission lines not designated as critical by NERC.  
7 Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs  
8 annually.
  - 9 • Integrated Vegetation Management: The IVM Program is an ongoing  
10 maintenance program designed to maintain cleared rights-of-way in a  
11 sustainable and compatible condition by eliminating tall-growing and  
12 fire-prone vegetation and promoting low-growing, compatible vegetation.  
13 Prioritization is based on aging of work cycles and evaluation of vegetation  
14 re-growth. After initial work is performed, the rights-of-ways are reassessed  
15 every two to five years.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.4**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.4  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.4**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(TRANSMISSION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in C.1 concerning metric targets; and Section D concerning performance against  
8           target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (3.4) Introduction**

10   **1. Metric Definition**

11           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.4 – Wires Down Non-Major  
12           Even Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

13           *Count of electric transmission wire down events on non-Major Event*  
14           *Days (MED) (as defined in IEEE (Institute of Electronic and Electrical*  
15           *Engineers) Standard 1366) divided by the total circuit miles of overhead*  
16           *transmission lines (divided by 1,000) in high fire threat district (HFTD)*  
17           *Areas.*

18   **2. Introduction of Metric**

19           This metric is a measure of how Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
20           (PG&E) provides safe and reliable electric services to its customers. It's  
21           also a measure of how available PG&E's electric transmission grid is to the  
22           market for the buying and selling of electricity as managed by the California  
23           Independent System Operator (CAISO).

24           This metric is associated with PG&E's Failure of Electric Transmission  
25           Overhead Asset Risk and Wildfire Risk, which are part of the Company's  
26           2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report (RAMP) filing.

27   **B. (3.4) Metric Performance**


28   **1. Historical Data (2013 – 2022)**

29           There are nine and a half years of historical data available from the  
30           years 2013 – June 2022. Although PG&E started measuring wire down  
31           incidents in the 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the  
32           number of transmission wire down incidents. This metric is normalized by



1 the transmission circuit miles within Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs. The HFTD  
 2 boundaries are a recent development and were not defined for several years  
 3 within the historical data timeframe. Hence, for all years prior to and  
 4 including performance year 2021 PG&E uses 5,525.9<sup>1</sup> overhead  
 5 transmission circuit miles in Tier 2/3 HFTD areas and assumes any  
 6 variances in prior years are negligible.

**FIGURE 3.4-1**  
**ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN EVENTS**  
**OCCURRING ON NON-MEDS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES (2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**



7 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

8 Unplanned electric transmission outages are documented by PG&E's  
 9 Transmission Operations Department using its Transmission Operations  
 10 Tracking & Logging (TOTL) application. If distribution-served customers are  
 11 affected by a particular transmission wire down event, the data captured in

<sup>1</sup> EOY 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference EOY 2022 mileage.

1 TOTL are merged in a separate data set with respective data from PG&E's  
2 distribution outage reporting application (integrated logging information  
3 system). Follow up is usually required to validate cause of the wire down  
4 event, including daily outage review calls with various stakeholder  
5 departments to clarify the details of the wire down event. Results are  
6 consolidated and regularly communicated internally to keep stakeholders  
7 informed of progress Metric performance.

### 8 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

9 All systems and processes and their outputs exhibit variability. Control  
10 charts help monitor variability and can be used to differentiate common  
11 causes of variability from special causes. Common, or chance, causes are  
12 numerous small causes of variability that are inherent to a system and  
13 operate randomly. Special, or assignable, causes can have relatively large  
14 effects on the process and may lead to a state that is out of statistical  
15 control—i.e., outside control chart limits.

16 The probability that a point falls above the upper control limit (for most  
17 control chart designs, usually an indicator of significant process degradation)  
18 or below the lower control limit (an indicator, usually, of significant process  
19 improvement) if only common causes are operating is approximately  
20 0.00135. It is therefore unlikely to have measures fall beyond the control  
21 limits when no special cause is operating. False alarms are possible, but  
22 the placement of the control limits at 3 standard deviations (+/-) from the  
23 process average is thought to control the number of false alarms adequately  
24 in most situations. The simplest rule for detecting presence of a special  
25 cause is one or more points that fall beyond upper or lower limits of the  
26 chart.

27 Control charts can further illustrate an expected range of performance  
28 based on historical data. They can assist with discrete observations of  
29 recent performance improvement or decline or stability.

30 Each year since 1998 PG&E and the CAISO or ISO have monitored  
31 electric transmission (ET) availability using control charts.

32 Appendix C of the Transmission Control Agreement (TCA) between  
33 PG&E and CAISO states that each participating transmission owner:

1 ...shall submit an annual report...describing its Availability Measures  
2 performance. This annual report shall be based on Forced Outage  
3 records...and shall include the date, start time, end time affected  
4 Transmission Facility, and the probable cause(s) if known.

5 Appendix C goes on to address targets which are defined as “The  
6 Availability performance goals established by the ISO,” which are based on  
7 the control chart limits calculated and shown in the annual report.

8 As mentioned, Electric Transmission (ET) wire down events have been  
9 tracked historically in part as a measure of how available PG&E’s ET grid is  
10 to the market managed by CAISO. With this proven and statistically robust  
11 method of calculating ET availability targets using control charts already  
12 established, it is reasonable—and preferable—to adopt this control chart  
13 methodology to not only monitor past and present performance but also  
14 better predict future performance and facilitate recommendations at a higher  
15 confidence level for annual targets related to ET wire down events.

16 There is precedent internally for using control charts to set targets.

17 Figure 3.4-1 above is a control chart showing historical annual  
18 performances through June 2022 for electric transmission wire down events  
19 excluding those that occurred on a declared major event day (MED).

## 20 **C. (3.4) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

### 21 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

22 [There are no updates to the 1 and 5-Year Targets since last report.](#)

### 23 **2. Target Methodology**

24 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, the following:

- 25 • Historical Data and Trends: 1-Year and 5-Year Targets are set to  
26 maintain performance within a 3 standard deviation range using the  
27 available historical data. As discussed above in the interpretations of  
28 control charts related to this metric—and absent any “special” cause(s)  
29 that would result in deviation above the current 3 standard deviations—it  
30 is reasonable to expect that future transmission wire down results would  
31 remain within the historical performance levels. Such results will vary  
32 based on the number of MEDs experienced in a year; however, end of  
33 year actuals should remain centered around the mean and below the  
34 UWL shown in Figure 3.4-1;

- 1 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 2 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 3 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and
- 4 Enforcement: The target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it
- 5 suggests that future results will remain within the historic performance
- 6 levels;
- 7 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Metric targets are
- 8 attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by
- 9 the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the
- 10 severity of inclement weather on days that don't register as Major
- 11 Event Days; and
- 12 • Other Considerations: None.

### 13 3. 2022 Target

14 Not to exceed 4.456, which represents maintaining a 3 standard  
15 deviation range. A 3 standard deviation remains consistent with other  
16 Electric Transmission external report filings with the CAISO.

### 17 4. 2026 Target

18 Not to exceed 4.456, which represents maintaining a 3 standard  
19 deviation range. A 3 standard deviation remains consistent with other  
20 Electric Transmission external report filings with the CAISO.

## 21 D. (3.4) Performance Against Target


### 22 1. Progress Towards the 1-year Target

23 As demonstrated in Figure 3.4-2 below, PG&E saw a performance of  
24 0.72 Transmission Wires Down Events per 1,000 circuit miles in the first half  
25 of 2022 which is consistent with Company's 1-year target.

### 26 2. Progress Towards the 5-year Target

27 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
28 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to meet  
29 the Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 3.4-2  
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN EVENTS  
HISTORIC RESULTS AND TARGETS**



1 **E. (3.4) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Wire down events can be caused by a variety of factors, including but not  
 3 limited to asset failure, third party contact, or vegetation contact. The following  
 4 work activities may provide future resiliency for certain wire down event causes,  
 5 though the effectiveness of the work is dependent upon the circumstances of the  
 6 wire down event (e.g., new assets may still be prone to a wire down event that  
 7 occur due to extreme weather events outside of standard design guidance).

- 8 • Asset Inspection: Enhanced detailed inspections (i.e., enhanced  
 9 inspections) of overhead transmission assets seek to proactively identify  
 10 and treat pending failures of asset components which could create future  
 11 wire down, outage, and/or safety events if left unresolved or allowed to “run  
 12 to failure.” Enhanced inspections for transmission assets involve at least  
 13 two detailed inspection methods per structure: ground and aerial. In  
 14 addition to the ground and aerial inspections, climbing inspections are also  
 15 required for 500 kilovolt (kV) structures or as triggered. All these inspection  
 16 methods involve detailed, visual examinations of the assets with use of  
 17 inspection checklists that are in accordance with the Electric Transmission  
 18 Preventive Maintenance (TD-1001M), as well as the Failure Modes and

1 Effects Analysis. Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone,  
2 helicopter, or aerial lift.

- 3 • Asset Repair and Replacement: Completing repair, replacement, and life  
4 extension to transmission assets provides the benefit of reduced probability  
5 of failure for components that could potentially result in a wire down event.  
6 Most corrective maintenance notifications are identified as a result of  
7 transmission asset inspections and patrols.

8 Prioritization of maintenance tags are based on severity of the issues found,  
9 fire ignition potential (i.e., asset-conditions impacting issues associated with  
10 HFTD areas and High Fire Risk Area), probability of failure and the Wildfire  
11 Consequence Model. As conditions are identified, they are given a time-based  
12 priority based on guidance in PG&E's Electric Transmission Preventative  
13 Maintenance Manual. For certain tags (E and F priority tags), additional  
14 prioritization occurs based on the damage found. Time dependent conditions  
15 (meaning that the damage can worsen with time) with ignition potential are  
16 typically prioritized before other non-time dependent, non-ignition potential tags.  
17 Execution of the prioritized work plan would also have to address other factors  
18 such as clearance availability, access, work efficiency, etc.

19 Additionally, replacement of assets in HFTD areas also may reduce wire  
20 down event risk. This reduction can be a combination of replacing aged,  
21 degraded assets, as well as providing more robust, up-to-standard designs.  
22 Asset removal eliminates wire-down event risk by removing the energized  
23 electrical components.

- 24 • Vegetation Management: Trees or other vegetation that make contact or  
25 cross within flash-over distance of high voltage transmission lines can cause  
26 phase to phase or phase to ground electrical arcing, fire ignition or local,  
27 regional or cascading, grid-level service interruption. Dense vegetation  
28 growing within the right-of-way (ROW) can act as a fuel bed for wildfire  
29 ignition. Vegetation growing close to any pole or structure can impede  
30 inspection of the structure base and in some cases can damage the  
31 structure or conductors and result in wire down events.

32 PG&E operates our lines in ET corridors that are home to vast amounts of  
33 vegetation. This vegetation ranges from sparse to extremely dense. Our  
34 transmission lines also pass through urban, agricultural, and forested settings.

1 The corridor environment is dynamic and requires focused attention to ensure  
2 vegetation stays clear of energized conductors and other equipment. Vegetation  
3 inspection is a required operational step in an overall Vegetation Management  
4 (VM) Program. Accordingly, PG&E has developed an annual inspection cycle  
5 program as part of our overall Transmission VM Program to respond to the  
6 diverse and dynamic environment of our service territory. The Routine North  
7 American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Routine Non-NERC  
8 Programs are annually recurring. The Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM)  
9 Program maintains cleared ROWs on a recurs every 3- to 5-year cycles. The  
10 frequency and prioritization for each of these programs is described in more  
11 detail below.

- 12 • Routine NERC: The Routine NERC Program includes Light Detection and  
13 Ranging (LiDAR) inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of  
14 vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on  
15 approximately 6,800 miles of NERC Critical lines. 100 percent inspection and  
16 work plan completion are required by NERC Standard FAC-003-4. Work is  
17 prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs annually.
- 18 • Routine Non-NERC: The Non-Routine NERC Program includes LiDAR  
19 inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation  
20 encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately  
21 11,400 miles of transmission lines not designated as critical by NERC.  
22 Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs  
23 annually.
- 24 • Integrated Vegetation Management: The IVM Program is an ongoing  
25 maintenance program designed to maintain cleared ROWs in a sustainable  
26 and compatible condition by eliminating tall-growing and fire-prone  
27 vegetation and promoting low-growing, compatible vegetation. Prioritization  
28 is based on aging of work cycles and evaluation of vegetation re-growth.  
29 After initial work is performed, the ROWs are reassessed every two to five  
30 years.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.5**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)**



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.5  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.5**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(DISTRIBUTION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.5) Overview**

11 **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.5 – Wires Down Red Flag  
13           Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Distribution) is defined as:

14           *Number of Wires Down events in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas*  
15           *on Red Flag Warning (RFW) Days involving overhead primary distribution*  
16           *circuits divided by RFW Distribution Circuit-Mile Days in HFTD Areas, in a*  
17           *calendar year.*

18 **2. Introduction of Metric**

19           This metric measures the number of distribution wire down events  
20           located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD areas that occurred on RFW Days and  
21           is divided by sum of days and line miles (of the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD  
22           overhead distribution line miles involved on each RFW Day). In 2012,  
23           Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) initiated the  
24           Wires Down Program, including introduction of the wires down metric, to  
25           advance the Company’s focus on public safety by reducing the number of  
26           conductors that fail and result in a contact with the ground, a vehicle, or  
27           other object.

28           This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution  
29           Overhead (OH) Asset Risk and Wildfire risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk  
30           Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report (RAMP) filing.

1 **B. (3.5) Metric Performance**

2 **1. Historical Data (2013 – June 2022)**

3 There are nine and a half years of historical data available from 2013 to  
4 YTD June 2022. Although PG&E started measuring distribution wire down  
5 incidents in the 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the  
6 number of distribution wire down incidents.

7 Over this historical reporting period, performance is largely influenced by  
8 external factors such as weather and third-party contact with our overhead  
9 electric facilities.

10 PG&E's overhead electric primary distribution system consists of  
11 approximately 81,000 circuit miles of overhead conductor and associated  
12 assets that could contribute to a wires down incident. Approximately  
13 25,280 miles of our overhead electric primary distribution lines traverse in  
14 the HFTD areas.

15 Over the last several years, we have completed significant work and  
16 launched various initiatives targeted at reducing wires down incidents,  
17 including:


- 18 • Investigating wire down incidents and implementing learnings and  
19 corrective actions;
- 20 • Performing infrared inspections of overhead electric power lines to  
21 identify and repair hot spots;
- 22 • Clearing of vegetation hazards posing risks to our overhead electric  
23 facilities;
- 24 • Replacing deteriorated overhead electric line conductors with newer line  
25 conductors; and
- 26 • Hardening of overhead electric power systems with more resilient  
27 equipment.

28 In addition, our vegetation management teams conduct site visits of  
29 vegetation caused wires down incidents as part of its standard tree caused  
30 service interruption investigation process. The data obtained from site visits  
31 supports efforts to reduce future vegetation caused wires down incidents.  
32 The data collected from these investigations also helps identify failure  
33 patterns by tree species that are associated with wires down incidents.

1 PG&E's asset data base reflects the circuit miles that currently exist,  
 2 and it does not specifically maintain line miles by HFTD in prior years. As  
 3 such, all wire down rates are based on a total of 25,278.5<sup>1</sup> overhead  
 4 distribution circuit line miles and assumes annual variances due to the circuit  
 5 miles are considered to be negligible.

6 For the calculation of this metric, both the HFTD overhead line miles and  
 7 number of wires down events are measured based on the area subjected by  
 8 each specific RFW Day event and summed for each specific year.

**FIGURE 3.5-1**  
**ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION**  
**PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER RFW/CIRCUIT MILE-DAYS (2013-YTD JUNE 2022)**



9 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

10 PG&E uses its Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) –  
 11 Operations Database to track and count the number of wires down  
 12 incidents, as well as its electric distribution geographical information  
 13 systems (EDGIS) to determine if the wire down incident was in an HFTD  
 14 locations. Although the outage database does not specifically identify  
 15 precise location of the downed wire, the Latitude and Longitude

---

<sup>1</sup> EOY 2021 circuit miles used due to in-year mileage fluctuations. April 2023 filing will reference EOY 2022 mileage.

1 (e.g., Lat/Long) of the device is used to isolate the involved electric power  
2 line Section as a proxy. PG&E also uses its EDGIS application to determine  
3 if that device (Lat/Long information) is in the HFTD (e.g., Tier 2 or Tier 3  
4 location). Outage information is entered into ILIS by our electric distribution  
5 operators based on information from field personnel and devices such as  
6 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™<sup>2</sup>  
7 devices. We last upgraded our outage reporting tools in year 2015 and  
8 integrated SmartMeter information to identify potential outage reporting  
9 errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

10 PG&E's meteorology group maintains a data base tracking RFW dates,  
11 time, and involved areas and determines RFW Circuit Miles Days as follows:

- 12 • The National Weather Service (NWS) will issue a RFW and their  
13 associated polygons under specific polygon/shapefiles called Fire Zones
- 14 • PG&E's geographic information system team has calculated all  
15 overhead Distribution and Transmission lines for all the Fire Zone  
16 shapefile boundaries that intersect PG&E territory. For each NWS Fire  
17 Zone PG&E has the number of OH line miles for Distribution and  
18 Transmission and the number of OH line miles for Transmission, which  
19 is then also split into the specific HFTD and non HFTD tiers and zones.
- 20 • Meteorology then compiles all the archived RFW shapefiles for  
21 California, and from all the RFW events, determines which zones there  
22 was a RFW under and the duration of time it lasted.
- 23 • RFW Circuit Mile Days= RFW days x Circuit line miles.

### 24 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

25 As shown in Figure 3.5-1 above, the distribution wire down events on  
26 RFW days per circuit mile day has varied each year but has generally  
27 declined since 2017. [Year-to-date June 2022 has experienced 0 wires](#)  
28 [down events on RFWs](#). 2021 experienced 13 wires down events on RFWs  
29 compared to 34 in 2020. Improved performance is attributed to ongoing

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2 SmartMeter is a PG&E registered trademark. All further references to SmartMeters in PG&E's testimony in this proceeding should be assumed to refer to the trademarked name, without continually using the ™ symbol, consistent with legally-acceptable practice.

1 efforts in reducing wires down events, in particular vegetation management  
2 and hardening.

### 3 **C. (3.5) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

#### 4 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

5 There are no updates to the directional 1 and 5-Year Targets since last  
6 report.

#### 7 **2. Target Methodology**

- 8 • Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes  
9 response stays the same in events)

10 To establish the directional 1-Year and 5-Year targets, the following  
11 factors were considered:

- 12 • Historical Data and Trends: This metric is expected to remain within the  
13 historical performance levels, but will vary based on the number of  
14 RFWs and severity of weather experienced in a year;
- 15 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 16 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 17 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
18 Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as  
19 it suggests performance will remain within the historical range which  
20 accounts for unknown factors which may vary such as the frequency  
21 and severity of weather;
- 22 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: The directional target  
23 to maintain performance is attainable within known resources, however  
24 this metric is impacted by the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's  
25 controls, such as the severity of weather on RFWs;
- 26 • Other Considerations: None.

#### 27 **3. 2022 Target**

28 The 2022 target is to maintain within historical performance levels.

#### 29 **4. 2026 Target**

30 The 2026 target is to maintain within historical performance levels.

1 **D. (3.5) Performance Against Target**

2 **1. Progress Towards the 1-year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 3.5-1 above, PG&E experienced 0  
4 distribution wires down events on Red Flag Warning Days in the first half of  
5 2022 which is consistent with Company's 1-year directional target.

6 **2. Progress Towards the 5-year Target**

7 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
8 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
9 align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

10 **E. (3.5)Current and Planned Work Activities**

11 PG&E will continue to execute many ongoing activities to reduce wires  
12 down, including the following programs:

- 13 • Overhead Conductor Replacement: PG&E's electric distribution system  
14 includes approximately 81,000 circuit miles of overhead conductor on its  
15 distribution system that operates between 4 and 21 kilovolts, including bare  
16 and covered conductors. Approximately 55,000 circuit miles of this  
17 distribution conductor, including approximately 40,000 circuit miles of small  
18 conductor is in non-HFTD areas. PG&E's Overhead Conductor  
19 Replacement Program, recorded in MAT 08J, proactively replaces overhead  
20 conductor in non-HFTD areas to address elevated rates of wires down and  
21 deteriorated/damaged conductors and to improve system safety, reliability,  
22 and integrity.

23 PG&E updated its prioritization process for overhead conductor  
24 replacements to include consideration the RAMP risk tranches with Safety  
25 Consequence Zones and/or shared protection zones with critical  
26 customer(s). The three focused tranches are: (1) corrosive regions with  
27 specific materials (ACSR), (2) elevated wires down (small copper  
28 conductors), and (3) poor reliability performance. The final definition of the  
29 Safety Consequence Zones is being developed, but currently takes into  
30 consideration: Within buffer zones near Major Transportation Infrastructure,  
31 Public Assembly Areas, and Public Safety Entities.

32 Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground  
33 Asset Management in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

1 • Patrols and Inspections: PG&E monitors the condition of primary overhead  
2 conductor through patrols and inspections consistent with General  
3 Office 165 and targeted infrared inspections. Replacement plans are  
4 developed using failure rates obtained through wires down analysis and  
5 conductor-splice data. PG&E conducts post-event investigations of targeted  
6 equipment failure caused outages (i.e., wires down events involving  
7 conductor or splice failure). These investigations collect physical and  
8 environmental attributes to determine conductor replacement justification  
9 and priority as well as to determine failure trends. The information collected  
10 is entered into the “Engineer Investigation Wires Down Database.” Analysis  
11 of this data has informed PG&E’s strategy to focus replacement work on  
12 conductor types with elevated wires down rates, including small (#4 and #6  
13 gauge) copper conductors and #4 ACSR conductors located in corrosion  
14 areas.

15 Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground  
16 Asset Management in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

17 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E’s broader grid design program  
18 covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E’s 2022  
19 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). The largest of these programs is the  
20 System Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential  
21 catastrophic wildfire risk caused by distribution overhead assets. In 2022,  
22 we are rapidly expanding our system hardening efforts by: completing  
23 470 circuit miles of system hardening work which includes overhead system  
24 hardening, undergrounding and removal of overhead lines in HFTD or buffer  
25 zone areas; completing at least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work,  
26 including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system  
27 hardening work; replacing equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition  
28 risks, such as non-exempt fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all  
29 known, remaining in HFTD areas). As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is  
30 targeting 3,600 miles of Undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and  
31 2026 as part of the 10,000 Mile Undergrounding program. This system  
32 hardening work done at scale is expected to have limited reliability benefit  
33 due rural HFTD geography, and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk, rather



1 than reliability risk at this time. Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and  
2 System Hardening Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- 3 • Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM): The EVM Program is targeted  
4 at OH lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplements PG&E's annual  
5 routine VM work with California Public Utilities Commission-mandated  
6 clearances. PG&E's VM Program, components of which exceed regulatory  
7 requirements, is critical to mitigating wildfire risk. PG&E's VM team inspects  
8 and identifies needed vegetation maintenance on all distribution and  
9 transmission circuit miles in PG&E's service area on a recurring cycle  
10 through Routine and Tree Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole Clearing. Our  
11 EVM Program goes above and beyond regulatory requirements for  
12 distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing overhang  
13 in HFTD areas. In 2022 PG&E will complete 1,800 miles of EVM work.

14 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
15 PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- 16 • Other Advancements: In addition, there are several technologies that PG&E  
17 is piloting to better identify and/or prevent conductor to ground faults. This  
18 includes:
  - 19 – SmartMeter based methods;
  - 20 – Distribution Falling Wire Detection Method;
  - 21 – Distribution Fault Anticipation;
  - 22 – Early Fault Detection; and
  - 23 – Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.6**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.6  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.6**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(TRANSMISSION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.6) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.6 – Wires Down Red Flag  
13           Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

14           *Number of Wires Down events in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas*  
15           *on Red Flag Warning (RFW) Days involving overhead transmission circuits*  
16           *divided by RFW Transmission Circuit-Mile Days in HFTD Areas, in a*  
17           *calendar year.*

18       **2. Introduction of Metric**

19           This metric measures the count of Transmission Wire Down events  
20           occurring on RFW Days and provides a partial indicator for electric system  
21           safety and overall electric service reliability for end-use customers.

22           This metric is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric Company's  
23           (PG&E) Failure of Electric Transmission Overhead Asset Risk and Wildfire  
24           Risk, which are part of the Company's 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation  
25           Phase Report filing

26 **B. (3.6) Metric Performance**

27       **1. Historical Data (2013 – YTD June 2022)**

28           PG&E used nine years of historical data that includes the years  
29           2013-YTD June 2022 for target analysis. In 2012, PG&E initiated the  
30           Electric Wires Down Program, including introduction of the electric wires  
31           down metric, to address increased focus on public safety by reducing the


1 number of electric wire conductors that fail and result in contact with the  
2 ground, a vehicle, or other object.

3 Initially the internal definition focused on wires down on the ground and  
4 in 2014 the definition was augmented to include wires down on foreign  
5 objects.

6 PG&E started measuring wire down incidents in the 2012, however,  
7 2013 was the first full year we uniformly measured the number of  
8 transmission wire down events. Actual results over time have confirmed  
9 that PG&E experiences more wire down events on days where storms are  
10 prevalent.

11 It should also be noted that when calculating this metric, both the HFTD  
12 overhead line miles and number of wires down events are measured based  
13 on the area subjected by each specific RFW Day event and summed for  
14 each specific year.

**FIGURE 3.6-1**  
**ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION**  
**PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER RFW/CIRCUIT MILE-DAYS (2013-JUNE YTD 2022)**



15 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

16 PG&E used its transmission outage database, typically referred to as  
17 Transmission Operations Tracking & Logging to count the number of these

1 events. Although PG&E's outage database does not specifically identify the  
2 precise location of the downed wire, PG&E uses the Lat/Long of the device  
3 used to operate/isolate the involved line Section as a proxy and then uses  
4 its Electric Transmission Geographic Information System application to  
5 determine if that point is in a Tier 2 or Tier 3 HFTD area. Although PG&E  
6 maintains historical line miles of its entire transmission system, it does not  
7 have the ability to identify the line miles specifically located within Tier 2 and  
8 Tier 3 HFTD in prior years. As such, these annual metrics all use the same  
9 current transmission and distribution Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD line miles as of  
10 the end of 2021.

11 The meteorology group maintains a data base with the RFW days/time  
12 and involved areas and determines RFW Circuit Miles Days as follows:

- 13 • The National Weather Service (NWS) will issue a RFW and their  
14 associated polygons under specific polygon/shapefiles called Fire  
15 Zones;
- 16 • PG&E's geographic information system team has calculated all  
17 overhead Distribution and Transmission lines for all of the Fire Zone  
18 shapefile boundaries that intersect PG&E territory. For each NWS Fire  
19 Zone PG&E has the number of OH line miles for Distribution and  
20 Transmission and the number of OH line miles for Transmission, which  
21 is then also split into the specific HFTD and non HFTD tiers and zones;
- 22 • Meteorology then compiles all the archived RFW shapefiles for  
23 California, and from all the RFW events, determines which zones there  
24 was a RFW under and the duration of time it lasted; and
- 25 • RFW Circuit Mile Days= RFW days x Circuit line miles.

### 26 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

27 As shown in Figure 3.6-1, the transmission wire down events on RFW  
28 days per circuit mile day is a very small subset of wire down events, making  
29 it difficult to identify any trending information. [Zero events occurred in 2021](#)  
30 [and January through June 2022. 2020 experienced one such event.](#) Since  
31 2013, only two years have experienced any Transmission Wire Down events  
32 on RFWs; 2017 (3) and 2020 (1), respectively.

1 **C. (3.6) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There are no updates to the directional 1- and 5-Year Targets since last  
4 report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes  
7 response stays the same in events);

8 Note that there has not been enough historic electric transmission wire  
9 down events on RFW days to establish a target based on prior performance.

- 10 • Benchmarking: Not available to best of our knowledge;
- 11 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 12 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
13 Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as  
14 it suggests performance will remain within the historical range;
- 15 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Unknown, however this  
16 metric is impacted by the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's  
17 control, such as the severity of weather on RFWs; mand
- 18 • Other Considerations: None.

19 **D. (3.6) Performance Against Target**

20 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

21 As demonstrated in Figure 3.6-1 above, PG&E experienced zero  
22 transmission wires down events on Red Flag Warning Days in the first half  
23 of 2022 which is consistent with Company's 1-year directional target.

24 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

25 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
26 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
27 align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

28 **E. (3.6) Current and Planned Work Activities**

29 Wire down events can be caused by a variety of factors, including but not  
30 limited to asset failure, third-party contact, or vegetation contact. The following  
31 work activities may provide future resiliency for certain wire down event causes,  
32 though the effectiveness of the work is dependent upon the circumstances of the

1 wire down event (e.g., new assets may still be prone to a wire down event that  
2 occur due to extreme weather events outside of standard design guidance).

3 • Asset Inspection: Enhanced detailed inspections (i.e., enhanced  
4 inspections) of overhead transmission assets seek to proactively identify  
5 and treat pending failures of asset components which could create future  
6 wire down, outage, and/or safety events if left unresolved or allowed to “run  
7 to failure.” Enhanced inspections for transmission assets involve at least  
8 two detailed inspection methods per structure: ground and aerial. In  
9 addition to the ground and aerial inspections, climbing inspections are also  
10 required for 500 kilovolt structures or as triggered. All these inspection  
11 methods involve detailed, visual examinations of the assets with use of  
12 inspection checklists that are in accordance with the Electric Transmission  
13 Preventive Maintenance (TD-1001M), as well as the Failure Modes and  
14 Effects Analysis. Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone,  
15 helicopter, or aerial lift.

16 • Asset Repair and Replacement: Completing repair, replacement, and life  
17 extension to transmission assets provides the benefit of reduced probability  
18 of failure for components that could potentially result in a wire down event.  
19 Most corrective maintenance notifications are identified as a result of  
20 transmission asset inspections and patrols.

21         Prioritization of maintenance tags are based on severity of the issues  
22 found, fire ignition potential (i.e., asset-conditions impacting issues  
23 associated with HFTD areas and High Fire Risk Area), probability of failure  
24 and the Wildfire Consequence Model. As conditions are identified, they are  
25 given a time-based priority based on guidance in PG&E’s Electric  
26 Transmission Preventative Maintenance Manual. For certain tags (E and F  
27 priority tags), additional prioritization occurs based on the damage found.  
28 Time dependent conditions (meaning that the damage can worsen with  
29 time) with ignition potential are typically prioritized before other non-time  
30 dependent, non-ignition potential tags. Execution of the prioritized work plan  
31 would also have to address other factors such as clearance availability,  
32 access, work efficiency, etc.

33         Additionally, replacement of assets in HFTD areas also may reduce wire  
34 down event risk. This reduction can be a combination of replacing aged,



1 degraded assets, as well as providing more robust, up-to-standard designs.  
2 Asset removal eliminates wire-down event risk by removing the energized  
3 electrical components.

- 4 • Vegetation Management (VM): Trees or other vegetation that make contact  
5 or cross within flash-over distance of high voltage transmission lines can  
6 cause phase to phase or phase to ground electrical arcing, fire ignition or  
7 local, regional or cascading, grid-level service interruption. Dense  
8 vegetation growing within the right-of-way (ROW) can act as a fuel bed for  
9 wildfire ignition. Vegetation growing close to any pole or structure can  
10 impede inspection of the structure base and in some cases can damage the  
11 structure or conductors and result in wire down events.

12 PG&E operates our lines in electric transmission (ET) corridors that are  
13 home to vast amounts of vegetation. This vegetation ranges from sparse to  
14 extremely dense. Our transmission lines also pass through urban,  
15 agricultural, and forested settings. The corridor environment is dynamic and  
16 requires focused attention to ensure vegetation stays clear of energized  
17 conductors and other equipment. Vegetation inspection is a required  
18 operational step in an overall VM Program. Accordingly, PG&E has  
19 developed an annual inspection cycle program as part of our overall  
20 Transmission VM Program to respond to the diverse and dynamic  
21 environment of our service territory. The Routine North American Electric  
22 Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Routine Non-NERC Programs are  
23 annually recurring. The Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM) Program  
24 maintains cleared ROWs on a recurs every three-to-5-year cycles. The  
25 frequency and prioritization for each of these programs is described in more  
26 detail below.

- 27 • Routine NERC: The Routine NERC Program includes Light Detection and  
28 Ranging (LiDAR) inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of  
29 vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on  
30 approximately 6,800 miles of NERC Critical lines. 100 percent inspection and  
31 work plan completion are required by NERC Standard FAC-003-4. Work is  
32 prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs annually.
- 33 • Routine Non-NERC: The Non-Routine NERC Program includes LiDAR  
34 inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation

1 encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately  
2 11,400 miles of transmission lines not designated as critical by NERC.  
3 Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs  
4 annually.

- 5 • Integrated Vegetation Management: The IVM Program is an ongoing  
6 maintenance program designed to maintain cleared ROWs in a sustainable  
7 and compatible condition by eliminating tall-growing and fire-prone  
8 vegetation and promoting low-growing, compatible vegetation. Prioritization  
9 is based on aging of work cycles and evaluation of vegetation re-growth.  
10 After initial work is performed, the ROWs are reassessed every two to  
11 five years.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.7**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.7  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.7**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (3.7) Overview**

10   **1. Metric Definition**

11           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.7 – Missed Overhead  
12           Distribution Patrols in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) is defined as:

13           *Total number of overhead electric distribution structures that fell below*  
14           *the minimum patrol frequency requirements divided by the total number of*  
15           *overhead electric distribution structures that required patrols, in HFTD area*  
16           *in past calendar year. “Minimum patrol frequency” refers to the frequency of*  
17           *patrols as specified in General Order (GO) 165. “Structures” refer to electric*  
18           *assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines,*  
19           *poles, etc.*

20   **2. Introduction of Metric**

21           Patrols involve simple visual observations to identify obvious structural  
22           problems and hazards affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD,  
23           nonconformances identified by patrols can involve conditions that represent  
24           a wildfire ignition risk. Performing required patrols on time ensures that  
25           nonconformances are identified in a timely manner so that they can be  
26           prioritized for repair in accordance with the risk of the condition.

27           Prior to year 2014, GO 165 required that patrols be completed any time  
28           between January 1 and December 31 each year.

29           Starting in 2015 and through 2019, Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
30           (PG&E) implemented the new GO 165 requirement to complete patrols each  
31           year within a prescribed timeframe, based on the date of the last patrol or

1 inspection. PG&E’s interpretation and implementation of this new language  
2 calculated the due date for each patrol each year as follows:

3 The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Patrol & Inspection  
4 requirement defines:

- 5 • The due date for each map is based on the date the map was last  
6 inspected or patrolled;
- 7 • Inspections or patrols may not exceed three additional months past the  
8 previous inspection or patrol date (maximum 15 months);
- 9 • Inspections or patrols may be performed before the due date;
- 10 • Inspections or patrols are performed by the end of the calendar year  
11 (12/31/YY); and
- 12 • The start of an inspection or a patrol starts a new inspection or patrol  
13 interval that must be completed within the prescribed timeframe.

14 For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E shifted away from the “12+3” due  
15 date for completing patrols, with the intent of wildfire risk reduction by  
16 focusing on the “High Fire Threat District” areas, and using new “risk”  
17 models to inform the prioritization of patrols. PG&E completed patrols by  
18 “static” due dates, August 31 for HFTD areas, and December 31st for  
19 Non-HFTD areas.

20 In 2022, PG&E intends to complete overhead patrols and inspections in  
21 compliance with GO 165.

## 22 **B. (3.7) Metric Performance**

### 23 **1. Historical Data (2015 – June, 30 2022)**

24 To be consistent with the implementation of new GO 165 requirements,  
25 historical data begins in 2015.<sup>1</sup> The 2015-2019 data includes systemwide  
26 results. The 2020-June 30, 2022, data includes HFTD specific results.

27 Prior to 2020, PG&E completed patrols on paper by “plat map”. Each  
28 plat map had a calculated “12+3” due date based on the start date of the last  
29 patrol or inspection for that plat map. For the years 2015-2019, PG&E  
30 tracked and measured performance of patrols based on the “12+3”


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<sup>1</sup> Historical patrol data is at plat map level vs. structure level. We are further validating plat based results for HFTD vs. NHFTD units, we may see slight changes to volumes completed late vs. on time, or vice-versa.

1 calculated due date for each *plat map*. Performance was tracked using  
2 detailed excel spreadsheets for each of the 19 Divisions across the system,  
3 and SAP data recorded for each plat map, which recorded the actual start  
4 and end dates for each plat map, as well as actual units and the PG&E LAN  
5 ID (login ID) of the Inspector who completed the work. PG&E’s annual  
6 performance for completing patrols in these years was 0.01 percent  
7 completed late.

8 For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E’s performance was impacted by  
9 the shift away from completing overhead patrols by the “12+3” calculated  
10 due dates to the use of a risk-based prioritization approach and focus on  
11 HFTD with the intention of wildfire risk reduction.

**FIGURE 3.7-1**  
**HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 - JUNE 30 2022)**



Note: Actual performance as follows between 2015-2019: 2015: 0.0003%, 2016: 0.0003%, 2017: 0.0000%, 2018: 0.0002%, 2019: 0.0015%.

12 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

13 The currently used data collection methodology was implemented in  
14 2020. It uses a mobile platform for completing overhead inspections,  
15 recorded at structure (pole) level using a detailed inspection checklist.

1 PG&E also shifted its maintenance plan structure in SAP from purely  
2 plat-map based to circuit/risk based, tracking performance at *structure-level*.

3 PG&E continues to perform Overhead patrols on paper, with target to  
4 shift to mobile technology over the next few years. Overhead Patrols are  
5 tracked at “maintenance plan” level, using excel spreadsheets and SAP  
6 data.

### 7 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

8 Between 2015-2019, PG&E’s annual performance for completing patrols  
9 by the CPUC “12+3” due date was 0.01 percent completed late. These  
10 results demonstrate our commitment to meet GO 165 CPUC “12+3” due  
11 dates.

12 For the years 2020 and 2021, with the shift to a wildfire risk reduction  
13 focused approach and away from completing overhead patrols by the “12+3”  
14 calculated due date, PG&E’s on-time performance worsened to 8.61 percent  
15 completed late in 2020 and 0.86 percent completed late in 2021. For  
16 January through June of 2022, performance improved to zero percent of  
17 patrols completed late.

## 18 **C. (3.7) 1-Year and 5-Year Target**

### 19 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

20 There are no changes to 1- and 5-Year targets since last report.

### 21 **2. Target Methodology**

22 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
23 following factors:

- 24 • Historical data and trends: Based on historical performance of  
25 0.01 percent completed late (2015-2019) and the results of the more  
26 recently used wildfire risk reduction approach (2020-2021). In 2022  
27 PG&E intends to improve performance by completing overhead patrols  
28 to (1) be in compliance with GO 165, with a target range of  
29 0.00 percent-0.05 percent completed late, and (2) incorporate Asset  
30 Strategy risk models.
- 31 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 32 • Regulatory Requirements: GO 165;



- 1 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targeted performance  
2 is attainable within PG&E’s currently known resource plan;
- 3 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight  
4 Enforcement: The target range is a suitable indicator for EOE as it  
5 intends to return PG&E to historical levels of near-zero percent  
6 non-compliances while also incorporating reasonable impacts resulting  
7 from prioritizing wildfire risk reduction, and therefore avoiding potential  
8 unintended consequence of conformance to risk reduction.
- 9 • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

10 **3. 2022 Target**

11 The 2022 target is 0.00 percent-0.05 percent to improve performance  
12 compared to 2021 based on the factors described above.

13 **4. 2026 Target**

14 The 2026 target is 0.00 percent-0.02 percent to improve performance  
15 compared to 2022, based on the factors described above, and the  
16 commitment to continuously improve performance.

17 **D. (3.7) Performance Against Target**


18 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

19 As demonstrated in Figure 3.7-2 below, PG&E saw 0.00 percent missed  
20 overhead Distribution patrols in the first half of 2022 which is consistent with  
21 Company’s 1-year target.

22 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

23 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
24 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
25 meet the Company’s 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 3.7-2  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-2021) AND  
TARGET (2026)**



**E. (3.7) Current and Planned Work Activities**

- Visibility and Compliance: Beginning in 2022, Supervisors and Inspectors will see the CPUC due dates for each patrol package to ensure understanding as to the due date of the overhead patrol.
- Tracking:
  - System Inspections will track progress and completion of overhead patrols on a continuous basis, using detailed excel tracking spreadsheets + SAP data;
  - System Inspections will track and report-out on any “late” overhead patrols, including identifying mitigating factors and implementing process improvements or changes to the program; and
  - System Inspections will track timeliness of patrols being completed on their weekly scorecard.
- Training: System Inspections will conduct refresher training to ensure understanding of the importance of patrols in identifying obvious structural problems and hazards in years where an inspection is not required.
- Maintenance Plan Management Tool: System Inspections Maintenance Planners will complete timely review and completion of changes to

- 1 structures and maintenance plans by way of the “maintenance plan
- 2 management tool.”

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 3.8**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION**  
**DETAILED INSPECTIONS IN HFTD AREAS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.8  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION  
DETAILED INSPECTIONS IN HFTD AREAS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.8**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION**  
5                                   **DETAILED INSPECTIONS IN HFTD AREAS**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.8) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.8 – Missed Overhead  
13           Distribution Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas is defined as:

14           *Overhead Distribution Detailed Inspections in High Fire Threat District*  
15           *(HFTD): Total number of structures that fell below the minimum inspection*  
16           *frequency requirements divided by the total number of structures that*  
17           *required inspection, in HFTD area in past calendar year. “Minimum*  
18           *inspection frequency” refers to the frequency of scheduled inspections as*  
19           *specified in General Order (GO) 165. “Structures” refers to electric assets*  
20           *such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines,*  
21           *poles, etc.*

22       **2. Introduction of Metric**

23           Detailed inspections are performed to identify nonconformances  
24           affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD, nonconformances identified by  
25           inspections can involve conditions that represent a wildfire ignition risk.  
26           Performing required inspections on time ensures that non-conformances are  
27           identified in a timely manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in  
28           accordance with the risk of the condition.

29           Prior to year 2014, GO 165 required that inspections be completed any  
30           time between January 1 and December 31 each year.

31           Starting in 2015 and through 2019, PG&E implemented the new GO 165  
32           requirement to complete inspections each year within a prescribed

1 timeframe, based on the date of the last patrol or inspection. PG&E's  
2 interpretation and implementation of this new language calculated the due  
3 date for each patrol or inspection each year as follows:

4 The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Patrol & Inspection  
5 requirement defines:

- 6 • The due date for each map is based on the date the map was last  
7 inspected or patrolled;
- 8 • Inspections or patrols may not exceed three additional months past the  
9 previous inspection or patrol date (maximum 15 months);
- 10 • Inspections or patrols may be performed before the due date;
- 11 • Inspections or patrols are performed by the end of the calendar year  
12 (12/31/XX); and
- 13 • The start of an inspection or a patrol starts a new inspection or patrol  
14 interval that must be completed within the prescribed timeframe.

15 For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E shifted away from the "12+3" due  
16 date for completing inspections with the intent of wildfire risk reduction by  
17 focusing on the HFTD areas, and using new risk models to inform the  
18 prioritization of inspections each year. PG&E completed inspections by the  
19 static due dates of, August 31 for HFTD areas, December 31 for Non-HFTD  
20 areas.

21 In 2022, PG&E intends to complete overhead patrols and inspections in  
22 compliance with GO 165.

## 23 **B. (3.8) Metric Performance**

### 24 **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 30 2022)**

25 To be consistent with the implementation of new GO 165 requirements,  
26 historical data begins in 2015. The 2015-2019 data includes systemwide  
27 results. The 2020-2021 data<sup>1</sup> includes HFTD specific results.

28 Prior to 2020, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) completed  
29 inspections on paper by plat map. Each plat map had a calculated "12+3"  
30 due date based on the start date of the last patrol or inspection for that plat


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<sup>1</sup> Historical inspection data <2020 is at plat map level vs. structure level. We are further validating plat map based results for HFTD vs. NHFTD units, we may see slight changes to volumes completed late vs. on time, or vice-versa.

1 map. For the years 2015 – 2019, PG&E tracked and measured  
2 performance of inspections based on the “12+3” calculated due date for  
3 each *plat map*. Performance was tracked using detailed excel spreadsheets  
4 for each of the 19 Divisions across the system, and SAP data recorded for  
5 each plat map, which recorded the actual start and end dates for each plat  
6 map, as well as actual units and PG&E LAN ID (login ID) of the Inspector  
7 who completed the work. PG&E’s annual performance for completion and  
8 inspections in these years was 0.01-0.04 percent completed late.

9 For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E’s performance was impacted by  
10 the shift away from completing overhead inspection by the “12+3” calculated  
11 due dates to the use of a risk-based prioritization approach and focus on  
12 HFTD with the intention of wildfire risk reduction.

FIGURE 3.8-1  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-JUNE, 30 2022)



## 2. Data Collection Methodology

13 The currently used data collection methodology was implemented in  
14 2020. It uses a mobile platform for completing Overhead inspections,  
15 recorded at structure (pole) level using a detailed inspection checklist.  
16 PG&E also shifted its maintenance plan structure in SAP from purely  
17 plat-map based to circuit/risk based, tracking performance at *structure-level*.  
18



1 PG&E now tracks the completion of inspections at structure (pole) level,  
2 using the “attainment report”, which records actual completion information  
3 for each structure from actual inspection data recorded in SAP.

### 4 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

5 Between 2015-2019, PG&E’s annual performance for completing  
6 inspections by the CPUC “12+3” due date was 0.01-0.04 percent completed  
7 late. These results demonstrate our commitment to meet GO 165 CPUC  
8 “12+3” due dates.

9 For the years 2020 and 2021, with the shift to a wildfire risk reduction  
10 focused approach and away from completing overhead inspections by the  
11 “12+3” calculated due date, PG&E performance worsened to 9.01 percent  
12 completed late in 2020 and 4.10 percent completed late in 2021. For  
13 January through June of 2022, there was one late overhead inspection of  
14 the 247,840 performed which equates to a percentage of 0.00%.

### 15 **C. (3.8) 1-Year and 5-Year Target**

#### 16 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

17 There are no changes to 1- and 5-Year targets since the last report.

#### 18 **2. Target Methodology**

19 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
20 following factors:

- 21 • Historical Data and Trends: Based on historical performance of  
22 0.01-0.04 percent completed late (2015-2019) and the results of the  
23 more recently used wildfire risk reduction approach (2020-2021), in  
24 2022 PG&E intends to improve performance by completing overhead  
25 inspections to: (1) be in compliance with GO 165, with a target range of  
26 0.00 percent-0.05 percent completed late, and (2) incorporate Asset  
27 Strategy risk models;
- 28 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 29 • Regulatory Requirements: GO 165;
- 30 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targeted performance  
31 is attainable within PG&E’s currently known resource plan;
- 32 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight  
33 Enforcement: The target range is a suitable indicator for EOE as it

1 intends to return PG&E to historical levels of near-zero percent  
2 non-compliances while also incorporating reasonable impacts resulting  
3 from prioritizing wildfire risk reduction, and therefore avoiding potential  
4 unintended consequence of conformance to risk reduction; and

- 5 • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

### 6 **3. 2022 Target**

7 The 2022 target is 0.00 percent-0.05 percent to improve performance  
8 compared to 2021 based on the factors described above.

### 9 **4. 2026 Target**

10 The 2026 target is 0.00 percent-0.02 percent to improve performance  
11 compared to 2022 based on the factors described above and the  
12 commitment to continuously improve performance.

## 13 **D. (3.8) Performance Against Target**


### 14 **1. Progress Towards/Deviation From the 1-Year Target**

15 As demonstrated in Figure 3.8-2 below, PG&E saw 0.00 percent missed  
16 overhead Distribution patrols in the first half of 2022 which is consistent with  
17 Company's 1-year target.

### 18 **2. Progress Towards/Deviation From the 5-Year Target**

19 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
20 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
21 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 3.8-2  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-JUNE, 30 2022) AND  
TARGET (2026)**



**E. (3.8) Current and Planned Work Activities**

- Visibility and Compliance: Beginning in 2022, Supervisors and Inspectors will see the CPUC due dates for each inspection that is due to ensure understanding as to the due date of the overhead inspection.
- Tracking:
  - System Inspections will track progress and completion of overhead inspections on a continuous basis, using detailed SAP data reports and excel tracking spreadsheets.
  - System Inspections will track and report-out on any “late” overhead inspections, including identifying mitigating factors and implementing process improvements or changes to address gaps.
  - System Inspections will track timeliness of inspections being completed on their weekly scorecard.
- Training: System Inspections conducts annual “Refresher” training on overhead inspections, which includes focus on anything that has changed since the previous year (guidance, standards, procedures), including updates to the INSPECT application, inspection checklists, and associated Inspector job aids.

- 1 • Asset Strategy – Monthly Inspection Validations: Monthly inspection  
2 validations will continue to identify required additions to the original plan  
3 arising from additions or changes to the asset registry.
- 4 • Asset Strategy – Ad Hoc Inspections: Asset Strategy will continue to  
5 evaluate the asset registry and may identify additional “ad hoc” structures to  
6 be inspected each year, based on analysis related to ignition risk, etc.
- 7 • Maintenance Plan Management Tool: System Inspections Maintenance  
8 Planners will complete timely review and completion of changes to  
9 structures and maintenance plans by way of the “maintenance plan  
10 management tool.”
- 11 • Desktop Quality Control: System Inspections conducts desktop work  
12 verification activities on a valid sample size of completed inspections to  
13 evaluate the completeness and quality of inspections.
- 14 • Quality Control Field Work Verification: System Inspections conducts “blind”  
15 field work verification activities on a valid sample size of completed  
16 inspections to evaluate the completeness and quality of inspections.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.9**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.9  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.9**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9           **A. (3.9) Overview**

10           **1. Metric Definition**

11                   Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.9 – Missed Overhead  
12           Transmission Patrols in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas is defined as:  
13                   *Overhead (OH) Transmission Patrols in High Fire Threat District*  
14                   *(HFTD): Total number of structures that fell below the minimum patrol*  
15                   *frequency requirements divided by the total number of structures that*  
16                   *required patrols, in HFTD area in past calendar year where, “Minimum patrol*  
17                   *frequency” refers to the frequency of patrols requirements, as applicable.*  
18                   *“Structures” refers to electric assets such as transformers, switching*  
19                   *protective devices, capacitors, lines, poles, etc.*

20           **2. Introduction of Metric**

21                   Patrols involve simple visual observations to identify obvious  
22                   nonconformances affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD areas,  
23                   nonconformances identified by patrols can involve conditions that represent  
24                   a wildfire ignition risk. Performing patrols on time allows non-conformances  
25                   to be identified in a timely manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in  
26                   accordance with the risk of the condition.

27                   All assets require either a detailed inspection or a patrol each year.  
28                   While detailed inspections have shifted from circuit-based cycles to an  
29                   inspection frequency that depends on HFTD and structure-level risk  
30                   considerations, patrols are performed by circuit. Therefore, any line that  
31                   does not receive a detailed inspection from end-to-end will require a patrol  
32                   and it is possible for some structures to receive both an inspection and a

1 patrol in the same year. Patrols may be performed either by air (helicopter)  
2 or ground (walking or driving). Compared to transmission detailed  
3 inspections, the transmission OH patrol program has not undergone  
4 significant changes over the reporting period from 2015-present. Starting in  
5 2021, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) imposed an in-year  
6 deadline of July 31 for patrols on circuits containing HFTD or High Fire Risk  
7 Area structures. Monthly validations of the inspection plan were started in  
8 June 2021 to ensure that all assets were either inspected or patrolled each  
9 year, including assets that were newly added to the asset registry. The  
10 in-year deadline of July 31 introduced in 2021 for inspections and patrols in  
11 HFTD will continue to be used in 2022. Beginning in 2022, assets added to  
12 the registry after July 31 or whose HFTD changes after July 31 will not be  
13 considered late as in 2021, provided that they are inspected or patrolled  
14 within 90 days of the addition to the registry or the HFTD change.


15 **B. (3.9) Metric Performance**

16 **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 30, 2022)**

17 Historical data is provided from 2015-June 30, 2022. Data provided for  
18 2015-2019 reflects systemwide performance. HFTD-specific performance is  
19 not available prior to 2020. The percentage of missed patrols is calculated  
20 as the number of patrols not performed by the required deadline divided by  
21 the total number of patrols performed for that year. Through 2020, there  
22 was not a specific in-year deadline for patrols, so the deadline was  
23 considered December 31. The July 31 deadline for HFTD patrols in 2021  
24 allowed exceptions due to access issues and weather that may have  
25 prevented a helicopter to fly, or where access issues may have prevented a  
26 ground patrol. In 2021, HFTD structures added to the asset registry after  
27 July 31 and inspected after the July 31 deadline were counted as missed  
28 inspections, as well as instances where the asset location was corrected  
29 from non-HFTD to HFTD after July 31.



**FIGURE 3.9-1  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – JUNE 2022)**



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                Overhead patrols are tracked at the “maintenance plan” level, using data  
3                sheets to record completion and findings, if applicable, as well as the SAP  
4                data.

5        **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

6                There were no missed patrols January through June of 2022 with a total  
7                of 55,275 patrols completed – 33,270 in Tier 2 HFTD areas and 22,005 in  
8                Tier 3 HFTD areas.

9        **C. (3.9) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

10        **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

11                There have been no changes to 1- and 5-Year targets since last report.

12        **2. Target Methodology**

13                To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the  
14                following factors:

- 15                • Historical Data and Trends: The July 31 deadline for HFTD patrols was  
16                first applied in 2021 and is still in practice. Therefore targets use 2021  
17                performance as a baseline with incremental improvement for the  
18                reasons described below;

- 1 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 2 • Regulatory Requirements: Relevant items include: (1) General Order  
3 165 requirements to follow internal maintenance procedures, and  
4 (2) Wildfire Mitigation Plan targets to perform HFTD inspections and  
5 patrols by July 31;
- 6 • Attainable Within known Resources/Work Plan: Targets are attainable  
7 within currently known resources;
- 8 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
9 Enforcement: Targets are suitable indicators for EOE as historical driver  
10 of worsening performance (asset registry changes after July 31) will  
11 have an allowance to be counted as on time if inspected within 90 days  
12 of the addition to the registry or HFTD change beginning in 2022. This  
13 update ensures that the metric is an appropriate indicator of  
14 performance by focusing the measure on timely action to complete  
15 inspections as opposed to asset registry completeness; and
- 16 • Other Qualitative Considerations: The issue of patrols on both sides of  
17 double-circuit structures was considered in the development of the  
18 2022 Inspection and Patrol plan. If an inspection validation in 2022  
19 concludes that a structure needs to have a patrol added, the validation  
20 will call for a patrol on all circuits on the structure (alternately, the  
21 structure may receive a detailed inspection, which includes inspection of  
22 all circuits on the structure).

### 23 **3. 2022 Target**

24 The 2022 target is to improve performance to 0.00 percent-0.05 percent,  
25 based on the 90 day allowance for asset registry changes and consideration  
26 of double circuits described in the methodology above.

### 27 **4. 2026 Target**

28 The 2026 target is to improve performance to 0.00 percent-0.02 percent,  
29 based on the 90 day allowance for asset registry changes and consideration  
30 of double circuits described in the methodology above, as well as a  
31 reduction over time in the number of asset registry additions from assets  
32 being discovered in the field.

1 **D. (3.9) Performance Against Target**


2 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 3.9-2 below, PG&E saw 0.00% missed  
4 overhead Transmission patrols in the first half of 2022 which is consistent  
5 with Company's 1-year target.

6 **2. Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target**

7 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
8 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
9 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 3.9-2  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 - JUNE 2022) AND TARGET (2026)



10 **E. (3.9) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11 Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to  
12 performance and their description of that tie:

- 13 • 2022 Inspection and Patrol Plan: The 2022 Inspection and Patrol plan has  
14 been created, which defines the initial scope of the HFTD patrols that fall  
15 under this metric. The plan contains approximately 170 circuits running  
16 through HFTD areas (containing approximately 31,000 HFTD structures)  
17 that will be patrolled.

- 1 • Monthly Inspection Validations: Monthly inspection validations, which also  
2 consider required patrols, will continue to identify required additions to the  
3 original plan arising from additions or changes to the asset registry.  
4 Changes in HFTD affect the scope of patrols covered by this metric.
- 5 • In-Year Deadline Requirements: The in-year deadline of July 31 introduced  
6 in 2021 for patrols in HFTD will continue to be used in 2022, with the same  
7 provisions for access issues as in 2021 and the addition of the 90-day  
8 requirement described above for additions and changes to the asset  
9 registry. The deadline is tracked with the patrol orders so that each HFTD  
10 patrol is identified as having the July 31 compliance requirement.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.10**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION DETAILED INSPECTIONS  
IN HFTD AREAS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.10  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION DETAILED INSPECTIONS  
IN HFTD AREAS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.10**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION DETAILED INSPECTIONS**  
5                                   **IN HFTD AREAS**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.10) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.10 – Missed Overhead  
13           Transmission Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas is defined as:

14           *Overhead (OH) Transmission Detailed Inspections in High Fire Threat*  
15           *District (HFTD): Total number of structures that fell below the minimum*  
16           *inspection frequency requirements divided by the total number of structures*  
17           *that required inspection, in HFTD area in past calendar year where,*  
18           *“Minimum inspection frequency” refers to the frequency of scheduled*  
19           *inspections requirements, as applicable. “Structures” refers to electric*  
20           *assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines,*  
21           *poles, etc.*

22       **2. Introduction of Metric**

23           Detailed inspections are performed using several methods (ground,  
24           aerial, and climbing) to identify non-conformances affecting safety or  
25           reliability. Within HFTD areas, non-conformances identified by inspections  
26           can involve conditions that represent a wildfire ignition risk. Performing  
27           inspections on time allows non-conformances to be identified in a timely  
28           manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in accordance with the risk  
29           of the condition.

30           Due to the importance of detailed inspections in identifying conditions  
31           that affect wildfire, other safety, and reliability risks, the OH transmission  
32           detailed inspection program has undergone significant evolution over the

1 reporting period for the metric, 2015-present. Prior to 2019, detailed ground  
2 inspections were performed by circuit with a frequency depending on the  
3 voltage and whether the majority of the structures on the circuit were wood  
4 (2-year cycle) or steel (5-year cycle).

5 The Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP), which began in late  
6 2018 and extended into 2019, introduced several key improvements to OH  
7 transmission inspections including the use of an 'enhanced' inspection  
8 methodology with a questionnaire developed from a wildfire-ignition Failure  
9 Modes and Effects Analysis and the addition of aerial inspections using  
10 high-resolution drone photographs to provide a second vantage point from  
11 above to complement the ground inspections performed with the inspector  
12 standing at the base of the structure. These improvements from WSIP were  
13 incorporated into the regular OH inspection program beginning in 2020.

14 The 2020 inspections replaced the old wood- or steel-based inspection  
15 cycles with cycles that called for more frequent inspections in HFTD areas,  
16 annually for Tier 3 and on a 3-year cycle for Tier 2, compared to a 5-year  
17 cycle for non-HFTD areas. The 2020 inspections also included non-HFTD  
18 structures in High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA), which were treated like Tier 2.

19 The 2021 inspection program continued using the HFTD-based cycles  
20 introduced in 2020 and imposed an in-year deadline for HFTD and HFRA  
21 inspections of July 31, consistent with Pacific Gas and Electric Company's  
22 (PG&E) 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). The intent of this deadline  
23 was to allow completion of the inspections and any emergency repairs found  
24 from the inspections prior to peak fire season. Monthly validations of the  
25 inspection plan were started in June 2021 to ensure that all assets requiring  
26 an inspection under their prescribed cycles were included in the plan,  
27 including assets that were newly added to the asset registry.

28 The 2022 inspection scope introduced the use of wildfire risk and  
29 consequence scores at the structure level to inform the selection of assets  
30 to be inspected. Beginning in 2022, assets added to the registry after  
31 July 31 or whose HFTD changes after July 31 will not be considered late,  
32 provided that they are inspected within 90 days of the addition to the registry  
33 or the HFTD change.




1 **B. (3.10) Metric Performance**

2 **1. Historical Data (2015 – June, 30 2022)**

3 Historical data is provided from 2015 - June, 30 2022. Data provided for  
4 2015-2019 reflects systemwide performance. HFTD-specific performance is  
5 not available prior to 2020. The percentage of missed inspections is  
6 calculated as the number of inspections not performed by the required  
7 deadline divided by the total number of inspections performed for that year.  
8 Through 2020, there was not a specific in-year deadline for inspections, so  
9 the deadline was considered December 31. The July 31 deadline for HFTD  
10 inspections in 2021 allowed exceptions due to access issues, landowner  
11 refusal, or site-specific worker safety situations (i.e., Cannot Get In (CGI))  
12 where an unsuccessful inspection attempt was made prior to the deadline.  
13 In 2021, HFTD structures added to the asset registry after July 31 and  
14 inspected after the July 31 deadline were counted as missed inspections, as  
15 well as instances where the asset location was corrected from non-HFTD to  
16 HFTD after July 31.

**FIGURE 3.10-1**  
**HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE | PERCENT LATE (2015 - JUNE, 30 2022)**



1       **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2               The currently used data collection methodology was implemented in  
3               2020. It uses a mobile platform for completing overhead inspections,  
4               recorded at structure (pole) level using a detailed inspection checklist.

5       **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

6               There were no missed inspections January through June of 2022 with a  
7               total of 75,603 patrols completed – 53,125 in Tier 2 HFTD areas and 22,478  
8               in Tier 3 HFTD areas.

9       **C. (3.10) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

10       **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

11               There are no changes to 1- and 5-Year targets since last report.

12       **2. Target Methodology**

13               To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the  
14               following factors:

- 15       • Historical Data and Trends: The July 31 deadline for HFTD patrols was  
16       first applied in 2021 and is still in practice. Therefore targets use 2021  
17       performance as a baseline with incremental improvement for the  
18       reasons described below;
- 19       • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 20       • Regulatory Requirements: Relevant items include: (1) General  
21       Order 165 requirements to follow internal maintenance procedures, and  
22       (2) Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) targets to perform certain HFTD  
23       inspections and patrols by July 31;
- 24       • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targets are attainable  
25       within currently known resources;
- 26       • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
27       Enforcement: Targets are suitable indicators for EOE as historical driver  
28       of worsening performance (asset registry changes after July 31) will  
29       have an allowance to be counted as on time if inspected within 90 days  
30       of the addition to the registry or HFTD change beginning in 2022. This  
31       update ensures that the metric is an appropriate indicator of  
32       performance by focusing the measure on timely action to complete  
33       inspections as opposed to asset registry completeness; and

- 1 • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

### 2 **3. 2022 Target**

3 The 2022 target is to improve performance to 0.00 percent-0.05 percent,  
4 based on the 90 day allowance for asset registry changes described in the  
5 methodology above.

### 6 **4. 2026 Target**

7 The 2026 target is to improve performance to 0.00 percent-0.02 percent,  
8 based on the 90-day allowance for asset registry changes described in the  
9 methodology above, as well as a reduction over time in the number of asset  
10 registry additions from assets being discovered in the field.

## 11 **D. (3.10) Performance Against Target**


### 12 **1. Progress Towards the 1-year Target**

13 As demonstrated in Figure 3.10-2 below, PG&E saw 0.00% missed  
14 overhead Transmission detailed inspections in the first half of 2022 which is  
15 consistent with Company's 1-year target.

### 16 **2. Progress Towards the 5-year Target**

17 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
18 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
19 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 3.10-2  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-JUNE, 30 2022) AND TARGET (2026)**



**E. (3.10) Current and Planned Work Activities**

Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to performance and their description of that tie.

- 2022 Inspection and Patrol Plan: The 2022 inspection plan has been created and contains approximately 38,000 Tier 3 and Tier 2 structures receiving ground and aerial inspections and approximately 2,100 structures that also will receive a climbing inspection
- Monthly Inspection Validations: Monthly inspection validations will continue to identify required additions to the original plan arising from additions or changes to the asset registry. Changes in HFTD may affect the scope of inspections covered by this metric
- In-Year Deadline Requirements: The in-year deadline of July 31 introduced in 2021 for inspections in HFTD will continue to be used in 2022, with the same provisions for CGI access issues as in 2021 and the addition of the 90 day requirement described above for additions and changes to the asset registry. The deadline is tracked with the inspection and patrol orders so that each HFTD inspection is identified as having the July 31 compliance requirement.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 3.11**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS**

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GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS

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2   **CHAPTER 3.11**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found in  
6           Section A.3 concerning metric background; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (3.11) Overview**

10   **1. Metric Definition**

11           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.11 – General Order (GO) 95  
12           Corrective Actions in High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) is defined as:

13           *The number of Priority Level 2 notifications that were completed on time*  
14           *divided by the total number of Priority Level 2 notifications that were due in the*  
15           *calendar year in HFTDs. Consistent with General Order (GO) 95 Rule 18*  
16           *provisions, the proposed metric should exclude notifications that qualify for*  
17           *extensions under reasonable circumstances.<sup>1</sup>*

18           GO 95, Rule 18, Priority Level 2 has four relevant timeframes for corrective  
19           action: (1) six months for potential violations that create a fire risk in Tier 3 of  
20           HFTD; (2) 12 months for potential violations that create a fire risk in Tier 2 of  
21           HFTD; (3) 12 months for potential violations that compromise worker safety;  
22           and (4) 36 months for all other Level 2 potential violations.<sup>2</sup>

23           This metric is also reported as Metric 29 in the annual Safety Performance  
24           Metrics Report.

25   **2. Introduction to the Metric**

26           The GO 95 Corrective Actions in HFTD metric measures the number of  
27           Priority Level 2 corrective notifications (tags) in HFTD that are completed in  
28           accordance with the GO 95 Rule 18 timelines. This metric is associated with

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1   Correction times may be extended under reasonable circumstances, such as: third-party refusal, customer issue, no access, permits required, system emergencies (e.g., fires, severe weather conditions).

2   GO 95 Rule 18, B1ai-aiii.

1 our Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Asset Risk and our Wildfire Risk,  
2 which are part of our 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report filing.  
3 Vegetation Management (VM) work generally follows wildfire risk priorities.  
4 Priority notifications are tracked to completion against procedural timelines that  
5 are consistent with the underlying risk of the work.

### 6 **3. Background**

7 This metric consists of two major activities: corrective notification repairs  
8 and VM. The Section below describes the work, including risk-informed  
9 prioritization and associated activities. We also compare Pacific Gas and  
10 Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) priority classifications against  
11 GO 95 Rule 18's classification and timelines for completion.

- 12 • Corrective Notifications Identified from Inspections: PG&E routinely  
13 inspects our electric assets using a variety of methods, including  
14 observations when performing work in the area, periodic patrols and  
15 inspections, and targeted condition-based and/or diagnostic testing and  
16 monitoring. These inspections of our overhead and underground electric  
17 assets are designed to meet GO 95, 165, and 174 requirements.  
18 Regarding our equipment inspections process, when an inspector identifies  
19 a maintenance condition, the inspector either immediately corrects  
20 (e.g., performs minor repair work) the condition and records the correction  
21 or records the uncorrected condition, which is also reviewed by a  
22 centralized inspection review team (CIRT). This additional review  
23 performed by the CIRT is to drive consistency in inspection results by  
24 having a centralized team review all field findings prior to recording the  
25 finding as corrective action notification (tag).

26 In addition, the inspector fills out the initial corrective notification tag.  
27 The centralized review team approves and prioritizes the corrective  
28 notification tag in our Work Management system. These tags are prioritized  
29 based on the risk posed by the condition and urgency of repairs. We also  
30 inspect vegetation in the vicinity of our facilities and apply a similar process,  
31 described below.

32 Regarding Priority Level 2 electric notifications pertaining to our  
33 equipment inspections, we have subdivided Priority Level 2 into two  
34 categories: Priority "B" and Priority "E". Priority "B" notifications are



1 scheduled to be addressed within 3 months for Tiers 2 and 3. Priority “E”  
2 are scheduled to be completed within 6 months for Tier 3 and 12 months for  
3 Tier 2.

- 4 • Vegetation Management: Regarding our VM Program, we routinely inspect  
5 clearances between our electric assets and adjacent vegetation through a  
6 variety of methods, including observations during annual patrols, targeted  
7 program inspections, and aerial light detection and ranging flights. These  
8 inspections are conducted by our VM personnel and are designed to meet  
9 or, in some cases, exceed GO 95 Rule 35 requirements and fire safety  
10 regulations that require a minimum clearance of 4 feet year-round for  
11 high-voltage power lines in the California Public Utilities  
12 Commission-designated HFTD areas. GO 95 Rule 35 also requires the  
13 removal of dead, diseased, defective, and dying trees that could fall into the  
14 lines.

15 When an inspector identifies a clearance condition or a potential tree  
16 hazard, they record an abatement prescription (tree work) within VM’s data  
17 systems. This tree work is assigned to tree crews unless there are  
18 constraints that require prior resolution (e.g., customer access, city or  
19 agency permits). [Once the constraint has been resolved, the tree work is  
20 addressed within 30 days or within the initial timeline based on HFTD Tier  
21 from the date it was inspected, which is either 180 days for Tier 3 or 365  
22 days for Tier 2.](#) Tree crews confirm the completion of tree work within the  
23 VM data systems. VM tree work identified in this way does not follow the  
24 EC or LC notification tag priority assignments. Our VM timeline to complete  
25 this tree work generally aligns with the risk presented by the vegetation and  
26 the risk reduction objectives of the VM Program. [It is important to note that  
27 this data is classified into three categories: EVM Dead and Dying,  
28 Vegetation Dead and Dying, and Vegetation Priority 2. Units of measure  
29 vary slightly. Each record for EVM Dead and Dying accounts for one tree,  
30 compared to Vegetation Dead and Dying and Vegetation Priority 2 where  
31 each record can account for more than one tree.](#)

- 32 • Priority Classifications and Timelines for Completion: We manage our  
33 corrective actions in HFTDs with a risk-informed prioritization of our work  
34 plans. Our strategy focuses on reducing wildfire risk associated with open

1 corrective notifications. To accomplish this, we first address the highest risk  
2 Level 2 corrective notifications first (e.g., Level 1 and Level 2 Priority “B”).  
3 After that, we manage the inventory of Level 2 Priority “E” corrective  
4 notifications in a risk informed manner, where the highest risk Level 2  
5 Priority “E” corrective notifications are targeted first, while deploying safety  
6 controls to manage the lower risk Level 2 Priority “E” corrective  
7 notifications. This approach allows strategic and targeted wildfire risk  
8 reductions, informed by risk spend efficiencies, to continue to be our  
9 primary focus.

10 We recognize that our electric Priority “B” notifications, which we  
11 consider having a higher likelihood of creating an equipment failure than  
12 other Level 2 Priority notifications, have a more aggressive timeline to  
13 address than GO 95 Rule 18 Priority Level 2. However, consistent with  
14 Decision 21-11-009, we are reporting our performance against the timelines  
15 set forth in GO 95 Rule 18 and can provide, upon request, additional  
16 information as to how we are performing against our more aggressive  
17 internal timelines for our electric Priority “B” notifications. Furthermore, we  
18 are including all Electric Corrective (EC for Distribution) and Line Corrective  
19 (LC for Transmission) notifications, as well as all inspection-identified  
20 vegetation safety hazards that meet the definition of GO 95 Rule 18  
21 Level 2.

22 The following table summarizes the priority classifications we use to  
23 comply with GO 95 Rule 18.

**TABLE 3.11-1  
GO 95 RULE 18 RISK CATEGORIES AND TIMELINES**

Line No.	GO 95 Rule 18	PG&E Priority	Description	GO 95 Rule 18 Timeline for Corrective Action	PG&E Internal Timeline for Corrective Action (Electric Notifications)	PG&E Internal Timeline for Corrective Action (Vegetation Tree Work)
1	Level 1	A (Electric) Priority 1 (Vegetation)	An immediate risk of high potential impact to safety or reliability	Take corrective action immediately, either by fully repairing or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying to a lower priority	Consistent with GO 95 Rule 18	Within 24 hrs. after identification
2	Level 2	B (Electric) Priority 2 or Dead & Dying (Vegetation)	Any other risk of at least moderate potential impact to safety or reliability:  Take corrective action within specified time period (either by fully repair or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying to Level 3 priority).	Time period for corrective action to be determined at the time of identification by a qualified Company representative, but not to exceed:  1. Six months for potential violations that create a fire risk located in Tier 3 of the HFTD. 2. 12 months for potential violations that create a fire risk located in Tier 2 of the HFTD.	Corrective action within 3 months from date condition identified for electric equipment	1. Within 20 business days from identification Priority 2 Tag. 2. Dead & Dying tree: a. Six months within Tier 3 & Tier 2 of the HFTD; and b. 12 months outside Tier 3 & Tier 2 of the HFTD.
3		E (Electric)	Any other risk of at least moderate potential impact to safety or reliability:  Take corrective action within specified time period (either by fully repair or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying to Level 3 priority).	Time period for corrective action to be determined at the time of identification by a qualified Company representative, but not to exceed:  1. Six months for potential violations that create a fire risk located in Tier 3 of the HFTD. 2. 12 months for potential violations that create a fire risk located in Tier 2 of the HFTD. 3. 12 months for potential violations that compromise worker safety; and 4. 36 months for all other Level 2 potential violations.	Corrective action within:  1. Six months for conditions that create a fire risk located in HFTD Tier 3 2. 12 months for conditions that create a fire risk located in HFTD Tier 2  Field Safety Re-assessment performed annually on time dependent tags to confirm Priority "E" Notification has not escalated to Priority A or B. If notification has escalated to Priority A or B, address according to timelines above.	N/A
4		H (Electric)	These are PG&E Priority "E" Notifications that are planned to be addressed by a planned System Hardening Project	Same as above	Field Safety Re-assessment performed annually on time dependent tags to confirm Priority "E" Notification has not escalated to a Priority A or B. If notification has escalated to Priority A or B, address according to timelines above.	N/A
5	Level 3	F (Electric)	Any risk of low potential impact to safety or reliability	Take corrective action within 60 months subject to the specific exceptions. <sup>(a)</sup>	1. Corrective actions for distribution assets to be addressed within five years from date condition identified. 2. Corrective actions for transmission assets to be addressed within two years from date condition identified.	N/A

(a) EXCEPTION – Potential violations specified in Appendix J or subsequently approved through Commission processes, including, but not limited to, a Tier 2 Advice Letter under GO 96B, that can be completed at a future time as opportunity-based maintenance. Where an exception has been granted, repair of a potential violation must be completed the next time the Company's crew is at the structure to perform tasks at the same or higher work level (i.e., the public, communications, or electric level). The condition's record in the auditable maintenance program must indicate the relevant exception and the date of the corrective action.

3.11-5

## 1 **B. (3.11) Metric Performance**

### 2 **1. Historical Data (2020 – June 30 2022)**

3 We are reporting historical data from the years 2020 through June 30,  
4 2022.

5 Our history of available data, which is recorded in our electric work  
6 management systems (e.g., SAP) goes back to 2010. However, we are  
7 focusing our historical reporting for this metric starting at 2020 due to various  
8 changes that occurred prior to 2020, which reshaped GO 95 and GO 165 to  
9 include boundaries for HFTD, as well as informed our current inspection  
10 methods to be more enhanced towards identifying ignition risks.

11 Reported timelines generally align with VM adoption of updated internal  
12 timeliness for Priority Tag mitigation and additional 'Dead & Dying' tree  
13 abatement identified through the implementation of PG&E Enhanced VM  
14 Program in 2019. The VM Program's work management system tracking these  
15 corrective actions is tracked in two separate databases. The Vegetation  
16 Management System (VMS) tracks work identified through its annual inspection  
17 programs. Tree work identified on its Enhanced Vegetation Management  
18 (EVM) Program is maintained in a geospatial platform named ArcGIS Online.

### 19 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

20 Data collected prior to year 2020 is excluded due to the various GO 165  
21 and GO 95 Rule 18 changes mentioned above.

22 We are including all EC (Distribution) and LC (Transmission) notifications,  
23 as well as all inspection-identified vegetation safety hazards that meet the  
24 definition of GO 95 Rule 18 Level 2. [Note that due dates must be manually  
25 adjusted in our data to align with the GO 95 Rule 18 timelines which vary from  
26 our internal timelines as previously mentioned.](#)

### 27 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

28 Metric performance is comprised of an aggregated performance for electric  
29 distribution and electric transmission corrective notifications, as well as  
30 vegetation safety hazards.

31 As described in earlier sections, we are reporting and setting targets  
32 against the timeframes identified in GO 95 Rule 18 rather than the timelines

1 articulated in our internal electric Priority “B” and “E” notifications, and internal  
2 VM Priority 2 and Dead and Dying Tree abatement corrective notifications.

3 To address the unprecedented wildfire risk in our service territory, in 2019  
4 we launched our Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP) as part of our  
5 Wildfire Safety Plan. The intent of that program was to expand our focus during  
6 inspections to include fire ignition risk posed by failure modes on our electric  
7 assets and accelerate the inspections to be complete by the beginning of the  
8 2019 wildfire season. The WSIP generated a volume much greater than what  
9 we have typically experienced for our annual electric corrective notification  
10 volume, with the majority of electric corrective notifications being of lower risk  
11 (e.g., Level 2 Priority “E” & Level 3).

12 Given the high volume (e.g., approximately 4x the volume from prior years)  
13 of identified electric distribution and transmission corrective notifications in the  
14 2019 WSIP, we pivoted from managing our electric corrective notifications  
15 based on due date to focusing our priority through a wildfire risk informed  
16 approach. This means we would complete Level 1 and Level 2 Priority “B”  
17 corrective notifications first and manage the inventory of Level 2 Priority “E” and  
18 Level 3 corrective notifications.

19 Our approach for managing the inventory of Level 2 Priority “E” is to:  
20 (1) group high concentrations of individual capital intensive rebuild corrective  
21 notifications into new, more comprehensive, System Hardening projects, and  
22 (2) permanently remove electric lines out of service that have multiple corrective  
23 notifications and serve small numbers of customers, where service can be  
24 provided via alternate line interconnections or remote grid solutions, as well as  
25 individual corrective work execution for those Level 2 Priority “E” notifications  
26 that were of high wildfire risk informed priority.

27 Our recent 2021 experience in managing our Level 2 Priority “E” corrective  
28 notifications in this manner resulted in a 62 percent relative risk reduction of  
29 open corrective notifications on electric distribution facilities located in HFTD  
30 Tiers 2 and 3.


31 For those electric corrective Level 2 Priority “E” notifications that were going  
32 to remain open past their original due date, and that had the potential to  
33 degrade over time, we performed Field Safety Reassessments (FSR) of those  
34 open Level 2 Priority “E” electric notifications to determine if the conditions of

1 the electric asset had degraded. If they had, we would accelerate those  
2 corrective notifications for repair.

3 We are also currently completing available vegetation priority corrective  
4 notifications within our internal timelines, limiting inventory to corrective  
5 notifications where we have access issues, such as customer property access  
6 issues or related permitting concerns, which are worked as dependencies are  
7 resolved. This is consistent with our Dead and Dying Tree Abatements apart  
8 from work identified by our EVM program. EVM work management is based  
9 upon a risk prioritization that has been updated annually through the  
10 performance period. These changes result in identified tree work from prior  
11 period risk prioritizations that are no longer included within the current period  
12 risk-based book of work. This has resulted in an inventory that we will target for  
13 completion.

14 The following figure plots our historical performance for GO 95 Rule 18  
15 Level 2 HFTD Corrective Notifications.

**FIGURE 3.11-1**  
**GO 95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS – HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2020 - JUNE 30 2022)**



1 **C. (3.11) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 [There are no changes to 1- and 5-year targets since last report.](#)

4 **2. Target Methodology**

5 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, we considered the following  
6 factors:

- 7 • Historical Data and Trends: The targets are based on the projected volume  
8 of GO 95 Rule 18 Priority Level 2 notifications, which consider existing open  
9 corrective action notifications and forecasted new corrective action  
10 notifications that are due for each year;
- 11 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 12 • Regulatory Requirements: GO 95 Rule 18 requirements;
- 13 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes, however attainability  
14 is subject to other emerging higher risk priorities that may influence our  
15 ability to meet projected targets. If emerging higher risk priorities emerge  
16 throughout the course of the year, we may need to prioritize our available  
17 resources to address these higher risk priorities and adjust our work plan  
18 accordingly;
- 19 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
20 Enforcement: Yes, performance at projected levels is sustainable, subject  
21 to other emerging higher risk priorities may influence ability to meet  
22 projected targets. If emerging higher risk priorities emerge throughout the  
23 course of the year, we may need to prioritize our available resources to  
24 address these higher risk priorities and adjust our work plan accordingly;  
25 and
- 26 • Other Qualitative Considerations: This target was established with the  
27 consideration of our risk informed strategy, as opposed to a corrective  
28 notification due date prioritization approach.

29 **3. 2022 Target**

30 Our target for Priority Level 2 corrective maintenance notifications on time  
31 completion rates is 70 percent for the year 2022. This metric performance is  
32 comprised of an aggregated performance, where the projected year 2022

1 volume of corrective notifications for electric distribution, electric transmission  
 2 and vegetation are 72,718; 13,514; and 157,321, respectively.

3 For year 2022, electric distribution notifications completed on  
 4 time percentage is projected at approximately 24 percent and electric  
 5 transmission notifications completed on time percentage is projected at  
 6 approximately 50 percent. The projected forecast for VM is approximately  
 7 92 percent. It is important to note that within this aggregated year 2022  
 8 performance, we are forecasting that our electric Level 2 Priority “B”  
 9 notifications performance to achieve completed on time percentages of  
 10 95 percent for both electric distribution and electric transmission notifications.  
 11 As described earlier, we consider electric Level 2 Priority “B” notifications to  
 12 have a higher likelihood of creating an equipment failure than other electric  
 13 Level 2 Priority notifications.

14 Our corrective notifications strategy will continue to focus on reducing  
 15 wildfire risk associated with our open corrective notifications by working the  
 16 highest risk Level 2 corrective notifications first versus managing corrective  
 17 notification due dates. Using this approach in 2022, we are forecasting to  
 18 reduce the relative wildfire risk associated with open electric distribution  
 19 corrective maintenance notifications in HFTD Tiers 2 and 3 by as much as  
 20 38 percent.

21 The following tables summarize PG&E’s Year 2022 Target for Priority  
 22 Level 2 notifications completed on time percentage, as well as a breakdown  
 23 between the electric distribution, electric transmission and VM Priority Level 2  
 24 notifications performance.

**TABLE 3.11-2  
 GO 95 RULE 18 PRIORITY LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2022  
 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
 (ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AND VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)**

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Priority “E”	Level 2 Priority “B”	Level 2 Priority “B” From “E”	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	12,305	152,945	2,477	167,727
2	Past Due	58,723	13,869	134	72,726
3	% On Time	17%	92%	95%	70%



**TABLE 3.11-3  
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2022  
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION ONLY)**

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	7,771	6,772	2,435	16,978
2	Past Due	52,155	356	128	52,639
3	% On Time	13%	95%	95%	24%

**TABLE 3.11-4  
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2022  
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
(ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ONLY)**

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	4,534	2,245	42	6,821
2	Past Due	6,568	119	6	6,693
3	% On Time	41%	95%	88%	50%

**TABLE 3.11-5  
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2022  
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
(VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)**

Line No.	Year 2022	EVM Dead and Dying	Vegetation Dead and Dying	Vegetation Priority 2	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	42,222	78,002	23,704	143,928
2	Past Due	10,555	1,592	1,247	13,394
3	% On Time	80%	98%	95%	91%

1 **4. 2026 Target**

2 Our 5-year target for Priority Level 2 corrective maintenance notifications on  
3 time is 76 percent. This metric performance is comprised of an aggregated  
4 performance where the projected year 2026 volume of corrective notifications  
5 for electric distribution, electric transmission and vegetation are at 54,731;  
6 11,339; and 159,820, respectively.

7 For year 2026, we are projecting an on-time percentage of approximately  
8 32 percent, 56 percent, 92 percent for electric distribution, electric transmission,  
9 and vegetation notifications performance, respectively.

1 Our corrective notifications strategy will continue to focus on reducing  
 2 wildfire risk associated with our open corrective notifications by working the  
 3 highest risk Level 2 corrective notifications first versus managing corrective  
 4 notification due dates. Furthermore, we are also revisiting opportunities to  
 5 further align our electric corrective action Priority levels (e.g., A, B, E, F, and H)  
 6 with that of GO 95 Rule 18 (e.g., Levels 1, 2, and 3), which we expect will  
 7 improve our performance in the long-term.

8 The following tables summarize our Year 2026 Target for Priority Level 2  
 9 notifications completed on time percentages, as well as a breakdown between  
 10 the electric distribution, electric transmission and vegetation Priority Level 2  
 11 notifications completed on time percentages.

**TABLE 3.11-6  
 GO 95 RULE 18 PRIORITY LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2026  
 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
 (ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AND VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)**

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	14,061	152,480	2,456	168,997
2	Past Due	39,447	14,215	131	53,793
3	% On Time	26%	91%	95%	76%

**TABLE 3.11-7  
 GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2026 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  
 PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
 (ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION ONLY)**

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	9,446	4,771	2,435	16,652
2	Past Due	34,600	251	128	34,979
3	% On Time	21%	95%	95%	32%

**TABLE 3.11-8  
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2026 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  
PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
(ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ONLY)**

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	4,615	1,760	21	6,396
2	Past Due	4,847	93	3	4,943
3	% On Time	49%	95%	88%	56%

**TABLE 3.11-9  
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2026 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  
PERFORMANCE AND TARGET  
(VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)**

Line No.	Year 2026	EVM Dead and Dying	Vegetation Dead and Dying	Vegetation Priority 2	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	44,000	77,990	23,959	145,949
2	Past Due	11,000	1,610	1,261	13,871
3	% On Time	80%	98%	95%	91%

1           The following figure plots our aggregated historical and aggregated  
2           projected performance for GO 95 Rule 18 Level 2 HFTD Corrective  
3           Notifications.

4   **D. (3.11) Performance Against Target**


5       **1. Progress Towards 1-Year Target**

6           As demonstrated in Figure 3.11-2 below, PG&E saw a performance of  
7           71.1 percent in the first half of 2022 which demonstrates improvement from our  
8           last report and is more consistent with Company's 1-year target.

9       **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

10          As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of programs  
11          to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to meet the  
12          Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 3.11-2  
GO 95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS – HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED PERFORMANCE



1 **E. (3.11) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to performance  
3 and their description.

- 4 • System Hardening: System Hardening Program focuses on mitigating wildfire  
5 risk posed by distribution overhead assets in and near Tier 2 and 3 HFTDs in  
6 our service territory. This program targets high wildfire risk miles and applies  
7 various mitigation activities, including: (1) line removal, (2) conversion of  
8 distribution lines from overhead to underground, (3) application of Remote Grid  
9 alternatives, (4) mitigation of exposure through relocation of overhead facilities,  
10 and (5) in-place overhead system hardening.
- 11 • Overhead Preventative Maintenance and Equipment Repair: Focuses on repair  
12 of electric equipment identified with corrective notifications. Our corrective  
13 notifications strategy will continue to focus on reducing wildfire risk associated  
14 with our open corrective notifications by working the highest risk Level 2  
15 corrective notifications first versus managing corrective notification due dates.  
16 We plan to accomplish this by continuing to complete Level 1 and Level 2  
17 Priority “B” corrective notifications first and manage the inventory of Level 2  
18 Priority “E” corrective notifications in a risk informed manner, where the highest

1 risk Level 2 Priority “E” corrective notifications are targeted first, while deploying  
2 safety controls to manage the lower risk Level 2 Priority “E” corrective  
3 notifications. Using this approach in 2022, we are forecasting to reduce the  
4 relative wildfire risk associated with open electric distribution corrective  
5 maintenance notifications in HFTD Tiers 2 and 3 by as much as 38 percent.

- 6 • Our corrective notifications strategy will continue to focus on reducing wildfire  
7 risk associated with our open corrective notifications by working the highest risk  
8 Level 2 corrective notifications first versus managing corrective notification due  
9 dates. Furthermore, we are also revisiting opportunities to further align our  
10 electric corrective action Priority levels (e.g., A, B, E, F, and H) with that of  
11 GO 95 Rule 18 (e.g., Levels 1, 2, and 3).
- 12 • See Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapters 4.3, 9, and 11 in PG&E’s 2023 General Rate  
13 Case for more information.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 3.12**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.12  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.12**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9           **A. (3.12) Overview**

10           **1. Metric Definition**

11                   Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.12 – Electric Emergency  
12           Response Time is defined as:

13                   *Average time and median time in minutes to respond on-site to an*  
14                   *electric-related emergency notification from the time of notification to the*  
15                   *time a representative (or qualified first responder) arrived onsite.*  
16                   *Emergency notification includes all notifications originating from 911 calls*  
17                   *and calls made directly to the utilities' safety hotlines. The data used to*  
18                   *determine the average time and median time shall be provided in*  
19                   *increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental*  
20                   *information, not as a metric.*

21           **2. Introduction of Metric**

22                   This metric measures the average and median time for Pacific Gas and  
23                   Electric Company (PG&E) to respond on-site to an electric emergency once  
24                   a notification is received. Measuring response to 911 calls within  
25                   60 minutes has been a long-standing top public safety measure for PG&E  
26                   and within the industry, and this metric, although calculated differently, is  
27                   similar in its intent for responding quickly to our customers and any  
28                   potentially unsafe conditions reported.

29           **B. (3.12) Metric Performance**

30           **1. Historical Data (2015 – June, 30 2022)**

31                   Historical data is provided from 2015 through June 30, 2022. Although  
32                   emergency response data exists prior to 2015 (as mentioned below), current




1 validation practices were not in place until 2015 and therefore only data from  
2 2015 is reported here for consistency and comparability.

3 Over the timeframe of 2015-2021, total average response time across  
4 all years is 35 minutes, and the median for across all years is 30 minutes.

5 Since 2015, PG&E's historical performance has been within the first  
6 quartile and has been in the first decile for several years when  
7 measuring percentage of response times within 60 minutes, which is the  
8 industry benchmarkable definition.

9 Metric performance has been driven by accurately predicting when large  
10 volumes of calls will occur (based on weather forecasts), proactive  
11 scheduling of resources for 911 response, cross-functional coordination  
12 across PG&E to train non-traditional stand-by staff, availability of resources  
13 for weather days and improved understanding of shifts in storm fronts and  
14 impacts on the system.

**FIGURE 3.12-1**  
**ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME HISTORICAL DATA (2015 - JUNE, 30 2022)**



## 15 2. Data Collection Methodology

16 The metric performance data is captured and stored in the Outage  
17 Information System (OIS) database. Each 911 call has a time stamp. The

1 start time of a 911 call involves receipt by utility personnel and entry into the  
2 OIS database (creation of a tag). The tag is created in the OIS database  
3 when the PG&E personnel is on the phone with the 911 dispatch agency  
4 (there is a direct 911 stand-by line into Gas Dispatch, where all 911 stand by  
5 calls are routed). This process removes the delay between the time the call  
6 is received and entered into the system, and the raw data is then reviewed  
7 for duplicate entries, which are cancelled (if found). The timestamp of when  
8 PG&E personnel responds on site is when they select the “onsite” button on  
9 their mobile data terminals, which marks the completion of the response. If  
10 there is a discrepancy or uncertainty, our Electric Dispatch team will validate  
11 the exact arrival time by leveraging GPS data from our employee’s vehicles  
12 and/or mobile data terminals. The response time in minutes is calculated by  
13 the difference between the two timestamps. From each call’s response  
14 time, the average and median time is calculated for all calls.

### 15 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

16 For January through June 2022, PGE’s average and median response  
17 times were both 30 minutes. Median response time performance saw no  
18 change from 2021 and average response time improved by one minute  
19 compared to 2021. In context, these results are still considered strong  
20 performance as: (1) weather severity is a known uncontrollable variable, and  
21 (2) the corresponding benchmarkable calculation, percent response time  
22 within 60 minutes, remains at the top of industry performance.

### 23 **C. (3.12) 1-Year and 5-Year Target**

#### 24 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

25 There have been no changes to 1- and 5-Year targets since the last  
26 report.

#### 27 **2. Target Methodology**

28 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the  
29 following factors:<sup>1</sup>

---

1 Targets represent values that serve as appropriate indicator lights to signal a review of potential performance issues. Targets should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance, as further described below.

- 1
- 2 • Historical Data and Trends: Comparable data is available starting in  
3 2015 although historical benchmarking trends (under alternative  
4 definition) are informative back to 2012. This historical data context  
5 confirms PG&E’s current results are improved, sustained, and  
6 reasonably considered strong performance, which has informed the  
7 target setting direction to “maintain”;
  - 8 • Benchmarking: Industry benchmarking is available under the  
9 emergency response time measure calculated as percent time  
10 responding on site within 60 minutes. PG&E is first quartile within this  
11 benchmark, and has used this industry data as the key datapoint to  
12 inform target setting:
    - 13 – To do this, PG&E used available industry benchmark data for  
14 the percentage time within 60 minutes metric to apply assumptions  
15 and generally extract estimated performance quartiles under the  
16 measures of average time and median time would equate to as a  
17 measures of average time and median time. The extrapolated  
18 estimated performance ranges for first quartile were then used.  
19 Specifically, these estimated values represent the point at which,  
20 when exceeded, performance would move out of first quartile and  
21 into second quartile;
    - 22 – PG&E’s intent is to stay in first quartile performance. Given the  
23 context that benchmarking provides, PG&E targets are meant to  
24 maintain current performance at levels better than the first quartile  
25 threshold, and would consider a performance change on the  
26 magnitude of exceeding these targets (i.e., moving into a worse  
27 estimated quartile, a signal of concern);
    - 28 – In other words, target values in this case represent performance  
29 levels that PG&E does not want to exceed or move performance  
30 towards. Values should not be interpreted as a plan for or  
31 expectation of worsening performance;
  - 32 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
  - 33 • Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
  - 34 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
Enforcement: Historical data and trends confirm that maintaining

1 estimated first quartile performance is a sustainable target in both the  
2 1-year and 5-year timeframes. A change in performance on the  
3 magnitude of reaching the targets (i.e., performance moving into the  
4 estimated second quartile) is an appropriate indicator light to examine  
5 potential performance issues as PG&E's intent is to maintain current  
6 practices and past improvements and mitigate any future operational  
7 impacts that may arise; and

- 8 • Other Considerations: None.

### 9 **3. 2022 Target**

10 The 2022 Target is to remain better than 44 minutes for average  
11 emergency response time and better than 43 minutes for median  
12 emergency response time. Targets are based on maintaining first quartile  
13 performance.

### 14 **4. 2026 Target**

15 The 2026 Target is to remain better than 44 minutes for average  
16 emergency response time and better than 43 minutes for median  
17 emergency response time. Targets are based on maintaining first quartile  
18 performance.

## 19 **D. (3.12) Performance Against Target**


### 20 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

21 As demonstrated in Figure 3.12-2 below, PG&E saw an average of 30  
22 response minutes and a median of 30 response minutes in the first half of  
23 2022 which is consistent with Company's 1-year target.

### 24 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

25 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of  
26 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to  
27 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 3.12-2  
ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED DATA**



1 **E. (3.12) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Additional actions that have been recently implemented to maintain top-level  
3 performance:

4 • Meteorology, Operations, and Dispatch Support:

- 5 – PG&E Meteorology validated and enhanced 911 forecasting by using
- 6 historical data to train the forecasting model and to provide 911 resource
- 7 requirement recommendations based on predicted weather. Improved
- 8 molding will allow for more effective staffing.
- 9 – A ‘concierge’ Meteorology advisor will be assigned pre-event and
- 10 identified for in event support.
- 11 – Meteorology will proactively reach out to Electric Dispatch if a specific
- 12 geographic area is looking to worsen over the forecast period.
- 13 Meteorology will also modify PG&E’s general wind alert system to
- 14 provide in event systematic support to Dispatchers.

- 15 • Mobile Solution Deployment: Transition non-electric standby personnel into
- 16 Field Automation System tool to allow for quicker dispatching to 911 standby
- 17 requests.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.13**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.13  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.13**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(DISTRIBUTION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.13) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.13 – the Number of California  
13           Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat  
14           Districts (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is defined as:

15                   *The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead*  
16                   *distribution circuits in HFTD Areas.*

17           A CPUC-Reportable Ignition refers to a fire incident where the following  
18           three criteria are met: (1) ignition is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric  
19           Company (PG&E) electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities  
20           burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from  
21           the ignition point.<sup>1</sup>

22           For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

23           PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident  
24           Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety  
25           quarterly via quarterly geographic information system, data reporting, in  
26           quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan updates, and the Safety Performance  
27           Metrics Report.

28       **2. Introduction of Metric**

29           The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions in HFTDs provides one way to  
30           gauge the level of wildfire risk that customers and communities are exposed

---

1       Please see CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014 for additional details.



1 to from overhead distribution assets. PG&E’s objective is to minimize the  
2 number of CPUC-reportable ignitions in the right locations during the right  
3 conditions that may trigger a catastrophic wildfire.


4 **B. (3.13) Metric Performance**

5 **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 2022)**

6 PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan in response  
7 to D.14-02-015 in June 2014. PG&E’s Ignitions Tracker includes all  
8 CPUC-reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014 data does  
9 not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

10 PG&E’s overhead distribution circuits traverse approximately  
11 25,500 miles of terrain in the HFTD areas where the overhead conductor is  
12 primarily bare wire, supported by structures consisting of poles, cross arms,  
13 associated insulators, and operating equipment such as transformer, fuses  
14 and reclosers. The main causes of CPUC-reportable ignitions have been  
15 collected and classified. These fall into six broad categories: vegetation  
16 contact, equipment failure, third party contact, animal contact, wire to wire  
17 contact, and other causes. The counts for 2017 to June 30, 2022, are  
18 shown in the graph below, highlighting the degree of variability that occurs  
19 from year to year relative to each category.

**FIGURE 3.13-1  
HISTORIC PERFORMANCE BY SUSPECTED CAUSE**



1                    There is also a seasonal pattern to the ignition events as shown in the  
 2                    chart of ignitions by month below for each of the years from 2017 through  
 3                    June 2022.

**FIGURE 3.13-2  
HISTORIC PERFORMANCE BY YEAR/MONTH**

Historic Performance by Year/Month						
Month	2017 Total	2018 Total	2019 Total	2020 Total	2021 Total	2022 Total
January	2	1	1		19	2
February		4		7	2	5
March	1	6	2	3	5	4
April	6	5	4	3	6	9
May	9	4	8	9	17	11
June	19	19	14	25	22	14
July	36	30	23	23	24	
August	33	25	15	27	17	
September	28	6	16	17	7	
October	42	15	13	17	6	
November	5	14	12	2		
December	6		1	3	1	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>45</b>

4                    **2. Data Collection Methodology**

5                    Data will be collected per PG&E’s Fire Incident Data Collection Plan  
 6                    (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of

1 unique HFTD CPUC-reportable Ignitions attributable to the distribution asset  
2 class with overhead construction types.

3 The following ignition events captured by PG&E's Fire Incident Data  
4 Collection Plan will be excluded for this metric:

- 5 • Duplicate events;
- 6 • Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
- 7 • Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
- 8 • Transmission ignitions; and
- 9 • Ignitions attributable to underground or pad-mounted assets as these  
10 are not associated overhead assets. (Ignitions caused by non-overhead  
11 assets in HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the  
12 asset, pose less of a wildfire risk.)

### 13 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

14 From January 1 to June 30, 2022, PG&E observed 45 overhead  
15 distribution CPUC-reportable ignitions, significantly lower than the same  
16 period 2021 which had 71 ignitions, and just below the same period for the  
17 previous 3 year average of 49 ignitions. The new mitigation of EPSS did not  
18 impact the number of ignitions for the first five months of 2022, as during  
19 those months EPSS was not widely enabled. The 31 ignitions that occurred  
20 during those months did not occur on EPSS enabled circuits. With the  
21 ongoing drought and prevailing weather conditions, the month of June saw  
22 widespread EPSS enablement and the trajectory of ignitions has started to  
23 deviate from historical patterns. June 2022 saw 14 ignitions versus the 22 in  
24 June 2021 and 25 in June 2020.

### 25 **C. (3.13) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

#### 26 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

27 PG&E's mid-year performance with this metric is on-track with expected  
28 results and no updates to target are proposed at this time.

#### 29 **2. Target Methodology**

30 The two major programs that most directly impact ignition reduction in  
31 the near-term are PSPS and EPSS. Other important resiliency programs  
32 like undergrounding, system hardening, and vegetation management will  
33 have an impact as multiple years of work are completed.


1 EPSS significantly decreased ignition events in 2021 and PG&E will be  
 2 enabling this protection when overhead distribution circuits in a Fire Index  
 3 Area have a forecasted Fire Potential Index (FPI) of R3 or higher across  
 4 HFTD. Ignitions in R3+ conditions represent all historical reportable  
 5 ignitions resulting in a fatality, all ignitions over 100 acres in size, and  
 6 99 percent of reportable ignitions where a structure was destroyed. See  
 7 Figure 3.13-4 for fire statistics by FPI rating.

**FIGURE 3.13-3  
 2018-2020 HFTD OVERHEAD REPORTABLE IGNITION STATISTICS  
 BY FPI, ALL ASSET CLASSES**

	R2+	R3+
% of Total Reportable Ignitions in HFTD	84%	60%
% of Wildfires >10 Acres	81%	71%
% of Wildfires >100 Acres	100%	100%
% of Total Structures Destroyed	100%	99%
% of Total Fatalities	100%	100%

8 PG&E enabled EPSS in 2021 and is using this limited data to forecast  
 9 the expected performance for this metric, at the end of 2022 a better  
 10 baseline will be available Based on 3-previous year averages (2018-2020)  
 11 124 ignitions and the observed effectiveness of EPSS to mitigate facility  
 12 ignitions in 2021 (49 percent), PG&E has projected 88 reportable distribution  
 13 HFTD in 2022. See Figure 3.13-5 for details. However, ignition counts are  
 14 dependent on weather conditions and are highly variable. As a result,  
 15 PG&E forecasts a range of 82 to 94 reportable ignitions to account for  
 16 variability (range is equal to projected target +/- 0.5 of standard deviation).

**FIGURE 3.13-4  
PROJECTED EPSS EFFECTIVENESS BASED ON 2018-2020 AVERAGES AND  
OBSERVED 2021 PERFORMANCE**



1 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
2 following factors:

- 3 • Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS  
4 deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022, there is no  
5 comparable historical data to help guide in target setting;
- 6 • Benchmarking: None;
- 7 • Regulatory Requirements: D.14-02-015;
- 8 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- 9 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
10 Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they  
11 consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to  
12 climate change; and
- 13 • Other Qualitative Considerations: The target range takes consideration  
14 for some variability in weather.

1       **3. 2022 Target**

2               The 2022 target is 82-94 ignitions. The upper end of this range  
3       represents a 25 percent reduction relative to the 3-year average  
4       (2018-2020). The lower end of this range represents a 34 percent reduction  
5       for the same period.

6       **4. 2026 Target**


7               The 2022 target is 82-94 ignitions. The upper end of this range  
8       represents a 25 percent reduction relative to the 3-year average  
9       (2018-2020). The lower end of this range represents a 34 percent reduction  
10       for the same period. Additional time and maturity of the EPSS program will  
11       enable PG&E to reduce ignitions in R3+ conditions and forecast the  
12       effectiveness of the EPSS program to help inform long-term target ranges.

13   **D. (3.13) Performance Against Target**

14       **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

15               PG&E has observed 45 CPUC reportable distribution overhead ignitions  
16       in HFTD year to date through June 2022, a slight reduction compared to  
17       3-prior year actuals but is on track to complete the year within the set goal.  
18       PG&E's goal is based on reducing ignitions during environmental conditions  
19       prone to wildfire; generally, these conditions are not widely observed until  
20       the end of Q2. PG&E started to widely enable EPSS across HFTD in June,  
21       which contributed to notable reductions in conditions where the risk of  
22       wildfires is greatest. The chart below compares 2022 cumulative  
23       performance with 3-previous year averages through the month of June;  
24       PG&E expects a greater favorable delta between 2022 actuals and 3-year  
25       previous averages through fire season.


FIGURE 3.13-5  
CUMULATIVE FIRE IGNITIONS BY MONTH



1 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

2 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E continues to deploy a number  
3 of programs designed to improve the long-term performance of this metric  
4 and meet the Company's 5-year performance target. PG&E expects no  
5 deviation from delivering the 2026 goal for this metric.

FIGURE 3.13-6  
 HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – JUNE 2022) AND TARGETS (2022 & 2026)



1 **E. (3.13) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 PG&E can expect to see improved performance on this metric through  
 3 continual execution of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) and maturation of key  
 4 wildfire mitigation strategies, including:

- 5 • Enablement and Expansion of the EPSS Program: In July 2021, to address  
 6 this dynamic climate challenge, we implemented the EPSS Program on  
 7 approximately 11,500 miles of distribution circuits, or 45 percent of the  
 8 circuits in HFTD areas. With EPSS, we engineered changes to our  
 9 electrical equipment settings so that if an object such as vegetation contacts  
 10 a distribution line, power is automatically shut off within 1/10th of a second,  
 11 reducing the potential for an ignition. EPSS-enabled settings provide a layer  
 12 of protection on days when the wind speeds are low. EPSS is especially  
 13 important during hot-dry summer days, when there are low winds, but  
 14 continued low relative humidity, low fuel moistures levels, and where the  
 15 volume of dry vegetation, in close proximity to the distribution lines,  
 16 increases the risk of an ignition becoming a large wildfire.



1           In 2022, we have expanded the EPSS scope to all HFTD and High Fire  
2 Risk Area (HFRA) areas in our service territory, as well as select non-HFTD  
3 areas. Our engineering team will continue to work through these circuits  
4 and program each protection device with the appropriate EPSS settings.  
5 Programming of EPSS settings into the protection devices along the circuits  
6 will be prioritized based on HFTD and HFRA exposure and forecasted Fire  
7 Potential Index (FPI) conditions. Once the devices are programmed, they  
8 will be capable of being enabled into EPSS mode. Enablement (activation)  
9 of EPSS settings will be determined based on FPI ratings throughout the  
10 service territory.

11           Please see Section 7.3.6.8, Protective Equipment Device Settings in  
12 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

- 13 • Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS): PSPS is a wildfire mitigation  
14 strategy, first implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during  
15 severe weather by proactively de-energizing powerlines (remove the risk of  
16 those powerlines causing an ignition) prior to forecasted wind events when  
17 humidity levels and fuel conditions are conducive to wildfires. PG&E's focus  
18 with the PSPS Program is to mitigate the risks associated with a  
19 catastrophic wildfire and to prioritize customer safety. In 2021, PG&E  
20 continued to make progress to its PSPS Program to mitigate wildfire risk,  
21 including updating meteorology models and scoping processes. In 2022,  
22 PG&E is installing additional distribution sectionalizing devices, Fixed Power  
23 Solutions, and other mitigations targeted at reducing the risk of wildfire.

24           Please see Section 8, PSPS, Including Directional Vision For PSPS in  
25 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

- 26 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program  
27 covers several significant programs to reduce ignition risk, called out in detail  
28 in PG&E's 2022 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System  
29 Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic  
30 wildfire risk caused by distribution overhead assets. In 2022, we are rapidly  
31 expanding our system hardening efforts by:
  - 32 – Completing 470 circuit miles of system hardening work which includes  
33 overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of overhead  
34 lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas;

- 1           – Completing at least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including  
2           Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening  
3           work; and
- 4           – Replacing equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as  
5           non-exempt fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all known,  
6           remaining in HFTD areas).

7           As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3,600 miles of  
8           undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the  
9           10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. This system hardening work done at  
10          scale is expected to have a material impact on ignition reduction

11          Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening  
12          Mitigations in PG&E’s 2022 WMP for additional details.

- 13          • Vegetation Management: PG&E’s Vegetation Management Program,  
14          components of which exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to mitigating  
15          wildfire risk. Our vegetation management team inspects and identifies  
16          needed vegetation maintenance on all distribution and transmission circuit  
17          miles in PG&E’s service area on a recurring cycle through Routine and Tree  
18          Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole Clearing. Our Enhanced Vegetation  
19          Management (EVM) Program goes above and beyond regulatory  
20          requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and  
21          removing overhang in HFTD areas. In 2022 PG&E will complete  
22          1,800 miles of EVM work.

23          Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in  
24          PG&E’s 2022 WMP for additional details.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.14**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN  
HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.14  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN  
HFTD AREAS  
(DISTRIBUTION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.14**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN**  
5   **HFTD AREAS**  
6   **(DISTRIBUTION)**

7           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
8           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
9           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
10           report are identified in blue font.

11   **A. (3.14) Overview**

12       **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.14 – The number of California  
14           Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat  
15           Districts (HFTD) areas (Distribution) is defined as:

16           *The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead (OH)*  
17           *distribution circuits in HFTD areas divided by circuit miles of OH distribution*  
18           *lines in HFTD multiplied by 1000 miles (ignitions per 1000 HFTD circuit*  
19           *miles).*

20           *A CPUC-Reportable Ignition refers to a fire incident where the following*  
21           *three criteria are met: (1) Ignition is associated with PG&E electrical assets,*  
22           *(2) something other than PG&E facilities burned, and (3) the resulting fire*  
23           *travelled more than one linear meter from the ignition point.<sup>1</sup>*

24           For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

25           PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident  
26           Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety  
27           quarterly via quarterly geographic information system, data reporting, in  
28           quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan updates, and the Safety Performance  
29           Metrics Report.

---

1   Please CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014, for additional details.

1       **2. Introduction of Metric**

2               The number of CPUC-reportable Ignitions in HFTDs, normalized by  
3       circuit mileage, provides one way to gauge the level of wildfire risk that  
4       customers and communities are exposed to from OH distribution assets.  
5       PG&E’s objective is to minimize the number of CPUC-reportable ignitions in  
6       the right locations during the right conditions that may trigger a catastrophic  
7       wildfire.


8       **B. (3.14) Metric Performance**

9       **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 2022)**

10              PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, in response  
11       to D.14-02-015, in June 2014 and our record, the Ignitions Tracker, includes  
12       all CPUC-reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014 data  
13       does not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

14              PG&E’s OH distribution circuits traverse approximately 25,500 miles of  
15       terrain in the HFTD areas where the OH conductor is primarily bare wire,  
16       supported by structures consisting of poles, cross arms, associated  
17       insulators, and operating equipment such as transformer, fuses and  
18       reclosers. Given the volume of equipment within the 25,500 miles of HFTD,  
19       the annual number of CPUC-reportable ignitions is too low to detect any  
20       statistical pattern.

FIGURE 3.14-1  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – JUNE 2022)



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                Data will be collected per PG&E’s Fire Incident Data Collection Plan  
3                (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of  
4                unique HFTD CPUC-reportable ignitions attributable to the distribution asset  
5                class with OH construction types.

6                The following ignition events captured by PG&E’s Fire Incident Data  
7                Collection Plan ) will be excluded for this metric:

- 8                • Duplicate events;
- 9                • Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
- 10              • Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
- 11              • Transmission Ignitions; and
- 12              • Ignitions attributable to underground or pad mounted assets as these  
13              are not associated OH assets. (Ignitions caused by non-OH assets in  
14              HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the asset, pose  
15              less of a wildfire risk.)

16              The circuit mileage utilized to calculate this metric originates from  
17              PG&E’s Electrical Asset Data Reports refreshed December 8, 2021. Circuit

1 mileage data from 2015 – 2018 is unavailable and PG&E used results from  
2 December 2021 to calculate this metric for all years for consistency.

### 3 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

4 From January 1 to June 30, 2022, PG&E observed 45 overhead  
5 distribution CPUC-reportable ignitions (corresponding to a rate of  
6 1.78 ignitions per 1,000 circuit miles), significantly lower than the same  
7 period 2021 which had 71 ignitions, and just below the average of  
8 49 ignitions for the same period over the previous 3 years. The new  
9 mitigation of EPSS did not impact the number of ignitions for the first five  
10 months of 2022, as during those months EPSS was not widely enabled.  
11 The 31 ignitions that occurred during those months, did not occur on EPSS  
12 enabled circuits. With the ongoing drought and prevailing weather  
13 conditions, the month of June saw widespread EPSS enablement and the  
14 trajectory of ignitions has started to deviate from historical patterns. June  
15 2022 saw 14 ignitions vs the 22 in June 2021 and 25 in June 2020.

#### 16 **C. (3.14) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

##### 17 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

18 PG&E's mid-year performance with this metric is on-track with expected  
19 results and no updates to target will be proposed.

##### 20 **2. Target Methodology**

21 The two major programs that most directly impact ignition reduction in  
22 the near term are PSPS and EPSS, other important resiliency programs like  
23 undergrounding, system hardening, and vegetation management will have  
24 an impact as multiple years of work are completed.

25 EPSS significantly decreased ignition events in 2021 and PG&E will be  
26 enabling this protection when overhead distribution circuits in a Fire Index  
27 Area have a forecasted Fire Potential Index (FPI) of R3 or higher across  
28 HFTD. Ignitions in R3+ conditions represent all historical reportable  
29 ignitions resulting in a fatality, all ignitions over 100 acres in size, and  
30 99 percent of reportable ignitions where a structure was destroyed; see  
31 Figure 3.14-2 for fire statistics by FPI rating.



**FIGURE 3.14-2  
2018-2020 HFTD OVERHEAD REPORTABLE IGNITION STATISTICS BY FPI,  
ALL ASSET CLASSES**

	R2+	R3+
% of Total Reportable Ignitions in HFTD	84%	60%
% of Wildfires >10 Acres	81%	71%
% of Wildfires >100 Acres	100%	100%
% of Total Structures Destroyed	100%	99%
% of Total Fatalities	100%	100%

1           PG&E enabled EPSS in 2021 and has limited data to forecast the  
2           expected performance for this metric and has projected a range for 2022  
3           and 2026. Please see the target setting methodology for *3.13 Number of*  
4           *CPUC-reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Distribution)* for target setting  
5           details.

6           **3. 2022 Target**

7           The 2022 target is 3.24-3.72 ignitions per 1000 HFTD circuit miles. The  
8           upper end of this range represents a 25 percent reduction relative to the  
9           3-year average (2018-2020); the lower end of this range represents a  
10          34 percent reduction for the same period.

11          **4. 2026 Target**

12          The 2022 target is 3.24-3.72 ignitions per 1000 HFTD circuit miles. The  
13          upper end of this range represents a 25 percent reduction relative to the  
14          3-year average (2018-2020); the lower end of this range represents a  
15          34 percent reduction for the same period. Additional time and maturity of  
16          the EPSS Program will enable PG&E to reduce ignitions in R3+ conditions  
17          and forecast the effectiveness of the EPSS Program to help inform  
18          long-term target ranges.

1 **D. (3.14) Performance Against Target**


2 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

3 As demonstrated in Figure 3.14-3 below, PG&E has observed 45 CPUC  
4 reportable distribution overhead ignitions year to date through June 2022  
5 (corresponding to a rate of 1.78 ignitions per 1,000 circuit miles), a  
6 15 percent reduction, compared to 3-prior year actuals. PG&E is on track to  
7 complete the year within the metric target.

8 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

9 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E continues to deploy a number  
10 of programs designed to improve the long-term performance of this metric  
11 and meet the Company's 5-year performance target. PG&E expects no  
12 deviation from delivering the 2026 goal for this metric.

FIGURE 3.14-3  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – JUNE 2022) AND  
TARGETS (2022 AND 2026)



1 **E. (3.14) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 PG&E can expect to see improved performance on this metric through  
3 continual execution of the WMP and maturation of key wildfire mitigation  
4 strategies, including:

- 5 • Enablement and Expansion of the EPSS Program: In July 2021, to address  
6 this dynamic climate challenge, we implemented the EPSS Program on  
7 approximately 11,500 miles of distribution circuits, or 45 percent of the  
8 circuits in HFTD areas. With EPSS, we engineered changes to our  
9 electrical equipment settings so that if an object such as vegetation contacts  
10 a distribution line, power is automatically shut off within 1/10th of a second,  
11 reducing the potential for an ignition. EPSS enabled settings provide a layer  
12 of protection on days when the wind speeds are low. EPSS is especially  
13 important during hot dry summer days, when there are low winds but  
14 continued low relative humidity, low fuel moistures levels, and where the  
15 volume of dry vegetation, in close proximity to the distribution lines,  
16 increases the risk of an ignition becoming a large wildfire.

17 In 2022, we will be expanding the EPSS scope to all HFTD and High  
18 Fire Risk Area (HFRA) areas in our service territory, as well as select non  
19 HFTD areas. Our engineering team will continue to work through these  
20 circuits and program each protection device with the appropriate EPSS  
21 settings. Programming of EPSS settings into the protection devices along  
22 the circuits will be prioritized based on HFTD and HFRA exposure and  
23 forecasted Fire Potential Index (FPI) conditions. Once the devices are  
24 programmed, they will be capable of being enabled into EPSS mode.  
25 Enablement (activation) of EPSS settings will be determined based on FPI  
26 ratings throughout the service territory.

27 Please see Section 7.3.6.8, Protective Equipment Device Settings in  
28 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

- 29 • Public Safety Power Shut Off: PSPS is a wildfire mitigation strategy, first  
30 implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during severe weather  
31 by proactively de-energizing powerlines (remove the risk of those powerlines  
32 causing an ignition) prior to forecasted wind events when humidity levels  
33 and fuel conditions are conducive to wildfires. PG&E's focus with the PSPS  
34 Program is to mitigate the risks associated with a catastrophic wildfire and to

1 prioritize customer safety in 2021, PG&E continued to make progress to its  
2 PSPS Program to mitigate wildfire risk, including updating meteorology  
3 models and scoping processes. In 2022, PG&E plans to install additional  
4 distribution sectionalizing devices, Fixed Power Solutions, and other  
5 mitigations targeted at reducing the risk of wildfire.

6 Please see Section 8, PSPS, Including Directional Vision For PSPS in  
7 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

- 8 • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program  
9 covers several significant programs to reduce ignition risk, called out in  
10 detail in PG&E's 2022 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System  
11 Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic  
12 wildfire risk caused by distribution OH assets. In 2022, we are rapidly  
13 expanding our system hardening efforts by: completing 470 circuit miles of  
14 system hardening work which includes OH system hardening,  
15 undergrounding and removal of OH lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas;  
16 completing at least 175 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including  
17 Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work;  
18 replacing equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as  
19 non-exempt fuses (3,000) and surge arresters (~4,500, all known, remaining  
20 in HFTD areas). As we look beyond 2022, PG&E is targeting 3,600 miles of  
21 Undergrounding to be completed between 2023 and 2026 as part of the  
22 10,000-Mile Undergrounding Program. This system hardening work done at  
23 scale is expected to have a material impact on ignition reduction

24 Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening  
25 Mitigations in PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

- 26 • Vegetation Management: PG&E's VM Program, components of which  
27 exceed regulatory requirements, is critical to mitigating wildfire risk. Our VM  
28 team inspects and identifies needed vegetation maintenance on all  
29 distribution and transmission circuit miles in PG&E's service area on a  
30 recurring cycle through Routine and Tree Mortality Patrols, as well as Pole  
31 Clearing. Our Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM) Program goes  
32 above and beyond regulatory requirements for distribution lines by  
33 expanding minimum clearances and removing overhang in HFTD areas.  
34 In 2022 PG&E will complete 1,800 miles of EVM work.

- 1 Please see Section 7.3.5, Vegetation Management and Inspections in
- 2 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.15**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS**

**(TRANSMISSION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.15  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)

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2   **CHAPTER 3.15**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS**  
5   **(TRANSMISSION)**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
8           Section D concerning performance against targets. Material changes from the prior  
9           report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (3.15) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.15 – Number of California  
13           Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)-Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat  
14           District (HFTD) areas (Transmission) is defined as:

15           *Number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead transmission*  
16           *circuits in HFTD Areas.*

17           *A CPUC-Reportable Ignition refers to a fire incident where the following*  
18           *three criteria are met: (1) Ignition is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric*  
19           *Company (PG&E) electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities*  
20           *burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from*  
21           *the ignition point.<sup>1</sup>*

22           For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

23           PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident  
24           Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety  
25           quarterly via quarterly geographic information system, data reporting, in  
26           quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan updates, and the Safety Performance  
27           Metrics Report.

28       **2. Introduction of Metric**

29           The number of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTDs provides one way  
30           to gauge the level of wildfire risk that customers and communities are

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1   Please CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014 for additional details.



1 exposed to from overhead transmission assets. PG&E's objective is to  
2 minimize the number of CPUC-Reportable ignitions in the right locations  
3 during the right conditions that may trigger a catastrophic wildfire.


4 **B. (3.15) Metric Performance**

5 **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 2022)**

6 PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, in response  
7 to D.14-02-015, in June 2014 and our record, the Ignitions Tracker, includes  
8 all CPUC-Reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014 data  
9 does not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

10 PG&E's overhead transmission circuits traverse approximately  
11 5,000 miles of terrain in the HFTD areas where the overhead conductor is  
12 primarily bare wire, supported by structures consisting of poles and towers.  
13 The annual number of CPUC-Reportable ignitions is too low to detect any  
14 statistical pattern.


**FIGURE 3.15-1**  
**HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – JUNE 2022)**



15 The main causes of CPUC-Reportable ignitions have been collected  
16 and classified. These fall into five broad categories: third-party contact,

1 animal contact, equipment failure, vegetation contact, and other causes.  
2 The counts for 2015 through June 2022 are shown in the graph below.

**FIGURE 3.15-2**  
**HISTORIC (2015 – JUNE 2022) PERFORMANCE BY SUSPECTED CAUSE**



3 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

4 Data will be collected per PG&E’s Fire Incident Data Collection Plan  
5 (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of  
6 unique HFTD CPUC-Reportable ignitions attributable to the transmission  
7 asset class with overhead construction types.

8 The following ignition events captured by PG&E’s Fire Incident Data  
9 Collection Plan (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P) will be excluded  
10 for this metric:

- 11 • Duplicate events;
- 12 • Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
- 13 • Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
- 14 • Distribution Ignitions; and
- 15 • Ignitions attributable to underground or pad mounted assets as these  
16 are not overhead assets. Ignitions caused by non-overhead assets in

1 HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the asset, pose  
2 less of a wildfire risk.

### 3 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

4 Historically, reportable transmission ignitions in HFTD are low in volume  
5 with variability year-to-year, which complicates the detection of significant  
6 trends. PG&E observed four reportable overhead ignitions in 2021 in  
7 comparison to a 3-year average of 10 ignitions; one ignition was  
8 caused by vegetation contact, two by equipment failure, and one by bird  
9 contact. [PG&E observed one reportable overhead ignition through June](#)  
10 [2022 caused by a third party contact.](#)

#### 11 **C. (3.15) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

##### 12 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

13 [PG&E's mid-year performance with this metric is on-track with expected](#)  
14 [results and no updates to target will be proposed.](#)

##### 15 **2. Target Methodology**

16 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the  
17 following factors:

- 18 • Historical Data and Trends: Target ranges are based on both PG&E's  
19 stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop and historical performance.  
20 The bottom end of the range is 0 in both 2022 and 2026, which reflects  
21 our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the  
22 range is 10 in both 2022 and 2026, which is based on our average  
23 performance over the last three years. The upper end of the range  
24 stays at 10 for 2026 because the volume of transmission ignitions is low,  
25 while variability year-to-year remains high;
- 26 • Benchmarking: None;
- 27 • Regulatory Requirements: CPUC D.14-02-015;
- 28 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
29 Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they  
30 consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to  
31 climate change; and
- 32 • Other Qualitative Considerations: The target range takes consideration  
33 for some variability in weather.

1       **3. 2022 Target**

2               PG&E’s target for 2022 is 0-10. The bottom end of the range is 0 in  
3               2022, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The  
4               upper end of the range is 10 in 2022, which is based on our average  
5               performance over the last three years. The upper end of the range stays at  
6               10 in 2022 and 2026 because the volume of transmission ignitions is low,  
7               while variability year-to-year remains high.

8       **4. 2026 Target**

9               PG&E’s target for 2026 is 0-10. The bottom end of the range is 0 in  
10              2026, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The  
11              upper end of the range is 10 in 2026, which is based on our average  
12              performance over the last three years. The volume of reportable ignitions  
13              caused by transmission assets is so low and highly variable.

14      **D. (3.15) Performance Against Target**


15      **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

16              PG&E has observed one CPUC reportable transmission ignition in  
17              HFTD year to date through June 2022 and is on track to completing the year  
18              within the target range for this metric.

19      **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

20              As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy several  
21              programs to keep metric performance within the Company’s target range.  
22              PG&E expects no deviation from delivering the 2026 goal for this metric.

**FIGURE 3.15-3  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – JUNE 2022) AND  
TARGETS (2022 AND 2026)**



**E. (3.15) Current and Planned Work Activities**

Through continual execution of its WMP, PG&E has taken action to reduce ignition risk associated with its transmission system, including:

- Enhanced Inspection Protocols: In 2022, PG&E is continuing to evolve our inspection programs and LiDAR data collection to proactively identify and treat pending failures and reduce wildfire risk associated with Transmission Facilities. In 2022, PG&E will complete 39,000 detailed ground and aerial inspections on transmission assets, climbing inspections on 1,800 transmission structures, and ground and aerial inspection of 43 transmission substations.

Please see Section 7.3.4.2, Detailed Inspections of Transmission Electric Lines and Equipment in PG&E’s 2022 WMP for additional details.

- Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS): PSPS is a wildfire mitigation strategy, first implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during severe weather by proactively de-energizing powerlines. PG&E’s main focus on PSPS is to mitigate the risks associated with a catastrophic wildfire and to prioritize customer safety. To that end, PG&E continued to make

1 progress to its PSPS program to mitigate wildfire risk, including updating  
2 meteorology models and scoping processes.

3 In 2022, PG&E plans to install additional distribution sectionalizing devices,  
4 Fixed Power Solutions, and other mitigations targeted at reducing the risk of  
5 wildfire.

6 Please see Section 8, Public Safety Power Shutoff, Including Directional  
7 Vision For PSPS in PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

8 • Conductor Replacement and Removal: In 2021, PG&E completed  
9 93.8 miles of conductor replacements and 10 miles of conductor removals.  
10 All this work took place on lines traversing HFTD areas. In 2022, PG&E will  
11 continue this effort by removing or replacing 32 circuit miles of conductor in  
12 HFTD or High Fire Risk Area.

13 Please see Section 7.3.3.17.2, System Hardening – Transmission in  
14 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 3.16**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN  
HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 3.16  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN  
HFTD AREAS  
(TRANSMISSION)

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 3.16**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN**  
5   **HFTD AREAS**  
6   **(TRANSMISSION)**

7           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
8           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
9           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
10           report are identified in blue font.

11   **A. (3.16) Overview**

12       **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.16 – percentage of California  
14           Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)-Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat  
15           District (HFTD) Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

16           *The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead*  
17           *transmission circuits in HFTD divided by circuit miles of overhead*  
18           *transmission lines in HFTD multiplied by 1,000 miles (ignitions per*  
19           *1,000 HFTD circuit mile).*

20           A CPUC-reportable ignition refers to a fire incident where the following  
21           three criteria are met: (1) Ignition is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric  
22           Company (PG&E) electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities  
23           burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from  
24           the ignition point.<sup>1</sup>

25           For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

26           PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident  
27           Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety  
28           quarterly via quarterly GIS data reporting, in quarterly Wildfire Mitigation  
29           Plan (WMP) updates, and the Safety Performance Metrics Report.

---

<sup>1</sup> Please see CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014 for additional details.

1       **2. Introduction of Metric**

2               The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions in HFTDs, normalized by  
3               circuit mileage, provides one way to gauge the level of wildfire risk that  
4               customers and communities are exposed to from overhead transmission  
5               assets. PG&E’s objective is to minimize the number of CPUC-reportable  
6               ignitions in the right locations during the right conditions that may trigger a  
7               catastrophic wildfire.


8       **B. (3.16) Metric Performance**

9       **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 2022)**

10              PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, in response  
11              to CPUC D.14-02-015, in June 2014 and our record, the Ignitions Tracker,  
12              includes all CPUC-reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014  
13              data does not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

14              PG&E’s overhead transmission circuits traverse approximately  
15              5,000 miles of terrain in the HFTD areas where the overhead conductor is  
16              primarily bare wire, supported by structures consisting of poles and towers.  
17              The annual number of CPUC-reportable ignitions is too low and too variable  
18              to detect any statistical pattern.

FIGURE 3.16-1  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 - 2022)



1        **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2                Data will be collected per PG&E’s Fire Incident Data Collection Plan  
3                (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of  
4                unique HFTD CPUC-reportable ignitions attributable to the transmission  
5                asset class with overhead construction types.

6                The following ignition events captured by PG&E’s Fire Incident Data  
7                Collection Plan (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P) will be excluded  
8                for this metric:

- 9                • Duplicate events;
- 10                • Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
- 11                • Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
- 12                • Distribution Ignitions; and
- 13                • Ignitions attributable to underground or pad mounted assets, as these  
14                are not overhead assets. Ignitions caused by non-overhead assets in  
15                HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the asset, pose  
16                less of a wildfire risk.

1 The circuit mileage utilized to calculate this metric originates from  
2 PG&E's Electrical Asset Data Reports refreshed December 8, 2021. Circuit  
3 mileage data from 2015-2018 is unavailable and PG&E used results from  
4 December 2021 to calculate this metric for all years for consistency.

### 5 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

6 Historically, reportable transmission ignitions in HFTD are low in volume  
7 with variability year-to-year, which complicates the detection of significant  
8 trends. PG&E observed a rate of 0.18 ignitions per 1,000-HFTD circuit mile  
9 from January through June in 2022 in comparison to a 3-previous year  
10 average of 1.75 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles.

## 11 **C. (3.16) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

### 12 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

13 PG&E's mid-year performance with this metric is on-track with expected  
14 results and no updates to target will be proposed.

### 15 **2. Target Methodology**

16 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the  
17 following factors:

- 18 • Historical Data and Trends: Target ranges are based on both PG&E's  
19 stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop and historical performance.  
20 The bottom end of the range is 0 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles  
21 in both 2022 and 2026, which reflects our stand that catastrophic  
22 wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is 1.75 ignitions per  
23 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in both 2022 and 2026, which is based on our  
24 average performance over the last three years. The upper end of the  
25 range stays at 1.75 for 2026 because the volume of transmission  
26 ignitions is low, as variability year-to-year remains high;
- 27 • Benchmarking: None;
- 28 • Regulatory Requirements: CPUC D.14-02-015;
- 29 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
30 Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they  
31 consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to  
32 climate change; and

- 1           • Other Qualitative Considerations: The target range takes consideration  
2           for some variability in weather.

3           **3. 2022 Target**

4           PG&E's target for 2022 is 0-1.75 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles.  
5           The bottom end of the range is 0 in 2022, which reflects our stand that  
6           catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is  
7           1.75 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in 2022, which is based on our  
8           average performance over the last three years.

9           **4. 2026 Target**

10          PG&E's target for 2026 is 0-1.75 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles.  
11          The bottom end of the range is 0 in 2026, which reflects our stand that  
12          catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is  
13          1.75 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in 2026, which is based on our  
14          average performance over the last three years. The volume of reportable  
15          ignitions caused by transmission assets is so low and highly variable.

16         **D. (3.16) Performance Against Target**


17           **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

18           As demonstrated in Figure 3.16-2 below, PG&E has observed one  
19           CPUC reportable transmission overhead Ignition to date through June 2022  
20           which is a rate of 0.18. PG&E's performance is on track to remain within the  
21           selected target range for 2022.

22           **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

23           As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy several  
24           programs to keep metric performance within the Company's target range.  
25           PG&E expects no deviation from delivering the 2026 goal for this metric.

**FIGURE 3.16-2  
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-2021) AND  
TARGETS (2022 AND 2026)**



**E. (3.16) Current and Planned Work Activities**

Through continual execution of its WMP, PG&E has taken action to reduce ignition risk associated with its transmission system, including:

- Enhanced Inspection Protocols: In 2022, PG&E is continuing to evolve our inspection programs and LiDAR data collection to proactively identify and treat pending failures and reduce wildfire risk associated with Transmission Facilities. In 2022, PG&E will complete 39,000 detailed ground and aerial inspections on transmission assets, climbing inspections on 1,800 transmission structures, and ground and aerial inspection of 43 transmission substations.

Please see Section 7.3.4.2, Detailed Inspections of Transmission Electric Lines and Equipment in PG&E’s 2022 WMP for additional details.

- Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS): PSPS is a wildfire mitigation strategy, first implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during severe weather by proactively de-energizing powerlines. PG&E’s main focus on PSPS is to mitigate the risks associated with a catastrophic wildfire and to prioritize customer safety. To that end, PG&E continued to make

1 progress to its PSPS Program to mitigate wildfire risk, including updating  
2 meteorology models and scoping processes.

3 In 2022, PG&E plans to install additional distribution sectionalizing devices,  
4 Fixed Power Solutions, and other mitigations targeted at reducing the risk of  
5 wildfire.

6 Please see Section 8, PSPS, Including Directional Vision for PSPS in  
7 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

8 • Conductor Replacement and Removal: In 2021, PG&E completed  
9 93.8 miles of conductor replacements and 10 miles of conductor removals.  
10 All this work took place on lines traversing HFTD areas. In 2022, PG&E will  
11 continue this effort by removing or replacing 32 circuit miles of conductor in  
12 HFTD or High Fire Risk Area.

13 Please see Section 7.3.3.17.2, System Hardening – Transmission in  
14 PG&E's 2022 WMP for additional details.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 4.1**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
NUMBER OF GAS DIG-INS PER 1,000 UNDERGROUND  
SERVICE ALERT (USA) TICKETS ON  
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPELINES**



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.1  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
NUMBER OF GAS DIG-INS PER 1,000 UNDERGROUND SERVICE ALERT (USA)  
TICKETS ON TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPELINES

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.1**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **NUMBER OF GAS DIG-INS PER 1,000 UNDERGROUND SERVICE**  
5   **ALERT (USA) TICKETS ON**  
6                                   **TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPELINES**

7           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
8           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
9           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
10           report are identified in blue font.

11   **A. (4.1) Overview**

12       **1. Metric Definition**

13           Safety and Operational Metric 4.1 – Number of Gas Dig-Ins per  
14           1,000 tickets on Transmission and Distribution Pipelines is defined as:

15           *The number of gas dig-ins per 1,000 Underground Service Alert (USA)*  
16           *tickets received for gas. A gas dig-in refers to damage (impact or exposure)*  
17           *which occurs during excavation activities and results in a repair or*  
18           *replacement of an underground gas facility. Excludes fiber and electric*  
19           *tickets. Also excludes tickets originated by the utility itself or by utility*  
20           *contractors.*

21       **2. Introduction of Metric**

22           Reducing gas dig-ins increases public safety and improves reliability. It  
23           is therefore important to take reasonable steps reduce this risk because gas  
24           dig-ins represent a potential risk to people, property, and the environment.

25           If ignited, gas from a dig-in could produce a fire or explosion, either of  
26           which, could result property damage, injury or even death. Release of gas  
27           from a dig-in also produces a possible health hazard from inhalation of  
28           natural gas. Finally, dig-ins typically produce a disruption or loss of service  
29           to one or more customers.

30           For all these reasons, fewer dig-ins reduces risk to public safety and  
31           minimizes interruption to the gas business and customers.

1 **B. (4.1) Metric Performance**

2 **1. Historical Data (2018 – June 2022)**

3 For this metric, PG&E has four years of historic data available, which  
 4 includes 2018- June 2022. The past four years were used for analysis in  
 5 target setting. Over the historical reporting period, performance improved as  
 6 demonstrated by both an increase in USA tickets and a decrease in gas  
 7 dig-ins.

**FIGURE 4.1-1  
 THIRD-PARTY TICKETS AND TOTAL DIG-IN COUNTS**

Month	USA Ticket Count					Month	Dig-In Count				
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022		2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
January	66,605	66,900	74,736	69,544	83,536	January	100	89	93	118	119
February	62,387	58,586	70,016	74,323	80,107	February	131	78	119	116	106
March	66,538	74,563	69,991	95,177	93,364	March	103	103	98	126	143
April	71,514	85,215	67,071	93,335	83,638	April	147	140	117	147	120
May	75,794	86,339	71,786	87,432	86,995	May	209	140	128	139	152
June	69,824	81,989	80,614	93,008	88,312	June	176	176	170	183	150
July	68,927	92,787	80,926	84,316		July	190	196	201	170	
August	74,158	89,869	76,521	87,507		August	186	200	182	175	
September	64,678	84,840	79,684	84,126		September	173	167	178	163	
October	77,779	91,022	81,680	82,106		October	179	191	155	135	
November	64,861	72,476	72,089	82,859		November	139	147	131	101	
December	56,219	64,452	73,995	71,744		December	110	86	126	64	
Grand Total	813,824	949,038	899,109	1,005,477	515,952	Total	1,843	1,713	1,698	1,637	790

8 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

9 The data used for this metric reporting is maintained in two files.  
 10 Together, these databases identify the number of dig-ins and the  
 11 811 tickets, respectively. To ensure accuracy of the Master Dig-In File data,  
 12 three data sources are reviewed:

- 13 1) The repair data file recorded in SAP-(Obtained using Business Objects  
 14 GCM058 Quarterly GQI Extract Report);
- 15 2) The Event Management Tool obtained from Gas Dispatch, (EM Tool)  
 16 data file; and
- 17 3) The Dig-In Reduction Teams (DiRT) Pronto download file, obtained from  
 18 the DiRT team data download report.

19 Events that meet the definition of dig-in are recorded as a ratio of total  
 20 dig-ins (count) divided by the third-party USA tickets (count) multiplied

1 by 1,000. This metric does not include tickets originated by the utility itself  
2 or by utility contractors.


3 This metric also does not include PG&E dig-ins to third parties  
4 (e.g., sewer, water, telecommunications). Dig-ins are reported in real-time,  
5 so they should be captured for the reporting period. However, in the event  
6 dig-ins are reported after the reporting cycle is closed, the dig-in would be  
7 captured in the next reporting cycle (i.e., the next quarter of the current year  
8 or the first quarter of the next year). Electric and Fiber dig-ins are also  
9 excluded from the dig-in count. Also excluded from the dig-in count are the  
10 following (since damages are not from excavation activity):

- 11 • Damages to above-ground infrastructure, such as meters and risers, or  
12 overbuilds;
- 13 • Pre-existing damages (e.g., due to corrosion or old wrap);
- 14 • Any intentional damage to a pipeline (e.g., drilling or cutting);
- 15 • Damage caused by driving over a covered facility (heavy vehicles  
16 damage gas pipe, non-excavation);
- 17 • Damage to abandoned facilities;
- 18 • Damage due to materials failure (e.g., Aldyl-A pipe); and
- 19 • Damage caused to gas or electric lines by trench collapse or soldering  
20 work.

### 21 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

22 There has been an overall downward trend in the number of dig-ins per  
23 1,000 third-party USA tickets. PG&E attributes the reduction to current and  
24 planned Damage Prevention activities. Overall, PG&E has worked to  
25 increase knowledge of the requirement to call 811 before digging through  
26 Public Awareness Campaigns and by providing training and education to  
27 contractors. PG&E continues to show an improvement in its dig-in ratio.

FIGURE 4.1-2  
TOTAL DIG-INS PER 1,000 THIRD-PARTY TICKETS 2018 – JUNE 2022



1 **C. (4.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There are no updates to the current 1- and 5-year targets since the last  
4 report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
7 following factors:

- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: Comparable data is available starting in  
9 2018. Performance has been consistent with a downward trend from  
10 2018-2022;
- 11 • Benchmarking: Although this metric is not benchmarkable as defined  
12 (benchmarkable metrics include total tickets rather than only a subset of  
13 tickets), benchmark data was used and derived as proxy guideposts to  
14 understand PG&E performance for third-party tickets to inform target  
15 setting. The target is set at a level consistent with strong performance;
- 16 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 17 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- 18 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight  
19 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the set target is a

1 sustainable assumption for maintaining metric performance, plus room  
2 for non-significant variability; and

- 3 • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

### 4 **3. 2022 Target**

5 The 2022 target is to maintain performance at or better than a rate  
6 of 2.56 based on the factors described above. This target represents an  
7 appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential performance issues.  
8 Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

### 9 **4. 2026 Target**

10 The 2026 target is to maintain performance better than a rate of 2.48  
11 based on the factors described above. Annual targets should continue to be  
12 informed by available benchmarking data.

## 13 **D. (4.1) Performance Against Target**


### 14 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-year Target**

15 As demonstrated in Figure 4.1-3, PG&E saw a 1.53 Gas Dig-In rate in  
16 the first half of 2022, which is remains consistent with the Company's 1-year  
17 target.

### 18 **2. Maintaining Performance against the 5-year Target**

19 As discussed in Section E, PG&E continues to use the Damage  
20 Prevention and DiRT programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward  
21 the Company's 5-year target.

**FIGURE 4.1-3  
TOTAL DIG-INS PER 1,000 THIRD-PARTY TICKETS 2018 - JUNE 2022 AND TARGETS  
THROUGH 2026**



**E. (4.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

PG&E’s Damage Prevention team is responsible for the overall management of PG&E’s Damage Prevention Program, by managing the risks associated with excavations around PG&E’s facilities and conducting investigations. As an additional control to manage the Damage Prevention Program, PG&E has its DiRT). DiRT consists of 25 people (18 PG&E Employees and 7 Contractors) deployed systemwide to investigate dig-ins. Team members work closely with various local PG&E operations personnel and respond to referrals from those employees when they observe excavations potentially not in compliance with the requirements of California Government Code Section 4216. DiRT personnel also assist the Ground Patrol team when they respond to immediate threats identified in the air by the Aerial Patrol team and other PG&E groups, in order to intervene in unsafe digging activities by third parties and follow-up to educate excavators as necessary.

PG&E’s Damage Prevention activities include educational outreach activities for professional excavators, local public officials, emergency responders, and the general public who lives and works within PG&E’s service territory. The program communicates safe excavation practices, required actions prior to excavating near underground pipelines, availability of pipeline location information, and other gas safety information through a variety of methods throughout the year. These efforts are aimed at increasing public awareness

1 about the importance of utilizing the 811 Program before an excavation project is  
2 started, understanding the markings that have been placed, and following safe  
3 excavation practices after subsurface installations have been marked. Specific  
4 activities aimed at preventing dig-ins include:

- 5 • Updating the Locate and Mark Field Guide to provide clear instruction  
6 around critical processes for locating underground assets, including  
7 troubleshooting of difficult to locate facilities;
- 8 • Continued participation in the Gold Shovel Standard (GSS). PG&E began  
9 this program that is now run by a third-party and available to utilities and  
10 excavators across the nation. The program sets safety criteria that PG&E  
11 contractors are required to meet to be eligible to do work on behalf of the  
12 Utility. The GSS became an internationally-recognized program, with  
13 companies in Canada adopting and implementing its certification  
14 requirements. The GSS Program is a way that PG&E is making its own  
15 communities safer, and also bringing best safety practices to the industry;  
16 and
- 17 • An 811 Ambassador program, which utilizes all PG&E employees to  
18 properly identify unsafe excavation activities where employees learn how to  
19 identify excavation-related delineations and utility operator markings.



**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 4.2**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**NUMBER OF OVERPRESSURE EVENTS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.2  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
NUMBER OF OVERPRESSURE EVENTS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.2**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **NUMBER OF OVERPRESSURE EVENTS**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets;  
7           Section D concerning performance against target; Section E concerning current and  
8           planned work activities. Material changes from the prior report are identified in  
9   blue font.

10   **A. (4.2) Overview**

11       **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metric 4.2 – Number of Overpressure (OP)  
13           events is defined as:

14                   *OP events as reportable under General Order (GO) 112-F 122.2(d)(5).*

15       **2. Introduction of Metric**

16           An OP event occurs when the gas pressure exceeds the Maximum  
17           Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline, plus the build ups, set  
18           forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) – 49 CFR 192.201.

19           This metric tracks the occurrence of OP events, which includes:

- 20       1) High pressure Gas Distribution (GD):  
21           a) (MAOP 1 pound per square inch gauge (psig) to 12 psig) greater  
22           than 50 percent above MAOP;  
23           b) (MAOP 12 psig to 60 psig) greater than 6 psig above MAOP; and  
24       2) Gas Transmission (GT) pipelines greater than 10 percent above MAOP  
25           (or the pressure produces a hoop stress of  $\geq 75$  percent Specified  
26           Minimum Yield Strength, whichever is lower).

27           OP events on low pressure systems are excluded from this metric  
28           because they are not defined in federal code 49 CFR 192.201.

29           OP events have the potential to overstress pipelines which pose  
30           significant safety and operational risks to Pacific Gas and Electric  
31           Company's (PG&E) gas system. PG&E has implemented multiple controls  
32           and mitigations to reduce OP events.

1           Following the San Bruno event in 2010, an Overpressure Elimination  
2 (OPE) task force was established to identify the root causes of OP events  
3 and develop corrective actions.

4           In 2011, several decisions were made in response to San Bruno  
5 incident. One of the most important corrective actions was to lower the  
6 normal operating pressure below the MAOP across the system, which  
7 resulted in a significant drop-off of OP events from 2011-2012.

8           Beginning in 2013, causal evaluations were conducted on all OP events.  
9 Corrective actions from these evaluations included: equipment and design  
10 review, training, fatigue management, improved Gas Event Reporting, and  
11 improved work procedures.

12           In 2015, several benchmarking studies and industry evaluations were  
13 conducted to learn OP elimination best practice. The benchmarking studies  
14 and analyses helped influence the development and strategies of the OPE  
15 Program.

16           In 2017, after the Folsom OP event,<sup>1</sup> the OPE Program was stood up  
17 under one sponsor with dedicated resources. The OPE Program formalized  
18 a two-pronged strategy to mitigate the risk of large OP events, while  
19 reducing operational risk: (1) Human (HU) Performance Strategy, and  
20 (2) Equipment (EQ)-Related Strategy.

21           In 2020, PG&E retooled an effort to reduce the number of HU  
22 Performance-related events. PG&E contracted with Exponent to perform an  
23 analysis on the OP and near hit events using the Human Factors Analysis  
24 and Classification System to drive focused actions to improve. This effort  
25 helped the team to develop the HU Performance tools to: identify and  
26 control risk, improve efficiency, avoid delays, reduce errors, prevent events,  
27 and promote excellent performance at every facility.

---

<sup>1</sup> On January 24, 2017, the Hydraulically Independent System that delivers gas to the Folsom area experienced a large OP event in excess of the system's 60 psig MAOP. The OP event caused damage to the regulator station equipment and resulted in a significant number of leaks on plastic distribution piping. Inspection of the station revealed that the station filter had been clogged with debris and the regulator boot had been eroded by contaminants. Further investigation revealed that an upstream pigging project scraped corrosion scales from internal pipe walls. The scale—along with other debris—traveled downstream, until eventually collecting at Folsom, causing the OP event.

1 **B. (4.2) Metric Performance**

2 **1. Historical Data (2011 – June 2022)**

3 Historical data of OP events is available since year 2011. Various data  
4 points of each OP event including location, Corrective Action Program  
5 (CAP) number, date, cause, corrective action, etc. are documented in the  
6 OP master list file attachment.

7 Data source of the metric is commonly from the Supervisory Control and  
8 Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, and from direct accounts, including:  
9 gauge pressure readings, chart recorders, electronic recorders, and  
10 metering data.

11 The availability of data has expanded throughout the years due to the  
12 increase in pressure monitoring devices allowing more OP events to be  
13 identified and recorded. [In 2012, PG&E had 1,409 SCADA pressure points  
14 on its pipeline system, and by end of June 2022, that number has grown  
15 to 6,695.](#)

16 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

17 PG&E has both an automated process and field process for logging Gas  
18 OP events. For the automated process, the SCADA system monitors EQ  
19 pressure and notifies potential issues to Gas Control through alarms. For  
20 the field process, field personnel are required to gauge pressure during  
21 maintenance and clearances and report to Gas Control if an abnormal  
22 operating condition arises.


23 Several controls are in place for this metric:

- 24 1) Each OP event is entered into our system of record SAP system CAP to  
25 ensure retention of record history.
- 26 2) Each OP event's datasets (location, CAP number, date, cause,  
27 corrective action etc.) are reviewed by Facility Integrity Management  
28 Program team to ensure accuracy and are logged in the OP master list  
29 which is viewable by all PG&E employees; and
- 30 3) Each OP event is distributed to stakeholders by an electronic page  
31 (epage) and an e-mail (Quick Hit), reviewed on the next Daily  
32 Operations Briefing with leadership.

1 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

2 In the first half of 2022, 4 overpressure events occurred in the PG&E  
3 gas system, trending towards 9 OP events for 2022. 9 OP events is the  
4 middle point of the 10-year historical data (2012-2021) excluding years  
5 2015, 2018 and 2021.

**FIGURE 4.2-1  
OVERPRESSURE EVENTS 2011-2022**



6 **C. (4.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

7 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

8 There have been no changes to the 1- and 5-year targets.

9 **2. Target Methodology**

10 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
11 following factors:

- 12 • Historical Data and Trends: OP events have ranged from 5 to 11 events  
13 per year since 2012. The target is based on the maximum number of  
14 events in the past seven years.

- 1 • Benchmarking: This metric is not traditionally benchmarkable, however  
2 PG&E has contracted with third parties to conduct international and  
3 North American industry evaluations. The benchmarking studies  
4 indicated that PG&E has demonstrated strong performance in this area.
- 5 • Regulatory Requirements: OP events as reportable under California  
6 Public Utilities Commission GO No.112-F, 122.2(d)(5).
- 7 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Workplan: Yes.
- 8 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
9 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the maximum of the past  
10 seven years is a sustainable assumption for maintaining metric  
11 performance, plus room for non-significant variability; and
- 12 • Other Qualitative Considerations: The approach of using the maximum  
13 of the past seven years includes the consideration of the expected  
14 impact of ongoing SCADA device installations—improved system  
15 visibility and monitoring points may result in a higher number of  
16 observed OP events. Additionally, as the OP Program has expanded,  
17 there has been an increase in pressure monitoring devices throughout  
18 the system, which allows more OP events to be identified and recorded.

### 19 **3. 2022 Target**

20 The 2022 target is to maintain performance at or better than 11 events,  
21 based on the factors described above. This target represents an  
22 appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential performance issues.  
23 Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

### 24 **4. 2026 Target**

25 The 2026 target is to maintain performance better than nine events,  
26 based on the factors described above, along with stepped-improvement of  
27 one event every two years. This target demonstrates continued focus on  
28 improvement year-over-year. PG&E continues to review operations and  
29 look for opportunities to perform work to further reduce OP events and  
30 contribute to system safety.

1 **D. (4.2) Performance Against Target**


2 **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

3 In the first half of 2022, 4 overpressure events occurred in PG&E’s gas  
4 system which is consistent with the Company’s 1-year target of equal to or  
5 less than 11.

6 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

7 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying several programs  
8 to maintain or improve the long-term performance of the Over Pressure  
9 metric to meet the Company’s 5-year performance target.

**FIGURE 4.2-2  
OVERPRESSURE EVENTS 2011-2021 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2026**



10 **E. (4.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11 PG&E’s strategic objective includes plans to execute the secondary  
12 Overpressure Protection Program (OPP) to mitigate common failure mode  
13 failure OP events for both GT and GD over a 10-year period (2018-2027).

- 14 • Gas Distribution: For 2019-June 2022, PG&E has retrofitted approximately  
15 492 GD pilot-operation stations. By end of June 2022, PG&E has achieved  
16 the goal of retrofitting 50% of GD pilot-operated stations.. PG&E will



1 continue the effort of retrofitting GD pilot-operation stations to mitigate the  
2 common failure mode OP events in the Gas Distribution System. This plan  
3 will have installed secondary OPP at all GD pilot-operated stations (which  
4 carry the common failure mode risk) by 2025.

- 5 • Gas Transmission: In 2019, PG&E rebuilding and retrofitting Large Volume  
6 Customer Regulators (LVCRs) sets specifically to address OP risks. All  
7 Large Volume Customer Regulators (LVCR) are forecasted to be rebuilt or  
8 retrofitted by the end of 2023.<sup>2</sup> From 2019-June 2022, PG&E has rebuilt  
9 and retrofitted approximately 47 Large Volume Customer Regulators  
10 (LVCRs). PG&E will continue the effort of rebuilding GT LVCRs to mitigate  
11 that common failure mode OP events in the Gas Transmission System.

---

<sup>2</sup> From 2019-2021, PG&E has rebuilt and retrofitted approximately 43 LVCRs.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 4.3**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
TIME TO RESPOND ON-SITE TO EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.3  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
TIME TO RESPOND ON-SITE TO EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.3**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **TIME TO RESPOND ON-SITE TO EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9           **A. (4.3) Overview**

10           **1. Metric Definition**

11                   Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 4.3 – Time to Respond On-Site to  
12                   Emergency Notification is defined as:

13                           *Average time and median time to respond on-site to a gas-related*  
14                           *emergency notification from the time of notification to the time a Gas Service*  
15                           *Representative (GSR) (or qualified first responder) arrived onsite.*  
16                           *Emergency notification includes all notifications originating from 911 calls*  
17                           *and calls made directly to the utilities' safety hotlines.*

18                   The data used to determine the average time and median time shall be  
19                   provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as  
20                   supplemental information, not as a metric.

21           **2. Introduction of Metric**

22                   Gas emergency response measures Pacific Gas and Electric  
23                   Company's (PG&E) ability to respond with urgency to hazardous or unsafe  
24                   situations that may be a threat to customer and public safety. In some  
25                   situations, GSRs respond to emergency situations as first responders.  
26                   Responding to emergency situations is PG&E's highest priority so that  
27                   PG&E can prevent or ameliorate hazardous situations. PG&E's goal is to  
28                   have a GSR on-site as quickly as possible for customer generated gas odor  
29                   calls. Faster response time to Emergency Notifications reduces the length  
30                   of emergent situations.

31                   PG&E's GSRs respond to approximately 500,000 gas service customer  
32                   requests annually. These requests include: investigating reports of possible

1 gas leaks; carbon monoxide monitoring; re-lights; appliance safety checks;  
2 and maintenance work, including Atmospheric Corrosion remediation and  
3 regulator replacements.

4 Consistent with current practice, PG&E will continue to treat all  
5 customer-reported gas odor calls as Immediate Response (IR) and will  
6 attempt to respond to such calls within 60 minutes. To meet this goal,  
7 PG&E utilizes industry best practices, such as: mobile data terminals,  
8 real-time Global Positioning Systems, backup on-call technicians, and shift  
9 coverage of 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

## 10 **B. (4.3) Metric Performance**

### 11 **1. Historical Data (2011 – June 2022)**

12 Historical data is presented as a value in minutes for response time,  
13 indicated as both an average and a median value for all Emergency  
14 Notifications for each calendar year.

15 Data sets prior to 2014 come from historically submitted documentation;  
16 data sets from 2014 forward come from the Customer Data Warehouse  
17 system (a database for Field Automated Systems (FAS) data) and go  
18 through a rigorous, multi-step audit process prior to submission to ensure  
19 accuracy and precision.

### 20 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

21 The response time by PG&E is measured from the time PG&E is  
22 notified—defined as the order creation time in Customer Care and Billing by  
23 the contact center—to the time a GSR or a PG&E-qualified first responder  
24 arrives on-site to the emergency location (including Business Hours and  
25 After Hours). PG&E notification time is defined as when a gas emergency  
26 order is created and timestamped.

27 Using PG&E's Field Automation System (FAS), the average response  
28 time is measured for all IR gas emergency orders generated where a GSR  
29 or qualified first responder is required to respond.

30 The following IR gas emergency jobs are excluded in the total gas  
31 emergency orders volume count:

- 1 • Level 2 and above emergencies;<sup>1</sup>
- 2 • If the source is a non-planned release of PG&E gas, the original call is
- 3 included—the gas emergency itself—and all subsequent related orders
- 4 are excluded;
- 5 • If the source is either a planned release of PG&E gas or another
- 6 non-leak-related event, all related orders from the metric are excluded,
- 7 including the original call;
- 8 • Duplicate orders for assistance;
- 9 • Cancelled orders;
- 10 • For multiple leak calls from the same Multi-Meter Manifold;<sup>2</sup>
- 11 • Unknown premise tag with no nearby gas facility; and
- 12 • If the FAS system is unavailable—such as during a tech down event—
- 13 the jobs cannot be created in our system, and are therefore, an
- 14 exception (not available to be included in the volume).

### 15 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

16 Since 2011, PG&E has improved and maintained strong performance in  
17 this metric. [Over the past 6 months, we have continued this excellence by](#)  
18 [achieving an average of 19.8 minutes and a recorded median of](#)  
19 [18.23 minutes.](#)

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
1 Defined in the Gas Emergency Response Plan as a region-wide emergency event that may require 1-2 days for service restoration.

2 The first order is included, and all subsequent orders are excluded.

FIGURE 4.3-1  
AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 2013-2021



FIGURE 4.3-2  
MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2013-2021



1 **C. (4.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There are no updates to the current 1- and 5-year targets since the last  
4 report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
7 following factors:

- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: Comparable data is available starting in  
9 2015. Performance has been consistent from 2015-2022;
- 10 • Benchmarking: The targets for average response time and median  
11 response time are informed by available benchmarking data and targets  
12 are set at a level consistent with strong performance;

- 1 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 2 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- 3 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and
- 4 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the set targets is a
- 5 sustainable assumption for maintaining average and median response
- 6 time performance, plus room for non-significant variability; and
- 7 • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

### 8 **3. 2022 Target**

9 The 2022 target is to maintain performance better than or equal to  
10 21.6 minutes for average response time and 19.8 minutes for median  
11 response time, based on the factors described above. These targets  
12 represent values that serve as appropriate indicator lights to signal a review  
13 of potential performance issues. Targets should not be interpreted as  
14 intention to worsen performance.

### 15 **4. 2026 Target**

16 The 2026 target is to maintain performance better than or equal to  
17 21.2 minutes for average response time and 19.4 minutes for median  
18 response time, based on the factors described above. Annual targets  
19 should continue to be informed by available benchmarking data.

## 20 **D. (4.3) Performance Against Target**

### 21 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**


22 As demonstrated in Figure 4.3-3 and 4.3-4, PG&E saw an average  
23 response time of 19.8 minutes and a median response time of  
24 18.23 minutes in the first half of 2022 which is consistent with the  
25 Company's 1-year targets.

### 26 **2. Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target**


27 As discussed in Section E below, PG&E continues to employ thorough  
28 review, auditing, and cross-functional programs to maintain performance in  
29 pursuit of the Company's 5-year target.



**FIGURE 4.3-3  
AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 2013-2021 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2026**



**FIGURE 4.3-4  
MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2013-2021 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2026**



1 **E. (4.3) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to  
3 performance and their description of that tie.

- 4 • Field Service and Gas Dispatch: PG&E’s Field Service and Gas Dispatch  
5 partner together to respond to customer Gas Emergency (odor calls). There  
6 is a shared responsibility in the overall performance of this work. GSRs are  
7 deployed systemwide, 24 hours a day—utilizing an on-call as needed.
- 8 • Monitoring Controls: Activities which help us to maintain our Gas  
9 Emergency Response include: continued focus and visibility in our Daily

1 Operating Reviews, Weekly Operating Reviews, and Cross Functional  
2 Reviews. These help to illustrate several key drivers, including: Dispatch  
3 Handle Time, Drive Time, and Wrap Time.

- 4 • Audits: PG&E performs audits on Emergency calls to identify opportunities.
- 5 • Data Analysis: Staffing and historical Gas Emergency Response volume  
6 are reviewed to help drive decisions. We utilize Best Practice of Dispatching  
7 to the closest resource. In addition, Dispatcher Ride Alongs with GSRs  
8 have been implemented to drive cross-functional understanding.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 4.4**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**GAS SHUT-IN TIME, MAINS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.4  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
GAS SHUT-IN TIME, MAINS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.4**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **GAS SHUT-IN TIME, MAINS**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (4.4) Introduction**

10   **1. Metric Definition**

11           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 4.4 – Gas Shut-In Time, Mains is  
12           defined as:

13                   *Median time to shut-in gas when an uncontrolled or unplanned gas*  
14                   *release occurs on a main. The data used to determine the median time*  
15                   *shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c)*  
16                   *as supplemental information, not as a metric.*

17   **2. Introduction of Metric**

18           The measurement of Gas Shut in Time captures the median duration of  
19           time required to respond to and mitigate potentially hazardous gas leak  
20           conditions. These leak conditions are associated with the public safety risk  
21           of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service. The term “shut  
22           in” refers to the act of stopping the gas flow. It is important for the flow of  
23           gas to be stopped to avoid consequences such as overpressure events or  
24           explosions and so that work can be safely performed to make repairs in a  
25           timely manner. Performance aims for faster response times as a measure  
26           of prevention resulting in lower risk of an incident impacting public safety  
27           and minimized interruption to the gas business and customers. It is  
28           imperative that we promptly and effectively resolve any hazardous  
29           conditions on our distribution network while balancing timeliness, customer  
30           outages, and employee safety.

31           The timing for the response starts when the Pacific Gas and Electric  
32           Company (PG&E or the Utility) first receives the report of a potential gas

1 leak and ends when the Utility’s qualified representative determines, per the  
2 Utility’s emergency standards, that the reported leak is not hazardous, a  
3 leak does not exist, or the Utility’s representative completes actions to  
4 mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being non-hazardous (i.e., by  
5 shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak migration, repair, etc.)  
6 per the Utility’s standards.

7 This metric measures the median number of minutes required for a  
8 qualified PG&E responder to arrive onsite and stop the flow of gas as result  
9 of damages impacting gas mains from PG&E distribution network. It does  
10 not include instances where a qualified representative determines that the  
11 reported leak is not hazardous or a leak does not exist.

## 12 **B. (4.4) Metric Performance**

### 13 **1. Historical Data (2014 – June 2022)**

14 Historical data for shut-in the gas (SITG) Main metric is available for the  
15 period 2014 through June 2022. The data captures the median time that a  
16 qualified first responder requires to respond and stop gas flow during  
17 incidents involving an unplanned and uncontrolled release of gas on  
18 distribution mains. This data includes incidents related to distribution main  
19 pipelines and regulator stations because of third-party dig-ins, vehicle  
20 impacts, explosion, pipe rupture, and material failure.

21 Before 2014, PG&E used a decentralized emergency process to  
22 manage emergencies (i.e., each division used its own resources like  
23 mappers, planners, among others to track and manage emergencies).  
24 Similarly, support organizations like Dispatch, Mapping and Planning used  
25 their own management tools to help schedule and manage emergency  
26 information. Dispatch used a management tool called Outage Management  
27 that recorded times at various stages of the process (i.e., when the  
28 emergency call came in, when the Gas Service Representative (GSR)  
29 arrived at the site, when the leak was isolated, etc.). The Distribution  
30 Control Room used a tool called Gas Logging System to record incoming  
31 information.

32 In 2014, a centralized process was implemented to allow Distribution,  
33 Transmission, Dispatch, Planning and Mapping personnel to be co-located

1 and work together as a team to manage emergencies. This centralized  
2 process also allowed the development of the Event Management Tool  
3 (EMT) system.


## 4 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

5 The EMT is currently used as the official system to track gas  
6 emergencies from start to finish. It is used by Dispatch and Gas Distribution  
7 Control Center (GDCC) teams to create emergency events and collect  
8 incident information and allows PG&E to run reports and retrieve historical  
9 information. The data captures the time that a qualified first responder  
10 requires to respond and stop gas flow during incidents involving an  
11 unplanned and uncontrolled release of gas on distribution mains. There are  
12 distinct types of incidents recorded in the EMT: explosions, corrosion, cross  
13 bore, pipe damage, dig-ins, evacuations, exposed pipe—no gas leak, fires,  
14 gas leaks (including Grade 1), high concentration areas, Hi/Lo pressures,  
15 material failure, pipe ruptures, vehicle impacts, among others. The EMT  
16 provides access to the latest information on an incident. All emergency data  
17 is consolidated and stored in one place.

## 18 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

19 The range of data available to calculate the historical shut-in the gas  
20 median time for Mains is from 2014 through June 2022. Over this reporting  
21 period, performance improved, decreasing from 97 minutes in 2014 to  
22 76.4 minutes median time in 2022. Comparing 2022 performance to 2021,  
23 the median time decreased from 79.1 to 76.4 minutes.

**FIGURE 4.4-1  
GAS SHUT IN TIME, MAINS MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014-JUNE 2022**



1 **C. (4.4) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 [There have been no changes to the 1- and 5-year targets since the last](#)  
 4 [Safety and Operational Metrics report filed on April 1.](#)

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
 7 following factors:

- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the  
 9 past four years of median historical data, plus 10 percent. The past  
 10 four years were used because 2018 was when the FAS system was first  
 11 utilized, and this data period is consistent with current operational  
 12 practices. The use of 10 percent allows for non-significant variability,  
 13 and accounts for the consideration of risk during shut in events;
- 14 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 15 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 16 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;



- 1 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
2 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the past  
3 four years annual median response time plus 10 percent is a  
4 sustainable assumption for maintaining the improvement from  
5 2018-2021-time frame plus room for non-significant variability; and
- 6 • Other Qualitative Considerations: Reducing shut in time to the lowest  
7 possible result is not necessarily the best approach from a public safety  
8 standpoint, and there is consideration of risk in various situations. In  
9 some instances, the safest decision for our employees and the public is  
10 to allow the gas to escape before crews shut it off.

### 11 **3. 2022 Target**

12 The 2022 target is to maintain performance at or lower than  
13 85.4 minutes based on the factors described above. This target was  
14 established to account for the consideration of risk in various situations and  
15 aligns with our commitment to the safe operations of our assets. This target  
16 represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential  
17 performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen  
18 performance.

### 19 **4. 2026 Target**

20 The 2026 target is to maintain performance at or lower than  
21 83.4 minutes, based on the factors described above, along with stepped  
22 improvement of 0.5 minutes forecast year-over-year.

## 23 **D. (4.4) Performance Against Target**


### 24 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

25 As demonstrated in Figure 4.4-2, PG&E saw a median response time  
26 of 76.4 minutes in the first half of 2022 which is better than the Company's  
27 1-year target.

### 28 **2. Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target**

29 As discussed in Section E, PG&E will continue mitigating the risk of loss  
30 of containment on Gas Distribution Mains and Services and employing its  
31 various programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward its 5-year  
32 target.

**FIGURE 4.4-2  
GAS SHUT IN TIME, MAINS MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014-JUNE 2022 AND  
TARGETS THROUGH 2026**



1 **E. (4.4) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 PG&E will continue to drive metric progress through performance  
3 management and supervisor-out-in-the-field initiatives. This metric will continue  
4 to mitigate the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service by  
5 reducing distribution pipeline rupture with ignition.

6 The metric is supported by the following programs which focus on improving  
7 public safety: Field Services and Gas Maintenance and Construction (M&C).

- 8 • Gas Field Service: Field Service responds to gas service requests, which  
9 include investigation reports of possible gas leaks, carbon monoxide  
10 monitoring, customer requests for starts and stops of gas service, appliance  
11 pilot re-lights, appliance safety checks, as well as emergency situations as  
12 first responders.
- 13 • Gas Maintenance and Construction: Gas M&C performs routine  
14 maintenance of PG&E’s gas distribution facilities, which includes emergency  
15 response due to dig-ins, as well as leak repairs.

1           The following process improvement initiatives have been implemented to  
2 help achieve metric results:

- 3       • Enhanced plastic squeeze capability from approximately 50 percent to all  
4       GSRs for < 1.5" plastic pipe;
- 5       • Purchased and implemented emergency trailers in every division, allowing  
6       for emergency equipment to be accessed quickly and easily;
- 7       • Purchased additional steel squeezers for 2-8" steel pipe (housed on  
8       emergency trailers);
- 9       • Implemented Emergency Management tool (EM tool) to alert maintenance  
10      and construction (M&C) of SITG events when notified by third-party  
11      emergency organizations;
- 12     • Established concurrent response protocol (dispatch M&C and Field Service  
13      resources) when notified by emergency agencies. Utility Procedure  
14      TD-6100P-03 Major Gas Event Response: Fire, Explosion, and Gas Pipeline  
15      Rupture was updated in 2021 to align with PG&E's response and  
16      communication protocols;
- 17     • Implemented 30-60-90-120+ minute communication protocols between Gas  
18      Distribution Control Center and Incident Commander to ensure consistent  
19      communication and issue escalation during events; and

20           The following process improvement initiatives are on-going to help achieve  
21 metric results:

- 22     • Tier 3 incident review meetings monthly to share best practices and review  
23      long duration events;
- 24     • Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees as  
25      part of Operator Qualification refresher.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 4.5**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**GAS SHUT-IN TIME, SERVICES**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.5  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
GAS SHUT-IN TIME, SERVICES

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.5**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **GAS SHUT-IN TIME, SERVICES**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (4.5) Overview**

10   **1. Metric Definition**

11           Safety and Operational Metric 4.5 – Gas Shut-In Time, Services is  
12           defined as:

13                   *Median time to shut-in gas when an uncontrolled or unplanned gas*  
14                   *release occurs on a service. The data used to determine the median time*  
15                   *shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c)*  
16                   *as supplemental information, not as a metric.*

17   **2. Introduction of Metric**

18           The measurement of Gas Shut-In Time captures the median duration of  
19           time required to respond to and mitigate potentially hazardous gas leak  
20           conditions. These leak conditions are associated with the public safety risk  
21           of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service. The term  
22           “shut-in” refers to the act of stopping the gas flow. It is important for the flow  
23           of gas to be stopped to avoid consequences such as overpressure events or  
24           explosions and so that work can be safely performed to make repairs in a  
25           timely manner. Performance aims for faster response times as a measure  
26           of prevention resulting in lower risk of an incident impacting public safety  
27           and minimized interruption to the gas business and customers. It is  
28           imperative that we promptly and effectively resolve any hazardous  
29           conditions on our distribution network while balancing timeliness, customer  
30           outages, and employee safety.

31           The timing for the response starts when Pacific Gas and Electric  
32           Company (PG&E or the Utility) first receives the report of a potential gas

1 leak and ends when the Utility’s qualified representative determines, per the  
2 Utility’s emergency standards, that the reported leak is not hazardous, a  
3 leak does not exist, or the Utility’s representative completes actions to  
4 mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being non-hazardous (e.g., by  
5 shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak migration, repair, etc.)  
6 per the Utility’s standards.

7 This metric measures the median number of minutes required for a  
8 qualified PG&E responder to arrive onsite and stop the flow of gas as result  
9 of damages impacting gas mains from PG&E distribution network. It does  
10 not include instances where a qualified representative determines that the  
11 reported leak is not hazardous or a leak does not exist.

## 12 **B. (4.5) Metric Performance**

### 13 **1. Historical Data (2014 – June 2022)**

14 Historical data for Shut-In the gas (SITG) Services metric is available for  
15 the period 2014 through June 2022. The data captures the median time that  
16 a qualified first responder is required to respond and stop gas flow during  
17 incidents involving an unplanned and uncontrolled release of gas on  
18 services. This data includes incidents related to distribution services and  
19 related components such as service lines, valves, risers, and meters due to  
20 third party dig-ins, vehicle impacts, explosion, pipe rupture, and material  
21 failure.

22 Before 2014, PG&E used a decentralized emergency process to  
23 manage emergencies, i.e., each division used its own resources like  
24 mappers, planners, among others to track and manage emergencies.  
25 Similarly, support organizations like Dispatch, Mapping and Planning used  
26 their own management tools to help schedule and manage emergency  
27 information. Dispatch used a management tool called Outage Management  
28 that recorded times at various stages of the process (i.e., when the  
29 emergency call came in, when the Gas Service Representative (GSR)  
30 arrived at the site, when the leak was isolated, etc.). The Distribution  
31 Control Room used a tool called Gas Logging System to record incoming  
32 information.

1 In 2014, a centralized process was implemented to allow Distribution,  
2 Transmission, Dispatch, Planning and Mapping personnel to be co located  
3 and work together as a team to manage emergencies. This centralized  
4 process also allowed the development of the Event Management Tool  
5 (EMT) system.

## 6 **2. Data Collection Methodology**


7 The EMT is currently used as the official system to track gas  
8 emergencies from start to finish. The EMT is used by Dispatch and Gas  
9 Distribution Control Center (GDCC) teams to create emergency events and  
10 collect incident information and allows PG&E to run reports and retrieve  
11 historical information. There are distinct types of incidents recorded in the  
12 EMT: explosions, corrosion, cross bore, pipe damage, dig-ins, evacuations,  
13 exposed pipe—no gas leak, fires, gas leaks (including Grade 1), high  
14 concentration areas, Hi/Lo pressures, material failure, pipe ruptures, vehicle  
15 impacts, among others. The EMT provides access to the latest information  
16 on an incident. All emergency data is consolidated and stored in one place.

## 17 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

18 The range of data available to calculate the historical SITG median time  
19 for Services is from 2014 to 2022. Over this reporting period, performance  
20 improved, decreasing from 38.0 minutes in 2014 to 37.0 minutes in 2022  
21 (~2.6 percent improvement). But in comparison from 2021 performance to  
22 2022, the median time increased from 36.3 to 37.0 minutes (~2.6 percent  
23 decline).



**FIGURE 4.5-1  
GAS SHUT IN TIME, SERVICES MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014-2021**



1 **C. (4.5) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 [Three have been no updates to the current 1- and 5-year targets since](#)  
 4 [the last report.](#)

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
 7 following factors:

- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the  
 9 past four years of median historical data, plus 10 percent. The past  
 10 four years were used because 2018 was when the FAS system was first  
 11 utilized, and this data period is consistent with current operational  
 12 practices. The use of 10 percent allows for non-significant variability,  
 13 and accounts for the consideration of risk during shut in events;
- 14 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 15 • Regulatory Requirements: None;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the past four years annual median response time plus 10 percent is a sustainable assumption for maintaining the improvement from 2018-2021 time frame plus room for non-significant variability; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: Reducing shut in time to the lowest possible result is not necessarily the best approach from a public safety standpoint, and there is consideration of risk in various situations. In some instances, the safest decision for our employees and the public is to allow the gas to escape before crews shut it off.

### 3. 2022 Target

The 2022 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 40.4 minutes based on the factors described above. This target was established to account for the consideration of risk in various situations and aligns with our commitment to the safe operations of our assets. This target represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

### 4. 2026 Target

The 2026 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 39.6 minutes based on the factors described above along with stepped improvement of 0.2 minutes year-over-year.

## D. (4.5) Performance Against Target


### 1. Maintain Performance Against the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 4.5-2, PG&E saw a median response time of 37.0 minutes in the first half of 2022 which is better than the Company's 1-year target.

### 2. Maintain Performance Against the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E, PG&E will continue mitigating the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Mains and Services and employing its various programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward its 5-year target.

**FIGURE 4.5-2  
GAS SHUT IN TIME, SERVICES MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014-2022 AND  
TARGETS THROUGH 2026**



1        **3. Current and Planned Work Activities**

2                PG&E will continue to drive metric progress through performance  
3 management and supervisor-out-in-the-field initiatives. This metric will  
4 continue to mitigate the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main  
5 or Service by reducing distribution pipeline rupture with ignition.

6                The metric is supported by the following programs which focus on  
7 improving public safety: Field Services and Gas Maintenance and  
8 Construction (M&C).

- 9                • Gas Field Service: Field Service responds to gas service requests,  
10                which include investigation reports of possible gas leaks, carbon  
11                monoxide monitoring, customer requests for starts and stops of gas  
12                service, appliance pilot re-lights, appliance safety checks, as well as  
13                emergency situations as first responders.
- 14                • Gas M&C: Gas M&C performs routine maintenance of PG&E’s gas  
15                distribution facilities, which includes emergency response due to dig-ins,  
16                as well as leak repairs.

1           The following process improvement initiatives have been implemented  
2 to help achieve metric results:

- 3           • Enhanced plastic squeeze capability from approximately 50 percent to  
4 all GSRs for < 1.5" plastic pipe;
- 5           • Purchased and implemented emergency trailers in every division,  
6 allowing for emergency equipment to be accessed quickly and easily;
- 7           • Purchased additional steel squeezers for 2-8" steel pipe (housed on  
8 emergency trailers);
- 9           • Implemented Emergency Management tool (EM tool) to alert M&C of  
10 SITG events when notified by third-party emergency organizations;
- 11          • Established concurrent response protocol (dispatch M&C and Field  
12 Service resources) when notified by emergency agencies. Utility  
13 Procedure TD-6100P-03 Major Gas Event Response: Fire, Explosion,  
14 and Gas Pipeline Rupture was updated in 2021 to align with PG&E's  
15 response and communication protocols; and
- 16          • Implemented 30-60-90-120+ minute communication protocols between  
17 GDCC and Incident Commander to ensure consistent communication  
18 and issue escalation during events.

19           The following process improvement initiatives are on-going to help  
20 achieve metric results:

- 21          • Tier 3 incident review meetings monthly to share best practices and  
22 review long duration events; and
- 23          • Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees  
24 as part of Operator Qualification refresher.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 4.6**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF GAS ON**  
**TRANSMISSION PIPELINES**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.6  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF GAS ON  
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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.6**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF GAS ON**  
5   **TRANSMISSION PIPELINES**

6           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
7           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets;  
8           Section D concerning performance; Section E concerning current and planned work  
9           activities. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

10 **A. (4.6) Overview**

11 **1. Metric Definition**

12           Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 4.6 – Uncontrolled Release of  
13           Gas on Transmission Pipelines is defined as:

14           *The number of leaks, ruptures, or other loss of containment on*  
15           *transmission lines for the reporting period, including gas releases reported*  
16           *under Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191.3.*

17 **2. Introduction of Metric**

18           This metric tracks the total number of Grade 1, 2, and 3 leaks, as well as  
19           ruptures and other losses of containment on gas transmission (GT)  
20           pipelines. Leaks are an important indicator because each leak’s  
21           uncontrolled flow of gas into the surrounding area can increase the  
22           consequence of incidents and cause disruption to our customers’ gas  
23           service. Leaks are also an important indicator in evaluating the likelihood for  
24           where other incidents could occur due to similar criteria or conditions.

25 **B. (4.6) Metric Performance**

26 **1. Historical Data (2016 – June 2022)**

27           Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) started by reviewing six and  
28           a half years of historical data, comprising the years 2016 through June  
29           2022. In evaluating the data, PG&E noted changes in detection capabilities  
30           and frequency of surveys for the years after 2018. For this reason, the data  
31           used to develop these metrics is focused on 2019 – June 2022.

1       **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2               Leak data is managed and pulled by the PG&E Leak Survey Process  
3 team. This data is extracted from PG&E’s GCM013 report using SAP data.  
4 This report aggregates all leaks found during the reporting period including  
5 the location, line type, and grade of leak. Original grade is used for the  
6 metric criteria because it is not subject to change even if the leak condition  
7 or status changes due to regrade, cancelation, or repair.


8               In addition, transmission incidents reported to Pipeline and Hazardous  
9 Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) that meet the incident reporting  
10 definition in CFR 191.3 are considered for metric inclusion. These events  
11 may be leaks, ruptures, or other incidents. For each reporting period, PG&E  
12 will review any transmission incidents reported to PHMSA and compare  
13 against the GCM013 leaks using available information like incident location  
14 (Route/MP, latitude/longitude, or street address) and date/time of incident to  
15 remove any duplicates between the two datasets.

16       **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

17               The annual count of all leaks, ruptures, and loss of containment had  
18 been increasing steadily since 2016, with the largest increase seen from  
19 2018 to 2019. This increase is primarily due to a California Air Resources  
20 Board (CARB) rule change which requires more frequent leak surveys. The  
21 increase has improved visibility and resulted in a larger leak dataset relative  
22 to prior years. In March 2017, CARB finalized and approved the Oil and  
23 Gas Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Rule codified under California Code of  
24 Regulations, Title 17, Division 3, Chapter 1, Subchapter 10, “Climate  
25 Change,” Article 4. Effective January 1, 2018, the GHG Rule covers  
26 emission standards, including, but not limited to, stringent leak detection and  
27 repair requirements for facilities in certain Oil and Gas sectors. This rule  
28 applies to PG&E’s underground natural gas storage facilities and GT  
29 compressor stations. As a result, PG&E performs a quarterly leak survey at  
30 the impacted facilities and performs leak repairs based on CARB’s repair  
31 timelines. [Based off current year performance there is a declining trend.](#)  
32 [This trend can be analyzed for cause, after we get a full year of results for](#)  
33 [2022 that we can compare with 2021 results.](#)



**FIGURE 4.6-1  
LEAKS BY GRADE TYPE 2016 - JUNE 2022**



1 **C. (4.6) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There have been no updates to the current 1- and 5-year targets since  
4 the last report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the  
7 following factors:

- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: The targets are based on the average of  
9 the past three years of historical data. The most recent three years  
10 were used as the timeframe most representative of current leak survey  
11 practices;
- 12 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 13 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 14 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- 15 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
16 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the past

1 three years (2019 – June 2022) is a sustainable assumption and allows  
2 for non-significant variability; and

- 3 • Other Qualitative Considerations: The target also takes into  
4 consideration that the results for this metric may fluctuate based on  
5 miles of leak surveys performed. The number of leaks found has a  
6 correlative relationship to the miles of leak surveys performed. While  
7 this is a positive impact for risk visibility and mitigation, it can be a driver  
8 of varying trends appearing in the results.

### 9 **3. 2022 Target**

10 The 2022 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 3,545 leaks,  
11 ruptures, or other loss of containment on GT pipelines. This target, which is  
12 the average of performance over the last three years, is based on the  
13 factors described above. This target aligns with our commitment to the safe  
14 operations of our assets. This target represents an appropriate indicator  
15 light to signal a review of potential performance issues. Even though the  
16 target is set at a performance level worse than 2021 performance, it should  
17 not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

### 18 **4. 2026 Target**

19 The 2026 target is to maintain performance at or lower than  
20 3,405 events, which reflects a 1 percent annual reduction, and is based on  
21 the factors described above.

## 22 **D. (4.6) Performance Against Target**

### 23 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

24 Figure 4.6-3 demonstrates that PG&E saw 1,258 leaks in the first half of  
25 2022, which is 35 percent towards the Company's 1-year target.

### 26 **2. Progress Towards/Deviation From the 5-Year Target**

27 As discussed in Section E, PG&E continues using surveys and  
28 assessments, risk mitigation, and its programs to achieve the Company's  
29 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 4.6-2  
LEAKS BY GRADE TYPE 2016-2021 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2026





FIGURE 4.6-3  
UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF GAS INCIDENTS IN 2022



1 **E. (4.6) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 The primary programs that support the risk reduction goals of this metric are  
3 Transmission Integrity Management and Leak Management.


- 4 • Transmission Integrity Management: The Integrity Management Program  
5 provides the tools and processes for risk ranking and prioritization of  
6 remediation efforts. This program enables PG&E to focus on identifying and

1 remediating threats to its system. The Transmission Integrity Management  
2 Program (TIMP) assesses the threats on every segment of transmission  
3 pipe, evaluates the associated risks, and acts to prevent or mitigate these  
4 threats. The TIMP approach for assessing risk is based on methodologies  
5 consistent with American Society of Mechanical Engineers B31.8S and is in  
6 compliance with 49 CFR Part 192 Subpart O. Many of PG&E's programs  
7 that mitigate, and control transmission pipe asset risks are developed and  
8 managed within the TIMP program. Examples of assessments or mitigative  
9 work that contribute to reducing or preventing significant incidents include:  
10 strength testing, inline inspection, direct assessment, direct examination and  
11 pipe replacement.

- 12 • Leak Management: The Leak Management Program addresses the risk of  
13 Loss of Containment (LOC) by finding and fixing leaks. PG&E performs leak  
14 survey of the GT and storage system twice per year, by either ground or  
15 aerial methods in accordance with General Order 112-F. Leak surveys of  
16 pipeline and equipment are commonly accomplished on foot or vehicle, by  
17 operator-qualified personnel, using a portable methane gas leak detector.  
18 Aerial leak surveys, in remote locations and areas difficult to access on the  
19 ground, are performed by helicopter using Light Detection and Ranging  
20 Infrared technology. Additional activities that complement the TIMP include:  
21 risk-based leak surveys, continued use of Picarro, mobile leak quantification,  
22 and replacing/removing high bleed pneumatic devices at its compressor  
23 stations and storage facilities
- 24 • In-line Inspection (ILI): PG&E plans on performing ILI upgrades at a pace of  
25 8-12 upgrades per year. [By the end of 2022, PG&E estimates to have](#)  
26 [49.5 percent of the system capable of ILI](#). Work during the rate case will  
27 contribute to PG&E's overall goal of upgrading the system so that  
28 69 percent of PG&E's GT pipeline miles, are capable of ILI by end of 2036.
- 29 • External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA): PG&E has assessed the  
30 effectiveness of its ECDA Program by evaluating the leak rates on pipe  
31 where ECDA has previously been applied, and by tracking the number of  
32 immediate indications found during the ECDA surveys. Both indicators are  
33 trending down over time. Figure 5-4 shows the leaks found over time in  
34 locations where ECDA was previously applied. The significant decline over

1 time, indicates that the ECDA Program is reducing leaks. PG&E expects to  
2 conduct ECDA indirect inspections on approximately 268 miles of  
3 transmission pipeline in HCAs during the rate case period.

**FIGURE 4.6-4  
LEAK REDUCTION OVER TIME BY ECDA**



- 4 • Close Interval Survey: PG&E also has a Close Interval Survey (CIS)  
5 Program targeted at monitoring the effectiveness of the transmission  
6 pipelines' cathodic protection (CP) systems by reading the CP levels  
7 between the annual monitoring locations. [This program annually monitors](#)  
8 [the CP on 8-10 percent of PG&E's gas transmission pipelines](#). Assessing  
9 the levels of CP between test points provides increased confidence that the  
10 readings obtained at test stations reflect conditions along the entire system  
11 and enable PG&E to make CP adjustments where CIS indicates additional  
12 CP is warranted. CIS is recognized as a best practice to assess CP along  
13 the entire pipeline, verify electrical isolation, and identify potential  
14 interference gradients that may compromise the integrity of the system.
- 15 • Strength Testing: Strength tests are conducted as a qualifying test for  
16 MAOP and integrity assessments. [Leaks may be reduced as strength tests](#)  
17 [are performed for the following reasons](#):
  - 18 – A Section of pipe lacks a Traceable, Verifiable, and Complete (TVC)  
19 record of a test that supports the MAOP; or

1           – Subpart O integrity assessments require verification that pipeline threats  
2           will not compromise pipeline integrity.

3           Currently more than 82 percent of PG&E’s GT pipelines have a strength  
4           test. PG&E’s plan is to continue to perform strength tests on all HCA pipe that  
5           lack a TVC test record, and where the pipeline requires MAOP reconfirmation  
6           under the new federal regulations. Locations operating over 30 percent  
7           specified minimum yield strength will be the highest priority. This work will also  
8           enable PG&E to confirm the MAOP of all gas transmission lines in HCAs, Class  
9           3 and 4 locations and MCAs requiring assessment by July 2035.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 4.7**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 4.7  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 4.7**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9           **A. (4.7) Overview**

10           **1. Metric Definition**

11                   Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 4.7 – Time to Resolve Hazardous  
12                   Conditions (TRHC) is described as:

13                           *Median response time to resolve Grade 1 leaks. Time starts when the*  
14                           *utility first receives the report and ends when a utility’s qualified*  
15                           *representative determines, per the utility’s emergency standards, that the*  
16                           *reported leak is not hazardous or the utility’s representative completes*  
17                           *actions to mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being non-hazardous*  
18                           *(i.e., by shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak migration,*  
19                           *repair, etc.) per the utility’s standards.*

20                   The data used to determine the Median Time shall be provided in  
21                   increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental  
22                   information, not as a metric.

23           **2. Introduction of Metric**

24                   The measurement of TRHC captures the duration of time required to  
25                   mitigate hazardous gas leak conditions. These leak conditions are  
26                   associated with the public safety risk of loss of containment on Gas  
27                   Distribution Main or Service. Performance aims for faster resolution times  
28                   as a measure of prevention resulting in lower risk of an incident impacting  
29                   public safety and minimized interruption to the gas business and customers.  
30                   It is imperative that we promptly and effectively resolve any hazardous  
31                   conditions on our distribution network while balancing timeliness, customer  
32                   outages, and employee safety. Long duration blowing gas events have the

1 potential to negatively impact public safety if an ignition source is present, as  
2 well as it poses a risk if migration into sub-surface structures occurs.

### 3 **B. (4.7) Metric Performance**

#### 4 **1. Historical Data (2018 – June 2022)**

5 Historical data for TRHC Grade 1 Leaks metric is available for  
6 2018-June 2022. The data captures the time that a qualified first responder  
7 requires to respond and stop gas flow due to Grade 1 leaks. This data  
8 includes leaks identified in our distribution system and includes all facility  
9 types, i.e., customer facilities, service and main pipelines, meters, regulator  
10 stations, service risers, valves. It includes leaks identified by PG&E  
11 personnel only and with a final resolution of leak repaired.

12 Before 2014, PG&E used a decentralized emergency process to  
13 manage emergencies (i.e., each division used its own resources like  
14 mappers, planners, among others to track and manage emergencies).  
15 Similarly, support organizations like Dispatch, Mapping and Planning used  
16 their own management tools to help schedule and manage emergency  
17 information. Dispatch used a management tool called Outage Management  
18 that recorded times at various stages of the process (i.e., when the  
19 emergency call came in, when the Gas Service Representative arrived at  
20 the site, when the leak was isolated, etc.). The Distribution Control Room  
21 used a tool called Gas Logging System to record incoming information.

22 In 2014, a centralized process was implemented to allow Distribution,  
23 Transmission, Dispatch, Planning and Mapping personnel to be co located  
24 and work together as a team to manage emergencies. This centralized  
25 process also allowed the development of the Event Management Tool  
26 (EMT) system which was implemented in 2018.

27 PG&E started tracking gas flow stop times for Grade 1 leaks in 2018  
28 although this has not been a mandatory requirement, except when the  
29 incident is California Public Utilities Commission or Department of  
30 Transportation reportable.

#### 31 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

32 The EMT is currently used as the official system to track gas  
33 emergencies from start to finish. The EMT provides access to latest


1 information on an incident. All emergency data is consolidated and stored in  
2 one place.

3 The EMT is used by Dispatch and Gas Distribution Control Center  
4 teams to create emergency events and collect incident information. It also  
5 allows us to run reports and retrieve historical information. There are  
6 distinct types of incidents recorded in the EMT: explosions, corrosion, cross  
7 bore, pipe damage, dig-ins, evacuations, exposed pipe—no gas leak, fires,  
8 gas leaks (including Grade 1), high concentration areas, Hi/Lo pressures,  
9 material failure, pipe ruptures, vehicle impacts, among others. No  
10 transmission events are included in the metric.

### 11 **3. Metric Performance for Reporting Period**

12 The range of data available to calculate the historical TRHC for Grade 1  
13 leaks is from 2018 to June 2022. In this timeframe, performance improved  
14 significantly, decreasing from 183.4 minutes in 2018 to 159 minutes in 2022.  
15 Comparing 2022 performance to 2021, the median time decreased from  
16 161.0 to 159.0 minutes. The fluctuations during the 2018 to 2022 period  
17 appear to be due to random variability without any clear operational  
18 significance.

FIGURE 4.7-1  
TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2018-2022



1 **C. (4.7) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to One-and-Five Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 There have been no updates to the current 1- and 5-year targets since  
4 the last report.

5 **2. Target Methodology**

6 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
7 following factors:

- 8 • Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the  
9 past four years of historical data, plus 10 percent. The past four years  
10 were used because 2018 is the first year of available historical data.  
11 The use of 10 percent allows for non-significant variability, as well as  
12 unknown variability given that this is a new metric that has not been well  
13 measured and tracked in the past;
- 14 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 15 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 16 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;

- 1 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
2 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the past  
3 four years, plus 10 percent, is a sustainable assumption for maintaining  
4 the improvement from 2018-June 2022 time frame, plus room for  
5 non-significant variability and other unknown variables; and
- 6 • Other Qualitative Considerations: This is a new metric to PG&E that  
7 has not yet been closely tracked or well understood.

### 8 **3. 2022 Target**

9 The 2022 target is to maintain performance at or lower than  
10 183.5 minutes based on the factors described above.

11 This target aligns with our commitment to the safe operations of our  
12 assets. This target represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a  
13 review of potential performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as  
14 intention to worsen performance.

### 15 **4. 2026 Target**

16 The 2026 Target is to maintain performance at or lower than  
17 181.5 minutes based on the factors described above along with stepped  
18 improvement of 0.5 minutes year-over-year.

## 19 **D. (4.7) Performance Against Target**


### 20 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the One-Year Target**

21 As demonstrated in Figure 4.7-2, PG&E saw a median response time of  
22 159.0 minutes in the first half of 2022 which is better than the Company's  
23 one-year target.

### 24 **2. Maintaining Performance Against the Five-Year Target**

25 As discussed in Section E, PG&E will continue mitigating the risk of loss of  
26 containment on Gas Distribution Mains and Services and employing its  
27 various programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward its five-year  
28 target.

**FIGURE 4.7-2**  
**TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2018-2022 AND**  
**TARGETS THROUGH 2026**



1 **E. (4.7) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Starting in 2022, PG&E is applying the definition as stated in  
3 Decision 21-11-009 to existing data for further visibility. There are on-going  
4 efforts in place to ensure traceable and verifiable data. PG&E plans to  
5 implement SAP controls to ensure that Field Service and Maintenance and  
6 Construction (M&C) personnel are capturing this data at each occurrence. This  
7 will drive visibility into the metric to allow for performance management. This  
8 metric will continue to mitigate the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution  
9 Main or Service by reducing distribution pipeline rupture with ignition.

10 The metric is supported by the following programs which focus on improving  
11 public safety: Field Services and Gas M&C.

- 12 • Gas Field Service: Field Service responds to gas service requests, which  
13 include investigation reports of possible gas leaks, carbon monoxide  
14 monitoring, customer requests for starts and stops of gas service, appliance  
15 pilot re-lights, appliance safety checks, as well as emergency situations as  
16 first responders.
- 17 • Gas M&C: Gas M&C performs routine maintenance of PG&E's gas  
18 distribution facilities, which includes emergency response due to dig-ins, as  
19 well as leak repairs.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**

**CHAPTER 5.1**

**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**

**CLEAN ENERGY GOALS COMPLIANCE METRIC**



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 5.1  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
CLEAN ENERGY GOALS COMPLIANCE METRIC

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 5.1**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4                                   **CLEAN ENERGY GOALS COMPLIANCE METRIC**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.2 concerning data collection methodology; C.1 concerning metric  
7           targets; and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes  
8           from the prior report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (5.1) Overview**

10   **1. Metric Definition**

11           Safety and Operational Metric 5.1 – Clean Energy Goals Compliance  
12           Metric is defined as:

13                   *Progress towards Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s (PG&E)*  
14                   *procurement obligations as adopted in Decision (D.) 21-06-035,*  
15                   *D.19-11-016 and any subsequent decision(s) in Rulemaking (R.) 20-05-003,*  
16                   *or a successor proceeding, updating these requirements.*

17   **2. Introduction to the Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric**

18           The Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric (CEG Metric) directs PG&E  
19           to report on its progress towards the procurement obligations in the following  
20           California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) decisions:  
21           (1) D.19-11-016 and (2) D.21-06-035 (together, the Integrated Resource  
22           Planning (IRP) Decisions).<sup>1</sup>

23           In November 2019, the Commission issued D.19-11-016 in part to  
24           address near-term system reliability concerns beginning in 2021.  
25           D.19-11-016 requires incremental procurement of system-level resource  
26           adequacy (RA) capacity of 3,300 megawatts (MW) by all  
27           Commission-jurisdictional load serving entities (LSE).<sup>2</sup> In line with state

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1   See D.22-02-004 directing PG&E to make progress towards procuring a 95 MW four-hour energy storage project at the Kern-Lamont substation and a 50 MW 4-hour energy storage project at the Mesa substation, pp. 160-162; Ordering Paragraph (OP) 13 of D.22-02-004 exempts these energy storage projects from the Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric.

2   D.19-11-016, p. 34.

1 policy goals, the Commission also expressed a preference that LSEs pursue  
2 “preferred resources” such as new clean electricity capacity.<sup>3</sup> Of the  
3 3,300 MW procurement order, PG&E is directed to procure 716.9 MW of RA  
4 capacity on behalf of its bundled service customer portfolio with online dates  
5 between the years 2021-2023.<sup>4</sup>

6 D.19-11-016 also allowed each non-investor-owned utility (IOU) LSE an  
7 opportunity to “opt-out” of its procurement obligation and required  
8 notification to the Commission in February 2020 exercising this option. On  
9 April 15, 2020, the Commission issued a ruling increasing PG&E’s  
10 procurement obligation by 48.2 MW, totaling 765.1 MW, to account for LSEs  
11 that chose to opt-out of self-providing their required obligation.<sup>5</sup> Of the  
12 765.1 MW total, PG&E is required to procure 765.1 MW with the following  
13 online dates: 50 percent (382.6 MW) by August 1, 2021, 25 percent  
14 (191.3 MW) by August 1, 2022, and 25 percent (191.3 MW) by August 1,  
15 2023.<sup>6</sup>

16 Regarding the 48.2 MW, on July 29, 2022, PG&E filed supplemental  
17 Advice Letter (AL) 6654-E-A, discussing the fact that three “opt-out” LSEs  
18 ceased serving customers in California. As stated in AL 6654-E-A, PG&E  
19 consulted with the Commission’s Energy Division, and it was determined  
20 that the total opt-out MW for these LSEs was 1.2 MW. As set forth in  
21 D.22-05-015, in the event of an “LSE bankruptcy, or any other exit from the  
22 market,” any associated costs attributable to the opt-out procurement shall  
23 be allocated to the traditional cost allocation mechanism (CAM). While this  
24 may effectively reduce PG&E’s total procurement obligation by 1.2 MW,  
25 PG&E has not made an explicit adjustment to its total procurement  
26 obligation until/unless it has been directed to do so by the Commission.

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3 D.19-11-016, Conclusion of Law 22.

4 D.19-11-016, OP 3.

5 See Administrative Law Judge’s Ruling Finalizing Load Forecasts and GHG Benchmarks for Individual 2020 IRP Filings and Assigning Procurement Obligations Pursuant to D.19-11-016, issued on April 15, 2020, p. 11.

6 Due to rounding, numbers presented throughout this chapter may not add up precisely to the totals provided.

1 In June 2021, the Commission issued D.21-06-035 to address the  
 2 mid-term (period of 2023-2026) reliability needs of the electric grid and  
 3 further achieve the state’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction  
 4 targets. Accordingly, all of the 11,500 MW of incremental procurement  
 5 ordered in D.21-06-035 are to be zero-emitting, unless the resource would  
 6 otherwise qualify under California’s Renewables Portfolio Standard eligibility  
 7 requirements.<sup>7</sup> Of this total, PG&E is required to procure 2,302 MW with the  
 8 following online dates: 400 MW by August 1, 2023; 1,201 MW by June 1,  
 9 2024; 300 MW by June 1, 2025; and 400 MW by June 1, 2026. In addition,  
 10 D.21-06-035 also required that 900 MW (of PG&E’s 2,302 MW) have  
 11 specific operational characteristics to spur the development of long-duration  
 12 energy storage, increase the availability of firm energy, and serve as  
 13 replacement capacity for the retiring Diablo Canyon Power Plant.<sup>8</sup>

14 In aggregate, the total amount of procurement ordered upon PG&E in  
 15 the IRP Decisions is 3,067.1 MW with online dates between 2021-2026.  
 16 Table 1 outlines PG&E’s procurement obligation for each year.

**TABLE 5.1-1  
 PG&E’S TOTAL PROCUREMENT OBLIGATION PURSUANT TO THE IRP DECISIONS  
 (PRESENTED AS MW OF NET QUALIFYING CAPACITY (NQC))**

Line No.	Online Date	D.19-11-016	D.21-06-035	Total
1	8/1/2021	382.6		382.6
2	8/1/2022	191.3		191.3
3	8/1/2023	191.3	400	591.3
4	6/1/2024		1,201	1,201
5	6/1/2025		300	300
6	6/1/2026		400	400
7	Total	765.1	2,302	3,067.1

17 **3. Background on Net Qualifying Capacity**

18 For the purpose of assessing whether an LSE’s procurement obligation  
 19 has been met in accordance with the IRP Decisions, the Commission uses

---

7 D.21-06-035, OP 1.

8 *Id.*, p. 35; See also D.21-06-035, p. 56 requiring PG&E to procure 500 MW of zero-emitting resources by June 1, 2025, and 400 MW of long lead-time resources by June 1, 2026.

1 capacity counting rules based on the Commission’s RA program and the  
 2 results of effective load carrying capability (ELCC) modeling by consultants  
 3 E3 and Astrapé.<sup>9</sup> The counting rules are generally expressed as  
 4 a percentage that is applied to the nameplate capacity of the procured  
 5 resource. For example, a 4-hour energy storage resource with a nameplate  
 6 capacity of 100 MW can count 90.7 MW towards an LSE’s 2024 requirement  
 7 (100 MW \* 90.7 percent ELCC = 90.7 MW of NQC). PG&E’s procurement  
 8 progress herein is presented as MW of NQC based on the applicable  
 9 counting rules and guidance provided by the Commission.<sup>10</sup>

10 **B. (5.1) Metric Performance**

11 **1. Historical Data**

12 Pursuant to the IRP Decisions, procurement obligations began in 2021.  
 13 The projects pertaining to PG&E’s online date requirement of August 1,  
 14 2021 have all achieved commercial operation. PG&E’s next online date  
 15 requirement is for August 1, 2022. However, pursuant to the Commission’s  
 16 direction to only include historical data from January through June 2022 in  
 17 this September filing, PG&E is not including historical data towards the  
 18 August 1, 2022 online date requirement in the historical data table below.<sup>11</sup>

**TABLE 5.1-2  
 PG&E’S HISTORICAL METRIC PERFORMANCE (MW OF NQC)**


Line No.	Online Date	Total Procurement Obligation	Actual Procured Capacity
1	8/1/2021	382.6	418.2

<sup>9</sup> D.21-06-035, p. 71.

<sup>10</sup> See the Incremental ELCC Study for Mid-Term Reliability Procurement, pp. 8-9 at: [https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/20211022\\_irp\\_e3\\_astrape\\_incremental\\_elcc\\_study\\_updated.pdf](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/20211022_irp_e3_astrape_incremental_elcc_study_updated.pdf); See also the Staff Memo on Incremental ELCC to be Used for Mid-Term Reliability Procurement at: [https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/20211022\\_irp\\_mtr\\_elccs\\_staff\\_transmittal\\_memo.pdf](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/20211022_irp_mtr_elccs_staff_transmittal_memo.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> D.21-11-009, p. 59.

FIGURE 5.1-1  
PG&E'S HISTORICAL METRIC PERFORMANCE (MW OF NQC)



1 PG&E relies upon three main sources of available data to monitor its  
2 procurement progress of the IRP Decisions: (1) the baseline list of  
3 resources used to establish the procurement targets, (2) Commission rules  
4 and guidance on determining the MW of NQC, and (3) PG&E's internal  
5 database containing all of its energy procurement contracts approved by the  
6 Commission.

7 1) Baseline List of Resources: In establishing the procurement targets in  
8 the IRP Decisions, the Commission established baseline assumptions of  
9 resources available to meet system reliability needs. LSEs must  
10 demonstrate that the MW of NQC of the procured resource, new and/or  
11 existing, are incremental to the Commission's baseline assumptions.<sup>12</sup>  
12 PG&E uses this information to ensure resources are eligible to count  
13 towards its procurement obligations.

<sup>12</sup> See the Commission's baseline assumptions at:  
<https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/SearchRes.aspx?DocFormat=ALL&DocID=323767159>  
(D.19-11-016) and [https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltp/d2106035\\_baseline\\_gen\\_list\\_20220902.xlsx](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltp/d2106035_baseline_gen_list_20220902.xlsx) (D.21-06-035).

- 1           2) Commission Rules and Guidance on MW of NQC: As described above,  
2           the amount of MW of NQC that can be used to count towards an LSE's  
3           procurement obligation is based on the Commission's rules and  
4           guidance. PG&E uses this information to determine the amount of MW  
5           of NQC that is eligible to count towards its procurement obligations.
- 6           3) PG&E's Internal Database: This database contains PG&E's energy  
7           procurement contracts approved by the Commission, including  
8           procurement contracts to meet PG&E's procurement obligations from  
9           the IRP Decisions. The data contained in this database is consistent  
10          with the procurement contracts and respective ALs filed for Commission  
11          approval.

## 12       **2. Data Collection Methodology**

13           As described above, PG&E uses the baseline list of resources and the  
14          Commission's rules and guidance on MW of NQC to monitor its  
15          procurement progress.<sup>13</sup>

16           In addition, PG&E has internally categorized the 1.2 MW associated with  
17          the three "opt-out" LSEs as "inactive" for purposes of monitoring its progress  
18          towards its total procurement obligation as directed under the IRP  
19          Decisions.<sup>14</sup> This allows PG&E to appropriately account for the 1.2 MW of  
20          opt-out procurement that is authorized for cost recovery under the traditional  
21          CAM as set forth in D.22-05-015. While this may effectively reduce PG&E's  
22          total procurement obligation by 1.2 MW, PG&E has not made an explicit  
23          adjustment to its total procurement obligation until/unless it has been  
24          directed to do so by the Commission.

## 25       **3. Metric Performance for Reporting Period**

26           As outlined in Table 5.1-3 below, PG&E has procured sufficient  
27          incremental MW of NQC to exceed its procurement obligations pursuant to  
28          D.19-11-016.<sup>15</sup> PG&E notes that the Commission stated that procurement:

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13   See the information maintained by the Commission at:  
<https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-power-procurement/long-term-procurement-planning/more-information-on-authorizing-procurement/irp-procurement-track>.

14   PG&E's AL 6654-E-A, pp. 9-10.

15   PG&E's AL 5826-E and 6033-E.

1 ...amounts [that] are in excess of [an] LSE's obligation under  
2 D.19-11-016...may be counted toward the capacity requirements [in  
3 D.21-06-035] if they otherwise qualify.<sup>16</sup>

4 Moreover, D.21-06-035 stated that the Commission:

5 ...will allow LSEs to show procurement that they have conducted to  
6 support the Commission's orders or requirements in the context of the  
7 RPS program, as well as for emergency reliability purposes in  
8 R.20-11-003, as compliance toward the requirements herein.<sup>17</sup>

9 Accordingly, PG&E estimates that approximately 270 MW of NQC of its  
10 procurement from both D.19-11-016 and R.20-11-003 that have been  
11 approved by the Commission may be applied towards its procurement  
12 obligations from D.21-06-035.<sup>18</sup>

13 On January 21, 2022, PG&E filed AL 6477-E requesting Commission  
14 approval of nine agreements resulting from PG&E's Mid-Term Reliability  
15 Phase 1 solicitation to meet its procurement obligations from D.21-06-035.  
16 These agreements total 1,434 MW of NQC and have been approved by the  
17 Commission.<sup>19</sup>

18 Collectively, and as outlined in Table 5.1-3 below, PG&E has made  
19 steady progress towards achieving its procurement obligations from  
20 D.21-06-035. As stated above, D.21-06-035 required that 900 MW of NQC  
21 (of PG&E's 2,302 MW of NQC) have specific operational characteristics.  
22 Specifically, PG&E has been directed to procure 500 MW of NQC of  
23 zero-emitting resources by June 1, 2025 and 400 MW of NQC of long  
24 lead-time (LLT) resources by June 1, 2026.<sup>20</sup> PG&E issued its Phase 2  
25 solicitation in Spring 2022 seeking to satisfy its remaining procurement  
26 obligations to procure 500 MW of NQC of zero-emitting resources by  
27 June 1, 2025 and 400 MW of NQC of LLT resources by June 1, 2026.

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**16** D.21-06-035, p. 80.

**17** *Id.*

**18** PG&E's AL 6289-E.

**19** On April 21, 2022, the Commission adopted Resolution E-5202 approving the nine agreements without modification as filed in PG&E's AL 6477-E.

**20** The LLT resources are comprised of: (1) firm zero-emitting generation with a capacity factor of at least 80 percent and (2) long-duration storage resources defined as having at least eight hours of duration.



1 **C. (5.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target Since Last Report**

3 *There have been no changes to the 1-year or 5-year targets.*

4 **2. Target Methodology**

5 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
6 following factors:

- 7 • Historical Data and Trends: One year of historical data;
- 8 • Benchmarking: Not applicable;
- 9 • Regulatory Requirements: The targets are set to match the cumulative  
10 procurement obligations set forth in Commission decisions;
- 11 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- 12 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and  
13 Enforcement: Yes; and
- 14 • Other Considerations:
  - 15 – The target approach was established to meet the current  
16 Commission procurement obligations. PG&E’s procurement  
17 obligation may increase if other LSEs fail to meet their procurement  
18 obligations and PG&E is required to procure on their behalf;<sup>21</sup>
  - 19 – The ability for procured capacity to actually come online by  
20 established contractual online dates can be impacted by external  
21 factors, as has occurred recently due to impacts of the COVID-19  
22 pandemic, supply chain disruptions and the Department of  
23 Commerce’s investigation into potential solar module tariff  
24 circumvention; and
  - 25 – LSEs may request an extension of procurement obligations for LLT  
26 resources to June 1, 2028.

27 **3. 2022 Target**

28 The 1-year target for the CEG Metric is to procure an incremental  
29 574 MW of NQC with online dates by August 1, 2022, which is equal to the  
30 cumulative procurement obligations for 2021 and 2022 as outlined in  
31 Table 5.1-1.

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21 D.19-11-016, p. 67.

1       **4. 2026 Target**

2               The 5-year target for the CEG Metric is to procure an incremental  
3       3,067.1 MW of NQC with online dates by June 1, 2026, which is equal to the  
4       cumulative procurement obligations for 2021-2026 as outlined in  
5       Table 5.1-1. The IRP Decisions allow for the possibility of PG&E to be  
6       ordered by the Commission to perform backstop procurement on behalf of  
7       non-IOU LSEs, which could increase the 5-year target in the future. Further,  
8       D.21-06-035 allows an extension for LLT resources to come online up to  
9       June 1, 2028, if that LSE demonstrates good faith efforts.<sup>22</sup> For purposes of  
10      the 5-year target, PG&E is not making any assumptions on these specific  
11      items and is basing its 5-year target solely on its procurement obligations in  
12      the IRP Decisions (e.g., June 1, 2026).

13      **D. (5.1) Performance Against Target**

14              **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

15               PG&E has contracts with 9 energy storage resources in its portfolio,  
16      totaling 585.2 MW of NQC that are eligible to count towards its 1-year  
17      target.<sup>23</sup> The total of this procurement, as originally secured, is sufficient to  
18      exceed the 1-year target for 2022 of 574 MW of NQC. However, recent and  
19      ongoing events have created challenges to ensuring that the totality of this  
20      procurement continues to come online by the contractual online dates.<sup>24</sup>

21               For example, on July 20, 2022, PG&E filed AL 6658-E, requesting  
22      approval of contract amendments for the AMCOR and the North Central  
23      Valley projects after each developer described external barriers to

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22      D.21-06-035, OP 5.

23      On May 18, 2020, PG&E filed AL 5826-E requesting Commission approval of seven agreements to meet its 2021 procurement targets from D.19-11-016. On December 22, 2020, PG&E filed AL 6033-E requesting Commission approval of six agreements to meet its 2022 and 2023 procurement targets from D.19-11-016. The Commission approved these ALs in Res. E-5100 (August 27, 2020) and Res. E-5140 (April 15, 2021), respectively.

24      On July 25, 2022, PG&E submitted a notification letter to the Commission (“Notification Regarding Delay of Projects Approved Under D.19-11-016”) informing the Commission of additional Force Majeure notices received from certain developers indicating that not all projects will be online by August 1, 2022. Project development delays continue due to impacts of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and supply chain disruptions that are preventing the completion of projects.

1 completing their projects in line with their existing contract obligations.<sup>25</sup>  
2 PG&E engaged in negotiations with each developer, which ultimately  
3 concluded with an executed amendment to their contracts. Nexus  
4 Renewables, the developer of the AMCOR project, described challenges  
5 such as unexpected difficulties acquiring sufficient customers to support the  
6 behind-the-meter project. This contract was originally secured to come  
7 online by August 1, 2022, with 27 MW of NQC to meet the 1-year target of  
8 574 MW of NQC. In PG&E's AL 6658-E, PG&E requested Commission  
9 approval of a contract amendment to move the online date from August 1,  
10 2022, to August 1, 2023, and to reduce the capacity from 27 MW of NQC to  
11 10 MW of NQC. This contract amendment, if approved by the Commission,  
12 will not impact PG&E's ability to meet its total procurement obligation and  
13 PG&E will remain in compliance with the 1-year target of 574 MW of NQC in  
14 2022.<sup>26</sup>

## 15 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

16 PG&E has contracts with 25 energy storage resources and  
17 1 behind-the-meter resource in its portfolio, totaling 2,274 MW of NQC from  
18 26 resources that are eligible to count towards its 5-year target.<sup>27</sup> However,  
19 only 2,167.1 MW of NQC from these contracts will be counted towards its  
20 5-year target of 3,067.1 MW.<sup>28</sup> This is because PG&E has yet to procure  
21 contracts for 900 MW of NQC with specific operational characteristics as  
22 outlined above.

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**25** On July 20, 2022, PG&E filed AL 6658-E requesting contract amendments to the Nexus Renewables (AMCOR) and NextEra Energy Resources Development (North Central Valley) projects. PG&E has requested that the Commission issue a final resolution to approve this Tier 3 advice letter filing by October 6, 2022.

**26** On August 31, 2022, the Commission issued Draft Resolution E-5231 approving the contract amendments without modification as filed in PG&E's AL 6658-E. The Commission is expected to vote on the Resolution in October 2022. When the Commission votes on a Resolution, it may adopt all or part of it as written, amend, modify or set it aside and prepare a different Resolution. Only when the Commission acts does the Resolution become binding.

**27** On August 6, 2021, PG&E filed AL 6289-E requesting Commission approval of four agreements to meet procurement targets from R.20-11-003. The Commission approved these agreements in a non-standard disposition letter on August 26, 2021.


**28** Some of this capacity procured is in excess of what is needed strictly for compliance with the IRP Decisions and will be used toward summer reliability in 2023 and beyond.

1 PG&E notes, and as outlined above, that it submitted AL 6658-E for  
2 Commission approval with regards to contract amendments. The North  
3 Central Valley project is expected to be online by August 1, 2023, as  
4 originally secured. This contract amendment would not alter the online date  
5 or MW amount but increases the agreement's price due to numerous  
6 external factors cited by the developer affecting the viability of the project.  
7 These reasons include significant increases in component prices, continued  
8 supply chain constraints, and industry-wide inflation on total project costs.  
9 The developer informed PG&E that if a price increase was not possible, it  
10 would be unable to develop the project and terminate the agreement. PG&E  
11 has requested an expedited approval from the Commission of this contract  
12 amendment to ensure that this project is able to continue development, in  
13 order to ensure its contribution to system reliability. PG&E notes additional  
14 contracted projects may be facing similar challenges due to increases in  
15 component prices, supply chain constraints, industry-wide inflation, and  
16 interconnection delays.<sup>29</sup> PG&E will continue to work with developers and  
17 the Commission to address these challenges in order to meet the 5-year  
18 target in support of the state's reliability needs.

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<sup>29</sup> These challenges have been recognized by Energy Division Staff in the July 2022 Review of IRP February 2022 Filings.

**FIGURE 5.1-2  
PG&E'S CLEAN ENERGY GOAL HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS (MW OF NQC)**



1 **E. (5.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2 Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to  
3 performance and their description of that tie.

- 4 • Solicitation: As noted above, PG&E launched the Mid-Term Reliability  
5 Phase 2 solicitation in April 2022 seeking to satisfy its remaining  
6 procurement obligations under the IRP Decisions, specifically to procure  
7 500 MW of NQC of zero-emitting resources by June 1, 2025, and 400 MW  
8 of NQC of LLT resources by June 1, 2026. This solicitation is scheduled for  
9 completion in Q1 2023.
- 10 • Extension Request: D.21-06-035 outlines that LSEs may submit a request to  
11 extend the online date requirement for LLT resources from June 1, 2026, to  
12 June 1, 2028, if the LSE demonstrates good faith efforts by February 1,  
13 2023, to procure the required resources. At this time, PG&E expects to  
14 submit an extension request pursuant to D.21-06-035.

**TABLE 5.1-3  
PROGRESS TOWARDS PG&E'S CUMULATIVE PROCUREMENT OBLIGATION,  
PURSUANT TO THE IRP DECISIONS (PRESENTED AS MW OF NQC)**

Line No.	Description	8/1/2021	8/1/2022	8/1/2023	6/1/2024	6/1/2025	6/1/2026
1	<u>D.19-11-016 – Total Procurement Obligation</u>						
2	Total Procurement Obligation	382.6	573.8	765.1			
3	Incremental NQC Procured by PG&E <sup>(a)</sup>	<u>418.2</u>	<u>585.2</u>	<u>788.2</u>			
4	Excess/(Remaining)	35.7	11.4	23.1			
5	<u>D.21-06-035 – Total Procurement Obligation</u>						
6	Total Procurement Obligation			400	1,601		
7	Incremental NQC Procured by PG&E			<u>758.6</u>	<u>1,601</u>		
8	Excess/(Remaining)			358.6 <sup>(b)</sup>	–		
9	<u>D.21-06-035 – Zero-Emitting Resources</u>						
10	Zero-Emitting Resources					500	
11	Incremental NQC Procured by PG&E					<u>–</u>	
12	Excess/(Remaining)					(500)	
13	<u>D.21-06-035 – LLT Resources</u>						
14	LLT Resources						400
15	Incremental NQC Procured by PG&E						<u>–</u>
16	Excess/(Remaining)						(400)

(a) The excess capacity from 2021 will be counted towards the 2022 and 2023 targets.

(b) The excess capacity from 2023 will be counted towards the 2024 target.

**PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
**CHAPTER 6.1**  
**SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
**QUALITY OF SERVICE**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY  
CHAPTER 6.1  
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:  
QUALITY OF SERVICE

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1                                   **PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY**  
2   **CHAPTER 6.1**  
3                                   **SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:**  
4   **QUALITY OF SERVICE**

5           The material updates to this chapter since the April 1, 2022, report can be found  
6           in Section B.3 concerning metric performance; C.1 concerning metric targets; and  
7           Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior  
8           report are identified in blue font.

9   **A. (6.1) Overview**

10           Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 6.1 – The Quality of Service Metric  
11           which is defined as:

12           *The Average Speed of Answer (ASA) for Emergencies metric is a safety*  
13           *measure related to multiple risks, as well as quality of service and management*  
14           *measure, and is defined as follows: ASA in seconds for Emergencies calls*  
15           *handled in Contact Center Operations (CCO).<sup>1</sup> The metric is calculated daily for*  
16           *weekly, monthly, and yearly reporting.*

17   **1. Introduction of Metric**

18           A call is classified as an emergency when a caller selects the option of  
19           an emergency or hazard situation through the Interactive Voice Response  
20           (IVR) system. Once this option is selected the call is routed to an agent to  
21           receive the highest priority attention possible.

22           Not only is Emergency ASA a quality measurement of how efficiently we  
23           are able to answer customers calling us to report an emergency, it is also a  
24           safety measurement. Answering the call is the first step ensuring the  
25           customer is safe.

26           The metric is calculated by determining the average amount of time it  
27           took to connect customers to a service representative for calls where the  
28           customer identifies via IVR that they are calling to report a hazardous or  
29           emergency situation, such as a suspected natural gas leak or downed  
30           power line.

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1   D.21-11-019, Appendix A, p. 12.

1       **2. Background**

2               On an annual basis, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) handles  
3               between 5 to 6 million customer calls. Between 2017 and 2021,  
4               emergency-related calls averaged nine percent of total call volume;  
5               however, in the last two years, emergencies calls have increased due to  
6               weather related storms events, Rotating outages, Public Safety Shutoffs  
7               (PSPS), and Enhanced Power Safety Settings (EPSS). In 2020 and 2021  
8               emergency calls handled were 10 percent and 11 percent of total call  
9               volume, respectively.

10              Historically, PG&E has been able to successfully manage staffing needs  
11              to ensure emergency calls are answered quickly. The metric and  
12              associated targets are designed to maintain our performance.

13       **B. (6.1) Metric Performance**

14       **1. Historical Data (2015 – June 2022)**

15              PG&E has seven years of historical data representing 2015-06/2022 to  
16              include the total emergency calls handled and ASA by month.

17              The historical data for this metric provided with this report provides total  
18              emergency calls handled and the ASA performance by month and year.

19       **2. Data Collection Methodology**

20              The performance data is gathered from PG&E’s telephony system,  
21              Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise (UCCE). The data includes the  
22              number of emergency calls handled, and the total wait times (in seconds).  
23              Data is compiled each day for daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly reporting.

24              Historical data is collected using Microsoft’s Management Studio  
25              application via a Structured Query Language (SQL) server owned by the  
26              Workforce Management Reporting team.


27              The data is gathered by extracting summarized data for emergency  
28              specific call types. The call types are created by the Workforce  
29              Management Routing Team, to categorize the types of calls that are  
30              entering the phone system, Cisco UCCE.

31              PG&E began archiving historical call data in 2015 once it was identified  
32              that Cisco UCCE system was truncating historical data as it was running out  
33              of storage.

1 **3. Metric Performance for Reporting Period**


2 Between 2015 and June of 2022, the performance of Emergency ASA  
3 ranged between eight and 10 seconds, with a median performance of  
4 eight seconds (see Figure 6.1-1). In 2019, PG&E’s call handle time was  
5 highest (10 seconds) primarily due to the increased scope of PSPS events,  
6 and the website failure, in the fall of 2019.

**FIGURE 6.1-1  
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE OF EMERGENCY ASA BETWEEN 2015 AND JUNE 2022**



7 Currently in 2022, the Emergency ASA performance is seven seconds  
8 as of June. Throughout the year, monthly performance ranged between  
9 five seconds and ten seconds (see Figure 6.1-2). The primary drivers to the  
10 performance were based on unanticipated incidents (e.g., weather incidents  
11 impacting power outages, unplanned power outages) and call center  
12 representative staffing availability.

FIGURE 6.1-2  
MONTHLY PERFORMANCE OF EMERGENCY ASA BETWEEN JAN AND JUNE 2022



1 **C. (6.1) 1 Year Target and 5 Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 [There are no changes to the one- or five-year targets.](#)

4 **2. Target Methodology**

5 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the  
6 following factors:

- 7 • Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the  
8 past four years of historical data. The past four years were used  
9 because they are most consistent with current operation practices,  
10 including the expansion of PSPS, EPSS and Rotating outage programs.  
11 The average of this period is used as a reasonable indicator for  
12 sustaining and maintaining the performance going forward;
- 13 • Benchmarking: Not available;
- 14 • Regulatory Requirements: None;
- 15 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes, performance at or  
16 below the set target is sustainable; and
- 17 • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

1       **3. 2022 Target**

2               The 2022 target is at 15 seconds for the year to maintain performance  
3               based on the factors described above.

4       **4. 2026 Target**

5               The 2026 target is 15 seconds for the year to maintain performance  
6               based on the factors described above.

7       **D. (6.1) Performance Against Target**

8               **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

9                       As demonstrated in figure 6.1-2 above, PG&E saw an average  
10                      performance of 7 seconds a month for the first half of 2022, which is  
11                      consistent with the Company's 1-year target.

12              **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

13                      As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has implemented a number of  
14                      processes to maintain longer-term performance of this metric to meet the  
15                      Company's 5-year performance target.

16       **E. (6.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

17               The performance of this metric is significantly driven by Contact Center  
18               Representative resourcing. The CCO are staffed to handle forecasted volume  
19               based on historical trends. As staffing needs change due to upcoming events  
20               (e.g., PSPS, weather impacts, storm or heat-related outages) overtime is offered  
21               and planned in advance to increase staffing needs. Mandatory overtime  
22               (employees are required to stay on shift) and Emergency overtime (PG&E's  
23               Workforce Management team will send out notifications to offer Emergency  
24               overtime to employees currently not on shift.) are available options during  
25               same-day operations to support additional staffing needs. PG&E is forecasting  
26               to maintain the current level of staffing for 2022-2026.

27               Additionally, upfront messages provided to customers via IVR can be used  
28               to advise customers calling in of extended wait times to set expectations for  
29               customers to call back unless there is an emergency.